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New Passkey Attacks Can Recover Synced Private Keys or Bypass Phishing

Three research teams showed passkey bypasses: WebAuthn assertion replay in Microsoft Entra ID, synced-passkey key recovery in Google Password Manager, and Windows Hello key reuse.

SpecterOps' Pass-the-Passkey research showed Windows stored past YubiKey signatures in cleartext and chained this with Microsoft Entra ID passkey validation weaknesses to impersonate privileged users despite phishing-resistant MFA; the Windows Event Logging Service issue is tracked as CVE-2026-34348 (CVSS 6.5) and fixed in July 2026 updates. Unit 42's Golden Pass-ta-key attack recovered the 32-byte Security Domain Secret protecting Google Password Manager synced passkeys from Chrome on Windows via pre-existing malware. Dirk-jan Mollema showed in-session malware can use a hardware-bound Windows Hello for Business key without a fresh PIN or biometric check. Microsoft applied Entra-side mitigations for the relay assertion issue; no real-world exploitation has been reported.

The Hacker News · Aug 11, 2026VulnerabilityCVE-2026-34348

Apple iCloud Private Relay Can Expose Real IPs Through WebKit Proxy Bypasses

Researchers found WebKit features bypass proxies and iCloud Private Relay, leaking users' real IP addresses; Apple patched in iOS 26.6.1 and macOS 26.6.2.

Researchers Talal Haj Bakry and Tommy Mysk found that three WebKit features — DNS prefetching, WebAuthn Related Origin Requests, and WebTransport — bypass configured proxies and send traffic directly from the device. This leaks the user's real IP address in Safari and all WebKit-based iOS browsers and undermines iCloud Private Relay's dual-hop privacy design. Any website can trigger the leak via WebAuthn without user interaction or passkey use; a proof-of-concept site, leaks.psylo.app, demonstrates the issue. Apple investigated and patched the leaks in iOS 26.6.1 and macOS 26.6.2.

The Hacker News · 17d agoVulnerability

Skullcandy Dime 3 Bluetooth Flaw Lets Nearby Attackers Hijack Audio and Spy Through Microphone

Skullcandy Dime 3 earbuds on firmware 1.0.0.28 accept unauthenticated Bluetooth pairing via Airoha SDK flaw CVE-2025-20701, enabling audio hijack and microphone capture.

CERT/CC vulnerability note VU#859658 describes insecure Bluetooth Classic (BR/EDR) pairing on Skullcandy Dime 3 (model S2DCW) firmware 1.0.0.28, linked to CVE-2025-20701 in the Airoha Bluetooth audio SDK. The NoInputNoOutput I/O capability lets unknown nearby devices pair without pairing mode, PIN, passkey or user interaction, then bond and automatically reconnect. An attacker can hijack the A2DP audio session and access Hands-Free or Headset profiles to capture live microphone audio. Firmware 1.0.0.30 reportedly fixes the flaw, but the earbuds cannot be updated through the Skullcandy app, leaving current users without a consumer-accessible patch path.

VU#859658: Skullcandy Dime 3 wireless earbuds contain an unauthenticated Bluetooth pairing vulnerability

Skullcandy Dime 3 earbuds (CVE-2025-20701) accept Bluetooth pairings without owner consent, letting in-range attackers hijack audio or capture microphone; no firmware update path exists.

CERT/CC's VU#859658 describes CVE-2025-20701 in the Airoha Bluetooth audio SDK, present in Skullcandy Dime 3 (Model S2DCW) firmware 1.0.0.28. A direct Bluetooth Classic pairing request with no PIN or physical confirmation completes via NoInputNoOutput, adding the attacker's device as trusted. Attackers in radio range can hijack the A2DP audio session, access the Hands-Free/Headset profile, and capture live microphone audio. Firmware 1.0.0.30 contains the effective patch, but Skullcandy says the Dime 3 does not support app-based firmware updates, leaving existing units unpatchable.