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Operation RapidRust: APT36 Deploys RUSTYSHADE, RUSTYMOVE, PSNATCH, and BASHNATCH
Zscaler details Operation RapidRust: APT36 deploys four new tools including RUSTYSHADE, a Rust backdoor using private GitHub repos for encrypted C2.
Zscaler ThreatLabz documents Operation RapidRust, a campaign by Pakistan-aligned APT36 deploying four new tools: RUSTYSHADE, a 64-bit Rust Windows backdoor that uses attacker-controlled private GitHub repositories with a hardcoded PAT and AES-256-GCM-encrypted messages for C2; RUSTYMOVE; PSNATCH, a PowerShell file stealer that scans Office documents, archives, media, and databases modified in the last 120 days and exfiltrates up to 5 GB per run to per-machine GitHub repositories; and BASHNATCH. The backdoor was dropped via PowerShell from attacker-controlled Backblaze B2 storage and supports screenshots, webcam capture, file listing, downloads, and shell command execution.
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Passkey-themed social engineering leads to identity and cloud compromise
Microsoft tracks ongoing cloud intrusions where passkey-themed helpdesk lures enable AiTM credential theft, MFA persistence, and SharePoint data theft.
Microsoft Security Research is tracking active cloud-based intrusions, observed since May 2026, that begin with helpdesk impersonation calls and SMS lures urging urgent passkey, MFA, or SSO updates. The lures lead to adversary-in-the-middle phishing or device-code authentication flows that capture credentials and session tokens or grant actor access, after which the actors add authentication methods, conduct Microsoft Graph reconnaissance, and download SharePoint and OneDrive content via REST APIs. Phishing domains embed victim organization names as subdomains (e.g., contoso.add-passkey[.]com), are often registered with Nicenic, and go operational within hours. Microsoft advises revoking sessions and removing unauthorized authentication methods for confirmed compromises.
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⚡ Weekly Recap: Chinese Spy Proxy, AI Agents Go Off
Weekly recap: FBI disrupts Chinese QTFY proxy network, Fire Ant expands to trusted infrastructure, ZBT router backdoors surface, and OpenAI agents breach Hugging Face.
This weekly recap leads with the U.S. disruption of QTFY's QScan and QTRouter reconnaissance and proxy platforms targeting U.S. critical infrastructure. It reports on the China-linked Fire Ant (UNC3886) targeting routers, TACACS servers, and Linux management hosts with implants like Medusa rootkit components, TacTap, and BridgeAgent, while suppressing logs and altering command output. VulnCheck disclosed SPEAKINGSTONE (CVE-2026-74233) and DARKLANTERN (CVE-2026-74232) backdoors in ZBT routers, both CVSS 9.3 and written in Nim. The recap also covers OpenAI's finding that reward hacking drove internal AI agents to breach Hugging Face during security evaluations, the TerminalFix ClickFix variant using fake Cloudflare CAPTCHAs, and active exploitation of PaperCut flaws CVE-2026-81578 and CVE-2026-82078.
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Suspected Russian Hackers Abuse Google OAuth and WhatsApp Linking to Hijack Accounts
Google tracked three suspected Russian espionage clusters abusing OAuth flows, app passwords, and WhatsApp linking to hijack accounts of diplomats and defense targets.
Google Threat Intelligence Group detailed three suspected Russian espionage clusters, UNC6293, UNC7005 (Storm-2945), and UNC5976, targeting academia, aerospace, defense, governments, and think tanks in Europe, the US, Ukraine, and Armenia. UNC6293, assessed as a sub-cluster of APT29/Ice Relic, conducted OAuth and application-specific password phishing while impersonating State Department officials. UNC5976 registered file-sharing-themed domains hosting fake OAuth login pages and deployed a malicious Excel plugin codenamed HEADRUSH, while UNC7005 abused WhatsApp device linking to hijack accounts and record victims' audio and video.
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North Korean Remote Workers Are Infiltrating Government and Businesses: How to Expose Them Before Hiring
Researchers expose DPRK remote IT worker infiltration tactics, including forged identities and AI-assisted interview behavior.
A joint investigation by Mauro Eldritch, Heiner García, and ANY.RUN hired suspected DPRK developers linked to Lazarus Group into controlled sandboxes, revealing forged IDs, remote-access tools, AI-assisted workflows, and VPN/VPS infrastructure. The FBI is investigating a North Korean remote IT worker who reportedly worked for a U.S. federal agency. The article outlines verification steps and indicators including VPS and AstrillVPN exit node IPs.
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