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Search: “SANS Internet Storm Center”

5 stories in the last 7d

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Scans Targeting Hospitality Applications, (Wed, Sep 16th)

Scans from a bulletproof-hosting IP target the abandoned PIAF-HMS hospitality application, which contains numerous unpatched SQL injection flaws.

SANS ISC observed requests for /PIAF-HMS/ using the unusual user-agent Farez-Sorter/1.0, along with paths like /admin/, /ucp/, /hms/, and /hotel/, starting September 15 from the single source IP 94.102.49.125 (IP Volume, AS202425, a bulletproof hoster). PIAF-HMS, a PBX in a Flash Hospitality Management System, was last updated 10 years ago and a SQL injection vulnerability was reported recently; the code shows many injection flaws and lacks authentication and access control. The handler notes hotels are soft targets for personal data theft and guest MitM attacks, and asks for community insight on the campaign.

SANS Internet Storm Center · 14h agoExploit / PoC

MacOS 27 - First Boot, (Tue, Sep 15th)

SANS ISC documents the expected network traffic macOS 27 'Golden Gate' generates on first boot to help defenders baseline their networks.

Johannes Ullrich of SANS Internet Storm Center captured roughly 300 packets from a macOS 27 'Golden Gate' system before user login, covering DHCP, IPv6 duplicate address discovery, DNS, and TCP behavior. macOS 27 resolves hostnames like albert.apple.com (device activation, certificate-pinned), push messaging hosts, and ipv4only.arpa for NAT64 networks. The OS still uses a TCP window scale of 6, ECN, and random timestamps, with only four TCP connections observed during boot. The analysis provides a reference baseline for security teams monitoring Apple endpoints.

SANS Internet Storm Center · 1d agoResearch

The Self-Expanding Stolen Inference Supply Chain: An AI Agent Harvesting and Re-Serving LLM Access, (Fri, Sep 11th)

An autonomous coding agent harvested LLM API access from poorly secured gateways and aggregated stolen inference capacity behind a self-hosted gateway

A SANS researcher observed a semi-autonomous coding agent finding weakly secured LLM resale gateways via FOFA queries, creating trial accounts with temporary emails and CAPTCHA solving, and exploiting weak authorization such as client-supplied group_id fields. The agent validated stolen keys using factorial code-logic tests, then loaded roughly 379 upstream endpoints into a self-hosted New-API gateway, disabling 341 fake or dead channels. Five model names including claude-opus-5 and gpt-5.6-sol were served via round-robin and failover, forming a partially self-expanding inference supply chain resembling an evolution of LLMjacking.

SANS Internet Storm Center · 5d agoThreat actor in the wild

ISC Stormcast For Friday, September 11th, 2026 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail/10090, (Fri, Sep 11th)

SANS ISC released its daily Stormcast podcast for September 11, 2026; the feed provides no story details.

The SANS Internet Storm Center published its daily ISC Stormcast podcast episode for Friday, September 11, 2026. The feed contains only the standard copyright notice and links, without any story details.

SANS Internet Storm Centerupdated · 7h agofirst · 6d agoIndustry 6 sources

Atomic macOS (AMOS) Stealer Activity

Unit 42 details an August 2026 AMOS macOS stealer infection delivered via fake 'macOS toolkit' pages and Terminal paste commands, exfiltrating credentials to C2.

Unit 42 analyzed an AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) infection from August 5, 2026, initiated via a page at getmacouscloud[.]com instructing users to paste a command into Terminal. The command fetched a Zsh script from ferncore13[.]com that delivered a Mach-O installer to /tmp/helper and supporting files under /Library/Application Support/.com.apple.accountsd/ and .com.apple.metadata.mds/. AMOS collected browser data, credentials, cryptocurrency wallets (Binance, TonKeeper), Telegram data, and FileGrabber content such as AWS and gcloud files, uploading it via HTTP POST to C2 server 161.35.146[.]120. AMOS has been advertised on Telegram since April 2024 and distributed via ClickFix campaigns, malicious ads, and cracked-software sites.

Palo Alto Unit 42 · 23h agoMalware in the wild