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Hackers Are Hiding Espionage Infrastructure Inside Ordinary-Looking Casino Websites
Infoblox links China-aligned APT PeckBirdy C2 infrastructure hidden in casino and adult websites targeting Asian government, finance, IT, and education sectors.
Infoblox researchers report that China-aligned APT groups have used casino and adult websites as cover for PeckBirdy, a JavaScript command-and-control framework active since 2023. The sites embed C2 servers, register service workers for persistence, and serve fake browser-update prompts delivering backdoors capable of running commands, stealing credentials, and providing remote access. Targeted sectors across Asia include education, IT, banking, financial services, and government. Just over 3% of Infoblox enterprise customers resolved at least one PeckBirdy C2 domain, with detection coverage on VirusTotal ranging from 13 detections to none.
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One Attacker Has Scraped Both Salesforce and ServiceNow Portals Since 2025
Reco tracks the City Forum campaign: one Contabo VPS has scraped Salesforce and ServiceNow guest portals across finance, telecom and public sector since March 2025.
Reco researchers identified infrastructure at 158.220.87.79, a Contabo VPS using Go's default net/http user agent, that has harvested records from Salesforce Experience Cloud and ServiceNow customer portals across telecom, financial services, enterprise software and public sector targets for over a year. The tool abuses over-privileged persistent guest users, enumerating Salesforce Aura sites (560,000+ events at one target), probing Lightning Web Runtime via the UI-API across API versions v56.0-v66.0, and hitting the poorly documented ServiceNow Service Portal search endpoint. No named victims or actor attribution yet, and activity is ongoing with rising volume. Defenders are advised to hunt the Go-http-client user agent and specific IP in Salesforce Event Monitoring logs and syslog_transaction on ServiceNow, then tighten guest sharing rules and Knowledge Base read criteria.
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Hackers abused Claude to extract secrets from 1.8M Android apps
Anthropic reports ShinyHunters, Midnight Blizzard, and GTG-10007 misused Claude to automate credential theft, malware operations, and espionage against dozens of victims.
Anthropic's threat report details how ShinyHunters member 'frkoo' ran a credential-harvesting pipeline on ten AWS EC2 workers that mass-downloaded and decompiled 1.8 million Android APKs, scanning for hardcoded secrets with TruffleHog. In one AI-assisted operation, an actor extracted 2,100+ Azure AD authentication tokens across more than 40 Microsoft tenants in roughly 34 hours, and ShinyHunters affiliates also stole AI API keys and breached a SaaS provider affecting about 200 downstream customers. Russian espionage group Midnight Blizzard used Claude Code skills to automate malware development, phishing, C2, and exfiltration against 20+ government and defense entities, rebuilding malware automatically when detected. Chinese-linked GTG-10007 ran autonomous vulnerability research that uncovered zero-days in a major endpoint security product and hit roughly 50 organizations with confirmed compromises; Anthropic disrupted the abuse and banned the accounts.
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China-Linked UNC3569 Exploited Sogou Input Method Flaw to Deploy GRAYRABBIT Backdoor
China-linked UNC3569 exploited a Sogou Input Method flaw to deploy GRAYRABBIT backdoor on Windows machines across East and Southeast Asia.
Gen Digital found that China-linked UNC3569, a hacker-for-hire group tracked by Google since 2021, exploited a flaw in Sogou Input Method's Windows sgbiz: link handler to reach a sandbox-disabled Chromium 80 build and exploit 2021's CVE-2021-38003 for code execution. The chain delivered GRAYRABBIT, a remote shell backdoor capable of file transfer and module loading, via a 7-Zip DLL sideloading trick gated on process count. Tencent fixed the handler flaw in April 2026 but the embedded browser remains outdated. Sogou has over 455 million monthly users and roughly 70% share of Chinese input methods.
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Hackers Use Claude and GPT-Powered Tools to Help Breach Government and Financial Networks
Unit 42 links two Latin America campaigns where operators used Claude and GPT-4.1 during intrusions against government and financial targets.
Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 identified two activity clusters, CL-CRI-1131 and CL-CRI-1163, tied by shared SOCKS5 relay infrastructure and use of large language models during operations. The Mexican cluster targeted a transportation organization, federal ministries and water utilities in Mexico and Ecuador, while the Brazilian cluster used resume-themed phishing, custom remote-access Trojans and SockTz SOCKS5 tunneling against financial organizations. An exposed self-hosted NextChat interface on attacker infrastructure led researchers to assess operators used Claude and GPT-4.1 to generate workaround scripts and troubleshoot execution failures. Unit 42 noted AI reduced time needed to troubleshoot intrusions after initial access, rather than replacing the attacker.
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Slim Spider Steals Crypto Custody Secrets From Brazilian Financial Institution
CrowdStrike links previously unseen Slim Spider group to crypto custody secret theft at Brazilian financial institutions since March 2026.
CrowdStrike is tracking Slim Spider, a previously undocumented financially motivated group attacking Brazilian financial institutions since at least March 2026. The actor used custom Bash scripts to steal temporary cloud credentials, exfiltrated digital asset custody secrets, and used Foundry's cast tool to derive Ethereum wallet addresses, while deploying Go-based backdoor MikeDor and an implant impersonating Brazil's SPI instant payment infrastructure. Slim Spider also pivoted to Azure DevOps and Kubernetes clusters and used panels including NEXUS // Scanner, Painel de Emails Entra ID, and Painel Pix for reconnaissance and unauthorized Pix transfers. Separately, Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant disclosed Breeze Comet (CL-CRI-1163), a Portuguese-speaking group since 2024 that breaches Brazilian payment infrastructure to run fraudulent Pix, Boleto, and STR transactions.
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IT help-desk vishing tricks executives into handing over Microsoft 365 access
Arctic Wolf tracks PREY-0058 (linked to UNC6671), a vishing campaign stealing Microsoft 365 session tokens via AiTM panels for SaaS data theft and extortion.
Arctic Wolf is tracking a campaign, PREY-0058, sharing tradecraft with Google Threat Intelligence Group's UNC6671, in which callers posing as internal IT talk employees through fake passkey/MFA setups. Operator-controlled adversary-in-the-middle pages harvest passwords and MFA approvals to seize session tokens, then actors enumerate and bulk-exfiltrate data from SharePoint, OneDrive, Exchange, and Box. Extortion brands include BlackFile, Pink, Helix, Cinder, and Redact; targets are mostly US-based executives in construction, healthcare, real estate, finance, and professional services, with exfiltration shifting to residential proxies like NodeMaven.
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Fake IT Calls Target Executives in Microsoft 365 Data Theft and Extortion Attacks
Arctic Wolf tracks PREY-0058, a vishing and AitM token-theft crew targeting Microsoft 365 executives for data theft and extortion.
Arctic Wolf disclosed a widespread data theft and extortion cluster, PREY-0058, which overlaps with Mandiant's UNC6671 and possibly the Pink/Cinder extortion groups. Attackers impersonate IT help desk staff by phone, direct executives to authentication-themed lure domains, and run adversary-in-the-middle Microsoft 365 logins to harvest credentials, MFA approvals, and session tokens replayed via residential proxies such as NodeMaven. After access, they run discovery in SharePoint and Entra ID, then bulk-exfiltrate data from SharePoint, OneDrive, Exchange, and Box before sending extortion demands. Targets are primarily US construction, healthcare, real estate, finance, and professional services organizations.
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Philippine Nuclear and Naval Targets Hit by Suspected Chinese Operator
Suspected Chinese-speaking operator breached Philippine nuclear research and naval supplier systems via ownCloud CVE-2023-49103 and WordPress CVE-2024-28000.
Hunt.io found an exposed staging server containing custom Python scripts, logs, and stolen data documenting intrusions against a Philippine nuclear research body and a marine engineering company serving the Philippine Navy. The actor exploited an ownCloud authentication bypass (CVE-2023-49103) using empty-secret pre-signed WebDAV URLs and a LiteSpeed Cache plugin flaw (CVE-2024-28000) to gain WordPress admin access, also guessing passwords against XML-RPC with rockyou.txt. Roughly 9 GB was referenced as stolen from the nuclear agency, including reactor databases, radiation-safety records, and staff passport data; Simplified Chinese labels suggest a Chinese-speaking operator.
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Risky Bulletin: Slovakia finds Russian backdoor in traffic speed cameras
Slovakia's NBU found an SMS-triggered backdoor in Russian-made NERO R-ONE traffic cameras, pausing a 279-unit deployment.
Slovakia's national security service NBU issued an alert against NERO R-ONE high-speed traffic cameras after finding a backdoor that grants shell and network access via SMS from hardcoded Russian phone numbers. The cameras are a rebranded version of the Russian CORDON PRO.M model by St. Petersburg firm Semicon, purchased via a Cyprus shell company under a €30 million EU-funded project. The report also found SecureBoot disabled, vulnerable web management, and unauthenticated live streams; the Interior Ministry paused deployment of 279 cameras pending independent assessment.
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