CVE-2026-57967: Apache Artemis, Apache ActiveMQ Artemis: Missing authentication on CORE protocol session reattachment
CVE-2026-57967: unauthenticated attackers can hijack authenticated ActiveMQ Artemis sessions via crafted CORE protocol SESSION_REATTACH packets.
An unauthenticated remote attacker can craft a CORE protocol SESSION_REATTACH packet to steal an existing session and assume ongoing execution of the previously authenticated session on Apache Artemis and ActiveMQ Artemis. Affected versions are artemis-server 2.50.0 through 2.56.0 in Apache Artemis and artemis-server 1.0.0 through 2.44.0 in Apache ActiveMQ Artemis. Apache rates the issue important.
CVE-2026-86462: Apache Airflow FAB provider: FAB Admin password PATCH does not invalidate database-backed sessions
Apache Airflow FAB provider 3.2.0-3.8.x password changes do not invalidate database-backed sessions, letting stolen session cookies survive a password reset.
CVE-2026-86462 affects apache-airflow-providers-fab versions 3.2.0 before 3.9.0. Changing a user's password via the Admin user-edit PATCH endpoint does not invalidate that user's existing database-backed sessions. An attacker who already holds a copy of the victim's session cookie retains full access as that user after the password change. Severity is rated moderate.
New Passkey Attacks Can Recover Synced Private Keys or Bypass Phishing
Three research teams showed passkey bypasses: WebAuthn assertion replay in Microsoft Entra ID, synced-passkey key recovery in Google Password Manager, and Windows Hello key reuse.
SpecterOps' Pass-the-Passkey research showed Windows stored past YubiKey signatures in cleartext and chained this with Microsoft Entra ID passkey validation weaknesses to impersonate privileged users despite phishing-resistant MFA; the Windows Event Logging Service issue is tracked as CVE-2026-34348 (CVSS 6.5) and fixed in July 2026 updates. Unit 42's Golden Pass-ta-key attack recovered the 32-byte Security Domain Secret protecting Google Password Manager synced passkeys from Chrome on Windows via pre-existing malware. Dirk-jan Mollema showed in-session malware can use a hardware-bound Windows Hello for Business key without a fresh PIN or biometric check. Microsoft applied Entra-side mitigations for the relay assertion issue; no real-world exploitation has been reported.