PentestGPT: Open-source automated penetration testing agentic framework
Open-source PentestGPT runs autonomous LLM-driven penetration tests via Claude Code and Codex, with legacy human-in-the-loop mode supporting many providers.
PentestGPT, originally published at USENIX Security 2024 by Gelei Deng and colleagues, is an open-source framework that lets a large language model autonomously run penetration testing stages (recon, exploit, walkthrough) with no human in the loop, driving Claude Code or Codex CLIs. A legacy interactive mode uses three cooperating LLM sessions maintaining a Pentesting Task Tree and supports OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Gemini, DeepSeek, xAI, Qwen, Moonshot, and local models via Ollama. The tool sends anonymous telemetry to Langfuse by default, excluding command outputs, credentials, and flags, and is available free on GitHub.
Hackers build AI frameworks for widescale credential theft
Google GTIG details threat actors using autonomous multi-agent AI frameworks to automate attacks, including a six-hour credential-harvesting campaign and a 23,800-secret Recon panel.
Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG), drawing on Mandiant telemetry, reports threat actors are moving from AI coding assistants to autonomous multi-agent frameworks that automate vulnerability scanning, credential harvesting, troubleshooting, and IP rotation. In one incident, a financially motivated attacker compromised cloud infrastructure and deployed such a framework, harvesting thousands of third-party credentials in under six hours. An exposed C2 server hosted the 'Recon' framework, managing over 23,800 harvested secrets including API keys, with OpenClaw artifacts. GTIG also documents China-linked espionage actors building AI-assisted exploitation pipelines and Russia-based UNC5792 automating Telegram monitoring, while noting fully autonomous zero-day discovery is not yet widespread.
Hackers Deploy Agentic AI to Automate Exploitation and Mass Credential Harvesting
Google GTIG documents a financially motivated actor using a multi-agent AI framework to automate credential harvesting, compromising over 23,800 secrets within hours.
Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) documented a financially motivated actor that compromised an unnamed organization's cloud infrastructure and used a multi-agent AI framework to automate vulnerability scanning, credential harvesting, troubleshooting, and IP rotation. The operation went from planning to mass credential compromise in under six hours, harvesting more than 23,800 secrets including cloud and AI-service API keys via an exposed C2 dashboard called 'Recon'. The actor directed specialized agents using an AI coding chatbot and Markdown instruction files such as AGENTS.KNOWLEDGE.md and agentic_vuln_research.md. Google has not observed fully autonomous zero-day exploitation; the shift automates labor-intensive tasks like reconnaissance, account validation, and infrastructure management, sharply shrinking detection windows.
GTIG AI Threat Tracker: From Prompting to Autonomy – The Evolution of Adversarial AI
GTIG's Q2 2026 tracker shows adversaries adopting agentic AI workflows, including credential harvesting in under six hours and supply chain attacks by UNC6780.
Google Threat Intelligence Group's Q2 2026 report documents adversaries moving from basic prompting to agentic AI workflows and automation, including a cloud compromise followed by agent-enabled mass credential harvesting executed in under six hours. It tracks financially motivated actor UNC6780 (TeamPCP) conducting large-scale open source supply chain compromises across PyPI, npm, and Docker Hub since March 2026, deploying credential stealers. The report also highlights growing targeting of proprietary AI models, source code, prompts, and API credentials, plus LLMJacking practices where adversaries steal developer credentials or hijack cloud infrastructure to run unauthorized AI workloads.
Chinese Hackers Use AI Agents in Multi
China-linked campaign used the SecFlow AI-agent framework (Claude, Qwen, DeepSeek) to automate intrusions against government targets in Taiwan, Indonesia, China and Vietnam.
Hunt.io documented a second China-linked campaign wiring commercial AI models into live cyberespionage, reconstructing the SecFlow orchestration system from five accidentally exposed open directories. Targets included Taiwan's Kuomintang Party archives, Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, mainland Chinese government and education systems, and Vietnamese industrial hosts. The most extensive compromise hit a Fengtai District government Office Automation environment, yielding LSASS and registry hive theft, 822 user records and 1.28GB of attachments including patient health data. Tooling included a GLUTTON webshell hiding payloads in PNG pixels via steganography and a fake MySQL deserialization service for client-side code execution.
Fortinet expands AI security portfolio with Virtue AI acquisition
Fortinet acquired Virtue AI to add agent red-teaming, MCP scanning and runtime guardrails to its AI security portfolio.
Fortinet acquired Virtue AI to extend its Security for AI strategy beyond FortiAIGate, which protects LLMs from prompt injection, data leakage and model poisoning. Virtue AI brings automated agentic red-teaming across 50+ sandboxed environments and 14 domains, agent discovery and governance including MCP tool scanning, continuous AI validation, and real-time guardrails across text, images, video, audio and code. Financial terms were not disclosed and the consideration is immaterial to Fortinet; Gartner projects the AI security market to grow from $2.8B in 2026 to $16.4B by 2030.
TrajMark: Ownership Attribution and Segment-Level Tamper Localization for Coding-Agent Trajectories
Researchers introduce TrajMark, a training-free watermarking framework for coding-agent trajectories that recovers ownership, detects 95.5-100% of edits, and localizes tampered regions.
TrajMark is a training-free, symmetric-key, visible-only watermarking framework for coding-agent trajectories that separates robust ownership attribution from fragile local integrity verification. A sparse owner layer encodes a six-bit deployment identifier by rewriting keyed READ actions into masked linear equations, while a localization layer inserts linked Q12 seals that commit to protected critical-action segments. Across three coding-agent frameworks and three LLMs, it recovers the exact owner in all clean full-watermark batches, detects 95.5%-100% of single-site edits, and localizes 95.8% of random corruptions to an accepted protocol region. Owner marking adds no trajectory actions and matched Pass@1 is 26.9% versus 26.3% for unwatermarked runs.
$1 Million Sandbox Challenge Uncovers Linux Kernel Flaws
Vercel's $1M sandbox challenge surfaced two Linux kernel networking defects—one leaking host kernel memory, one crashing hosts—with CVEs pending.
Vercel ran a two-week, $1 million sandbox escape challenge (Aug 18–Sep 1) on its Firecracker-based microVM sandbox, receiving 1,285 reports and committing ~$325k in payouts (1 Critical, 7 High, 15 Medium, 49 Low validated so far). No attacker accessed real customer data. The most important filing found two independent Linux kernel networking stack defects—one leaks host kernel memory, the other deterministically crashes the host—with wide implications for cloud providers isolating workloads via the same kernel layer. Fixes are under private review with CVEs pending; Vercel also plans to open-source its agentic report-triage agent built on the Eve framework running Kimi K3.
Autonomous AI Agents Compromise Thousands of Credentials in Under Six Hours
Google's GTIG reports threat actors using autonomous AI agents, credential stealers, and LLMs to steal AI models, API credentials, and harvest thousands of credentials.
Google Threat Intelligence Group says attackers are targeting proprietary AI models across healthcare, government, and media, exfiltrating API credentials, and co-opting victim cloud environments to run unauthorized AI workloads. TeamPCP (Altered Spider/UNC6780) is conducting supply chain compromises of PyPI, npm, and Docker Hub, deploying the SANDCLOCK and DUSTMAKER credential stealers, with DUSTMAKER using AI workspace poisoning and prompt injection for defense evasion. One financially motivated actor used an autonomous multi-agent framework to compromise thousands of third-party credentials in under six hours without human intervention. China-nexus groups UNC6508 and Basin Castle (Mustang Panda) used local open-weight LLMs and commercial LLMs like Gemini, Claude, and Codex for espionage tasks and evading provider monitoring.
Hackers Use Autonomous AI Agents to Harvest Thousands of Credentials in Under 6 Hours
Google Cloud documents a financially motivated actor using autonomous AI agents on a compromised cloud tenant to harvest 23,800+ credentials in under six hours.
Google Cloud reports that an attacker compromised a victim's cloud environment and deployed a multi-agent framework driven by preconfigured Markdown playbooks to autonomously handle vulnerability scanning, credential collection, error troubleshooting, and IP rotation. An exposed command-and-control server hosted the 'Recon' framework with a live dashboard managing over 23,800 harvested secrets, including cloud and AI-service API keys. The report also ties DUSTMAKER to UNC6780/TeamPCP, targeting AI development tools and CI/CD systems via trojanized MCP packages such as tiktoken_mcp. Google has disabled linked assets and updated protections after the actors' operational security failures.
Week in review: Salesforce and ServiceNow portals exposed for 17 months, exploited Metabase 0-day
Weekly digest: exploited Metabase zero-day breached Framework; Salesforce/ServiceNow portals read for 17 months; Microsoft patched 400+ flaws.
Help Net Security's week in review aggregates top stories: a 'City-Forum' campaign tracked by Reco has been pulling records from Salesforce and ServiceNow portals worldwide for 17 months, and Framework suffered a breach via an exploited Metabase zero-day exposing customer contact and IP data. It also covers Microsoft's August 2026 Patch Tuesday fixing 400+ flaws including exploited zero-day CVE-2026-68820, Cisco's fix for exploited firewall DoS bug CVE-2026-20349 (added to CISA KEV), and a second N-able N-central hotfix for actively exploited CVE-2026-18577. Other items include GitHub expanding Dependabot malware alerts to eight package ecosystems and EU AI Act enforcement beginning on 2 August 2026.
Why 2026 is the Year to Upgrade to an Agentic AI SOC
Elastic Security Labs argues 2026 is the production inflection point for agentic AI in security operations centers.
Elastic Security Labs argues 2026 is the practical inflection point for agentic AI SOCs, noting nearly two-thirds of organizations are experimenting with AI agents while fewer than one in four have production deployments. The piece outlines operational challenges and recommendations: treat agents as non-human identities with least-privilege tool access, version-control system prompts as code, deploy unified agents with on-demand task packages, and enforce per-agent budgets and rate limits. It stresses explainability via RAG and transparent reasoning traces so analysts can verify and override autonomous decisions.