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5 stories in the last 24h

TP-Link Cameras 0-Day Vulnerabilities Allow Attackers to Spy on Users

Two zero-day flaws in TP-Link Tapo C200 cameras allowed authentication bypass and denial-of-service; fixed in firmware V5_1.4.6.

OPSWAT researchers Khoi Tran and Thai Do found CVE-2026-15315, an authentication bypass in the Tapo C200's local HTTPS interface that lets network-adjacent attackers replay an authentication value to gain administrator access, and CVE-2026-15316, an unauthenticated denial-of-service in the Wi-Fi onboarding process that crashes the camera's HTTPS service. TP-Link was notified on April 16, 2026, confirmed the flaws on July 10, and released patches on August 18, 2026 in firmware V5_1.4.6. Exploitation requires local network access but no valid account, existing session, or user interaction, exposing live feeds and stored recordings to surveillance risk.

[Control Systems] Phoenix Contact security advisory (AV26-927)

Canadian Cyber Centre warns Phoenix Contact, Pepperl+Fuchs, and Carlo Gavazzi I/O devices need firmware 1.7.4 to fix multiple vulnerabilities.

Canada's Cyber Centre issued advisory AV26-927 covering multiple vulnerabilities in Phoenix Contact ICE2/ICE3 and IOL MA8 EIP/PN devices, plus related Pepperl+Fuchs and Carlo Gavazzi YL212/YN115 products. Firmware versions prior to 1.7.4 are affected across roughly 15 models. Administrators are encouraged to review vendor advisories and apply available updates.

Forgery of C2PA on a Pixel 10

Researcher forged a Google Pixel 10 C2PA content credential with genuine signatures, showing root-level attackers can fake photo provenance.

A Hacker Factor blog post demonstrates an AI-generated 'unicorn glitter milk' news photo carrying a valid, cryptographically signed C2PA manifest traceable to Google's Pixel camera certificate chain, passing validation in Adobe Inspect and the CAI Verify tool with a verified timestamp. The author, working with UMBC's PASAWG working group, reported to Google and C2PA in November 2025 that root access on a Pixel device could sign arbitrary images as camera captures; after 90 days without resolution, details were published. The finding undermines C2PA Assurance Level 2 claims made for Pixel 10 Content Credentials.

Lobsters · security · 6h agoResearch

Android 0-day Vulnerability on Google Pixel Devices Actively Exploited in Attacks

Google patched CVE-2026-58704, an actively exploited Android zero-day allowing proximal privilege escalation via the Pixel cellular modem, urging the 2026-09-05 patch.

Google confirmed CVE-2026-58704, a high-severity elevation-of-privilege flaw in the Pixel cellular modem, is being exploited in limited, targeted attacks and shipped emergency fixes in the September 2026 Pixel Update Bulletin. The low-complexity bug requires no user interaction and enables proximal/adjacent privilege escalation with no additional execution privileges, phrasing Google has historically used for spyware-vendor and state-aligned zero-days. The Pixel bulletin patches 110 flaws including 12 critical RCEs, while the broader September Android update addressed roughly 180 vulnerabilities, including Wi-Fi memory-corruption bug CVE-2026-28662.

Cyber Security Newsupdated · 2h agofirst · 10h agoExploit / PoC in the wild 8 sourcesCVE-2026-58704CVE-2026-28662

Apple Reference Image: A New Approach for Verified Photography

Apple introduces Reference Image, hardware-backed verifiable photography on iPhone 18 Pro using sensor signing and Private Cloud Compute to counter AI-generated fakes.

Apple announced Reference Image, an opt-in camera mode debuting on the main sensor of iPhone 18 Pro and iPhone 18 Pro Max that produces securely timestamped, verifiable photographs. The design splits into two phases: a secure digital negative created by cryptographically signing pixel data at the sensor immediately after capture (preventing injection or tampering), then developing that negative into a reference image. Private Cloud Compute handles processing without exposing image contents to anyone, including Apple, and fraudulent reference images can be revoked without revealing the photographer's identity. Apple positions the system as stronger than C2PA-based approaches, which sign metadata after capture, are vulnerable to editing-chain compromise, and can tie images to a device or individual.