Operation QUICSILVER Targets Myanmar Government and IT with QUICAgent Backdoor
Seqrite Labs details Operation QUICSILVER, a China-nexus espionage campaign targeting Myanmar government and IT with graduation-invite lures deploying QUICAgent backdoor.
Seqrite Labs reported Operation QUICSILVER, a cyber espionage campaign against Myanmar's government and IT sectors attributed with moderate confidence to a China-nexus actor. Since April 2026, attacks used fake Belgian-Myanmar holiday and Burmese graduation ceremony invitation lures delivered via VHD/LNK files that abuse ftp.exe (LOLBAS) to assemble and launch QUICAgent, a Go backdoor communicating over QUIC on UDP 443 with five commands and Startup-folder persistence. Separately, China-linked Mustang Panda was observed using an updated COOLCLIENT backdoor with a signed kernel-mode driver across Myanmar, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Russia.
Poland's CERT Warns of Active Exploitation of Critical Zimbra Collaboration Suite Flaw
CERT Polska confirms active exploitation of critical unauthenticated RCE CVE-2026-73570 in Zimbra Collaboration Suite, patched July 20.
CERT Polska confirmed threat actors are actively exploiting CVE-2026-73570, an unauthenticated OS command injection in Zimbra Collaboration Suite allowing arbitrary shell commands as the zimbra user. Exploitation requires the SNMP trap service via snmp_notify with swatchdog running, which is enabled by default; Shadowserver tracks over 12,100 internet-exposed Zimbra servers. Zimbra fixed the flaw in version 10.1.20 on July 20, 2026, 28 days before exploitation was confirmed. Historical Zimbra targeting includes Winter Vivern, APT29, and APT28 campaigns.
Risky Bulletin: Slovakia finds Russian backdoor in traffic speed cameras
Slovakia's NBU found an SMS-triggered backdoor in Russian-made NERO R-ONE traffic cameras, pausing a 279-unit deployment.
Slovakia's national security service NBU issued an alert against NERO R-ONE high-speed traffic cameras after finding a backdoor that grants shell and network access via SMS from hardcoded Russian phone numbers. The cameras are a rebranded version of the Russian CORDON PRO.M model by St. Petersburg firm Semicon, purchased via a Cyprus shell company under a €30 million EU-funded project. The report also found SecureBoot disabled, vulnerable web management, and unauthenticated live streams; the Interior Ministry paused deployment of 279 cameras pending independent assessment.