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CVE-2026-91752: GNU libextractor < 1.15 Stack Overflow via OLE2

GNU libextractor before 1.15 has a stack-based buffer overflow (CVE-2026-91752) in its OLE2 parser, triggerable via crafted files.

A stack-based buffer overflow was identified in GNU libextractor's OLE2 plugin in versions prior to 1.15, assigned CVE-2026-91752. The flaw resides in the process_star_office function, which sizes a variable-length stack array using attacker-controlled OLE2 stream data. Attackers can craft malicious OLE2/StarOffice files to trigger the overflow. The issue was disclosed on the oss-security mailing list by researcher Haitam Lazaar on September 16, 2026.

oss-security · 2h agoVulnerability 2 sourcesCVE-2026-91752

The GNU C Library security advisories update for 2026-09-14

glibc advisory GLIBC-SA-2026-0017 discloses a buffer overflow in strfmon/strfmon_l affecting versions 2.38 through 2.44.

The GNU C Library published security advisories including GLIBC-SA-2026-0017, a buffer overflow in strfmon and strfmon_l. Calling these functions with right-justified width padding conversions can write past the end of the caller-supplied output buffer in glibc 2.38 to 2.44. Exploitation requires an application code path that calls strfmon with attacker-influenced parameters.

oss-security · 2d agoVulnerability 2 sources1

GNU GRUB 2.14: serial-MMIO lockdown bypass in Canonical-signed gcdx64.efi

Canonical-signed GRUB2 serial command accepts arbitrary MMIO addresses, letting local attackers with grub.cfg control bypass Secure Boot lockdown.

A vulnerability in Canonical's grub-efi-amd64-signed (gcdx64.efi, GRUB 2.14) exposes a serial command that accepts a caller-supplied 64-bit MMIO base address. The lockdown path does not restrict this command even when lockdown=y under UEFI Secure Boot, and the serial implementation does not validate that the requested register span belongs to a real UART rather than ordinary RAM. A local attacker with control of GRUB's boot configuration can abuse this to bypass the Secure Boot lockdown.

oss-security · 3d agoVulnerability2