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CrossLink: Breaking Location Privacy by Linking Device Identifiers Across Protocols

Researchers present CrossLink, a passive tracing algorithm linking temporary device identifiers across LTE, WiFi, and BLE, reconstructing full traces for 83% of simulated users.

Smartphones emit temporary identifiers simultaneously over LTE, WiFi, and BLE, and per-protocol randomization defenses implicitly assume their protections compose across protocols. CrossLink is an uncertainty-aware tracing algorithm that stitches device identifiers across time, space, and protocols even when the adversary is fully passive and rotations are unsynchronized. In large-scale mobility simulation it reconstructs full traces for 83% of users versus 22% for the best single-protocol baseline. It remains effective under partial sniffer coverage, including strategically placed sniffers near LTE handover regions, mobile sniffers, and limited high-coverage subregions.

arXiv cs.CR · 7d agoResearch

**Subject:** CVE-2026-2035703: Tozed ZLT X300 5G CPE — Unauthenticated Remote Root Code Execution via TR-069 Command Injection (CVSS 9.8)

Tozed ZLT X300 5G CPE firmware 6.01.3 has an unauthenticated TR-069 command injection (CVE-2026-2035703, CVSS 9.8) enabling root code execution.

Tozed ZLT X300 5G CPE router firmware 6.01.3 contains an OS command injection (CWE-78) in the TR-069/CWMP client daemon netcwmpd, tracked as CVE-2026-2035703 with CVSS 9.8. The IPPingDiagnostics Host parameter is passed unsanitized into sprintf, and the resulting shell command executes via system_by_root() as root. An attacker operating a rogue LTE base station built from roughly $300 of SDR hardware can impersonate the carrier's Auto Configuration Server and inject arbitrary commands. The disclosure does not report any observed exploitation.

Full Disclosure · 8d agoVulnerabilityCVE-2026-2035703

What your vendor says about PQC tells you if they are ready

Allot CTO outlines a telecom post-quantum migration playbook: inventory crypto, deploy hybrid ML-KEM on TLS first, and avoid missed interfaces.

Dr. Yaakov Stein, VP CTO of Allot, explains how mobile operators should triage post-quantum migration by data shelf life, protecting subscriber identity mappings, billing records, and call metadata that stay sensitive for years. He recommends starting with a comprehensive crypto inventory, then hybrid ML-KEM key exchange on TLS-protected 5G SBA and management interfaces, followed by IPsec backhaul and roaming links. Stein warns that migrations most often fail operationally through missed legacy interfaces such as SSH, RADIUS, or forgotten load balancers, and cites the early Kyber multi-packet TLS client hello issue as an example of middlebox incompatibility.

Help Net Security · 16d agoIndustry