Implementing a White-Box Undetectable Backdoor for Random Fourier Features
Researchers implement Goldwasser's CLWE-based undetectable backdoor for Random Fourier Features models in numpy/scipy, confirming practical realizability with no detectable differences from clean models.
The paper provides an end-to-end implementation of the Goldwasser et al. white-box undetectable backdoor for models trained with the Random Fourier Features algorithm, using only numpy and scipy. It derives two samplers for the core GP_d(b_k) distribution: a rejection-sampling proxy and an exact closed-form sampler verified against its analytic form. Statistical indistinguishability tests covering weight-space and functional black-box comparisons found no detectable difference between backdoored and clean models across sparsity ratios. The underlying lattice hardness reduction was not reproduced, and the work demonstrates the threat is realizable with commodity scientific-computing tools rather than specialized cryptographic infrastructure.
New DDRop Attack Breaks Intel TDX and AMD SEV-SNP Confidential Computing
DDRop uses a sub-$200 DDR5 interposer to drop memory writes, breaking Intel TDX and AMD SEV-SNP confidentiality guarantees.
Researchers at KU Leuven, ETH Zurich, Durham University, and Google will present DDRop at ACM CCS 2026, a first active interposer attack on DDR5 that silently drops memory writes so processors keep reading stale encrypted data, exploiting the missing freshness guarantee in Intel TDX, Intel Scalable SGX, and AMD SEV-SNP. On Intel TDX's default logical integrity mode it enabled reading victim VM memory, toggling debug mode, and forging remote attestation; AMD SEV-SNP was limited to copying pages between VMs. TDX's stronger cryptographic integrity blocks cross-VM attacks but likely not attestation forgery. The team will release board designs, firmware, and attack code on GitHub; no evidence of real-world use exists and no simple patch is available.
Security Vulnerability in a Voting System
A four-year-old vulnerability letting anyone recover ballot casting order was demonstrated with AI coding agents against Georgia's May 2026 primary data.
A previously disclosed vulnerability in ballot scanners used across 21 US states, including Georgia, allows recovery of the order in which ballots were cast. Nearly four years after the original disclosure, a researcher pointed AI coding agents at the vulnerability paper and used only public data — county early-voting lists and cast-vote record (CVR) files — to analyze voter behavior in Georgia's May 2026 primary. The demonstration required no access to voting machines, networks, source code, or non-public records.
Can your coding style predict whether your code is vulnerable?
University of Massachusetts Dartmouth researchers present VulStyle, a stylometry-based vulnerability detector that also exposes benchmark reliability problems.
VulStyle combines stylometric features with syntax-tree structure and source tokens, pre-trained on about 4.9 million functions across seven programming languages and fine-tuned on five vulnerability detection datasets. It beat token-only detectors on some benchmarks but its F1 drops sharply on DiverseVul, which the authors link to noisy labels inflating reported performance across popular datasets. The authors argue style-aware detection should be harder to evade but did not test this empirically, and they note that uniform LLM-generated code may strip away the individual developer style the model depends on.