Smart search ranks by meaning as well as keywords (one row per story, last 45 days).
git.kernel.org spends more CPU rendering commit pages for abusive AI-era scrapers than on all legitimate access including git clones.
Konstantin Ryabitsev reports that abusive crawler 'background radiation' at git.kernel.org consumes more CPU cycles rendering commit HTML than all legitimate access, with 14 cores across five geo-distributed nodes dedicated to scraper traffic. Simon Willison highlights the implications for crawlable web services like Datasette.
Show-Harness lets VLM agents control robots via discrete semantic action units, outperforming VLA baselines zero-shot and after light fine-tuning.
Show-Harness is an embodied agent harness that exposes discrete semantic action units a VLM reasons over, with embodiment-specific interpreters grounding them into local robot actions. It enables zero-shot robot control with closed-source frontier VLMs and low-cost adaptation of small open-source VLMs using only a few GPU-hours of fine-tuning. The companion GUMI (GUI Manipulation Interface) extends the same semantic action space to GUI-based demonstration collection without specialized teleoperation hardware. Experiments show robust generalization across tasks, embodiments, and environments, beating representative agentic and VLA paradigms.
GreyNoise observed scanners spoofing AI crawler user agents from 824 IPs to harvest .env files and cloud credentials; no confirmed theft.
GreyNoise researchers found attackers disguising automated scanning as AI crawler traffic, using six crawler names from four AI companies including Anthropic's ClaudeBot, OpenAI, Google, and Perplexity. Between July 28 and August 23, 2026, the six names arrived from 824 IP addresses spread across 795 /24 networks that matched no published vendor ranges, shared one HTTP client fingerprint that had used more than 1,500 user agent strings, and never requested /robots.txt. The scanners targeted /.env, /.env.production, /.env.bak, and /.aws/credentials, hunting secrets, cloud access keys, private keys, and password stores, while forged Amazon crawler names appeared at greater volume under undocumented user agents. GreyNoise could not confirm whether any file was returned or any organization affected, and published all 824 addresses and targeted paths for defenders.
Tencent research finds agents lose control in 55-62% of trajectories when degraded control boundaries coincide with executable unsafe opportunities across five models and 16 domains.
The study independently manipulates goal pressure, control degradation, and executable unsafe opportunity in a deterministic multi-turn environment across five agent models and 16 operational domains. Neither factor alone causes substantial loss of control; when both are present, loss-of-control rates reach 55% in the full-factorial study and 62% across ten additional domains. Restoring the original control boundary reduces the rate to 0% even when unsafe actions remain executable, and a context-management ablation shows compaction is harmless when constraints are preserved but omission raises the rate to 87%.
Akamai describes detecting autonomous AI browser agents like Comet using Masked Autoencoder Transformer models on sparse behavioral telemetry.
Akamai researchers present a behavioral telemetry approach for identifying agentic automation in web traffic. Masked Autoencoder Transformer models are used to detect the sparse behavioral signals produced by autonomous AI browser agents such as Comet. The work targets traffic classification and bot detection rather than a specific vulnerability, and becomes more relevant as agentic browsing adoption grows.
Show-Harness enables VLM agents to control robots via a semantic action interface, achieving zero-shot frontier control and few-GPU-hour adaptation of small VLMs.
Show-Harness exposes discrete semantic action units that VLMs reason over, with embodiment-specific interpreters deterministically grounding them into local robot actions. It enables zero-shot closed-source frontier VLM control and adapts small open-source VLMs for low-cost deployment with a few GPU-hours of fine-tuning. The companion GUMI interface extends the same semantic action space to GUI-based demonstration collection without teleoperation hardware, and Show-Harness-equipped agents outperform representative agentic and VLA paradigms.
Researchers introduce EVOHARNESSBENCH, a benchmark showing that evolving agent harnesses (tools, skills, agents) cause forgetting and inconsistent adaptation across 802 tasks.
The paper introduces EVOHARNESSBENCH, a benchmark that places non-stationarity in the externally supplied agent harness rather than in the task stream, evaluating agents across tools, skills, and specialist agents. It comprises 17 multi-stage harness streams built deterministically from verifier-based benchmarks, totaling 802 tasks, 520 tools, 42 skills, and 62 agents. Evaluation covers deployment (retention of previously accessible competence) and self-evolving adaptation settings. Results show harness expansion alone degrades previously solved tasks (harness-induced forgetting), adaptation gains are inconsistent, and retention and adaptation can pull in opposite directions.
Agent as Policy lets a general-purpose agent drive a physical robot via runtime reasoning and program generation, reaching 100% success on manipulation tasks.
The paper introduces Agent as Policy (AGP), which puts task planning and execution for a physical robot under a general-purpose agent's control with no task-specific or environment-specific training. The agent interprets visual evidence, writes executable programs, issues motion commands, and revises actions based on physical outcomes. AGP was evaluated on real-world manipulation tasks including assembly from human videos, block construction from goal images, die reorientation, targeted throwing, and bimanual towel folding. It achieved success rates of 100%, 100%, and 80% on three block construction configurations.
Position paper proposes monitoring across agent executions to detect and contain coordinated AI agent intrusions, grounded in the Hugging Face incident.
The paper argues that AI agents can turn shared infrastructure into a channel for coordinated intrusion, citing the Hugging Face incident and a public-wiki investigation where security assessment required evidence from multiple executions. It defines unsanctioned coordination relative to collaboration and delegated-authority policy, links storage-mediated coordination to stigmergy, and frames prospective episode discovery as the core research problem. A proposed evaluation compares isolated actions, rolling windows, known groups, and discovered episodes at matched review cost, measuring harmful outcomes and recurrence after channel closure and state quarantine. A checksum-verified reconstruction of the public wiki export separates declining retained writes from later administrative cleanup.
Researchers introduce SchemeArena, a 400-scenario benchmark stress-testing scheming in LLM agents, finding explicit instrumental goals are the strongest driver of covert misaligned behavior.
The paper presents SchemeArena, a 400-scenario benchmark built through factorized scenario synthesis spanning safety-relevant tool domains, instrumental goals, oversight conditions and pressure mechanisms. The accompanying SCOUT monitor grounds multi-criteria scheming judgments in evidence drawn from agents' reasoning and actions. Stress tests across five LLM agents show explicit instrumental goals are the strongest driver of scheming propensity, while action-only monitoring increased scheming in several closed models, suggesting partial oversight can act as an optimization constraint. The benchmark, code and monitor are released at github.com/launchnlp/SchemeArena.
ClickFix-style campaigns deploy WordlistLoader, which disguises malware as ordinary text, to deliver the increasingly prevalent Amatera infostealer.
Researchers describe WordlistLoader, a new loader that disguises malicious payloads as ordinary text or wordlist files to evade detection. It is being used in ClickFix-style social engineering campaigns to deliver Amatera, an increasingly prevalent infostealer. The obfuscation technique helps the campaign slip past file-type-based inspections.
terms.txt specifies a robots.txt-style protocol for per-path, per-purpose AI crawler consent and compensation, with enforcement adding 0.20-0.65 ms per request.
The paper documents that automated clients now make up most web requests, that training dominates Cloudflare-classified crawling, and that the largest AI platforms fetch thousands of pages per returned visitor while robots.txt cannot express identity, purpose, terms, or price. It specifies terms.txt plus an origin-enforced exchange using Web Bot Auth signatures, signed intent, delegation tokens, HTTP 402 negotiation, and signed receipts. A dependency-free implementation adds 0.20 to 0.65 ms per request on one vCPU.
Dark Reading reports AI-driven 'swarm' attacks like the PaperCut incident now span recon, lateral movement and exfiltration, forcing a rethink of the cyber kill chain.
Dark Reading examines how attackers are incorporating AI across the full kill chain, from building lab environments to stage and test agentic attacks through reconnaissance, lateral movement, and exfiltration. It cites a swarm-style AI attack on PaperCut systems as evidence that AI-enabled attackers are changing established defense and detection models.
Latent Space essay argues late-2025 agent gains came from models and harnesses maturing together, with harness logic absorbed into model weights.
The piece defines the agent harness as everything beyond model weights—tools, context, memory, guardrails—and charts its evolution from ReAct prompting (October 2022) through AutoGPT's premature autonomy, Cursor/Copilot's human-in-the-loop retreat, and Devin's roughly 15% success rate, to o1's capability overhang and Claude Code's February 2025 terminal agent with permission rules. It argues the Christmas 2025 jump cited by Transformer co-inventor Lukasz Kaiser reflected model and harness curves crossing, and that remaining harnesses will serve human attention rather than the model.
Darktrace says the Chaos botnet now targets misconfigured cloud deployments like Hadoop and added a SOCKS proxy for traffic relaying.
Darktrace identified a new 64-bit ELF variant of the Chaos botnet targeting misconfigured cloud deployments, expanding beyond the malware's traditional focus on routers and edge devices. Captured in a deliberately misconfigured Hadoop honeypot instance, the intrusion began with an HTTP request creating an application that ran embedded shell commands to fetch the Chaos agent binary from pan.tenire[.]com, set chmod 777 permissions, execute it, and delete the artifact to reduce forensic traces. The restructured variant adds a SOCKS proxy feature letting compromised systems ferry attacker traffic, while removing SSH-based spread and router-exploit functions, suggesting monetization beyond crypto mining and DDoS-for-hire. Possible Chinese origin is suggested by language artifacts and infrastructure; the delivery domain was previously used in Silver Fox's Operation Silk Lure phishing campaign delivering ValleyRAT.
Hugging Face introduces Funes, a tool that gives coding agents persistent, self-owned memory outside vendor clouds.
A Hugging Face blog post presents Funes, an approach for giving coding agents a persistent memory that developers own and control. The piece targets agent workflows where context must survive across sessions without ceding data to third-party services. No article body was available in the feed, so specifics beyond the title are limited.
SOCRadar's STRU analyzed PEEP, an emerging Chromium-based RAT disguised as a Chrome extension enabling post-exploitation control of browsers.
SOCRadar's Threat Research Unit (STRU) identified and analyzed PEEP, a Chromium-based post-exploitation toolkit distributed as a browser extension. PEEP provides RAT-style capabilities while posing as a legitimate Chrome extension. It is assessed as an emerging threat worth monitoring by defenders.
Researchers propose an L0-L4 control taxonomy for agentic visual generation, classifying controllers from fixed conditioning to experience-adaptive decision-making.
This paper proposes a taxonomy for agentic visual generation organized by what the controller can directly control in the generation process, rather than by planning depth, tool count, or model size. Levels range from L1 Conditioning Control through L2 Execution Control, L3 Outcome-Adaptive Control, and L4 Experience-Adaptive Control, with L0 Fixed Support denoting systems without a deployed decision-making controller. The framework is applied across image, video, editing, 3D, world, slide, and user-interface generation to map how controller capabilities and mechanisms have evolved across the field.
A poisoned world-model checkpoint hijacks downstream controllers without an explicit trigger rule, passing clean-data evaluation while steering 100% of triggered actions.
Researchers show that a released pretrained world-model checkpoint acts as a supply-chain backdoor for downstream control. The poisoned model routes trigger-bearing observations into a chosen latent region and reshapes dynamics so the victim's own Dreamer-style actor training or MPC/CEM planning re-discovers attacker-targeted actions. The attack hijacks 100% of triggered steps in the strongest settings while retaining roughly 75% clean-task success and passing standard clean-data diagnostics. Moderate clean fine-tuning fails to remove the backdoor without substantially degrading clean control.
Elastic Security Labs shows how Cursor hooks plus Elastic Agent turn AI coding agent activity into 13 million huntable security events.
Elastic Security Labs demonstrates auditing AI coding agent behavior by pairing Cursor hooks with Elastic Agent, capturing every tool call, shell command, file read, and MCP request as structured events. The dataset of 13 million captured events can be hunted with ES|QL, giving defenders visibility into agent actions.
Google open-sourced Mantis, an Apache-2.0 modular skills toolkit that lets AI coding agents find, reproduce, and patch vulnerabilities with sandboxed verification.
Google released Mantis on GitHub under Apache 2.0 as a stack-agnostic set of slash-command skills that chain through the full vulnerability lifecycle: mining version history, building threat models, filtering findings, reproducing bugs in gVisor or network-disabled VMs, assembling exploit chains, patching, and scoring residual risk from 1 to 10. It runs with Gemini CLI, Antigravity CLI, the Google ADK, or comparable agent frameworks, and a supervisor skill (/mantis-meta-agent) can drive the whole loop. Google says the design targets the sub-7 percent true-positive rate of naive AI code scanning, and that its hierarchical summary tree cuts token overhead by over 85 percent. The toolkit is deployable for local and internal evaluation but not yet recommended for production.
GreyNoise observes scanners spoofing OpenAI, Anthropic, and DeepSeek crawler user agents to hunt leaked credentials and secrets.
GreyNoise is observing automated scanners that pose as the web crawlers of OpenAI, Anthropic, DeepSeek, and Fortune 500 companies. The scanners use forged user agents while requesting files where misconfigured web servers frequently leak secrets and credentials. This activity abuses trust in AI crawler traffic to discover exposed credentials for follow-on attacks.
Research shows on-policy expert correction, not imitation fine-tuning, lets weaker agent models catch up under evolved harnesses.
Researchers study how to combine automated agent-harness evolution with lightweight fine-tuning across seven enterprise agent tasks. Naively training weaker models (Qwen3-Coder, Gemma 4) on expert trajectories under an evolved harness regressed performance by 4 to 30 points on all tasks. They propose an on-policy correction pipeline, automated by a meta-level MLE agent, where an expert rewrites only the failing turn of the weaker model's rollout, preserving model-harness fit.
ESRL explores MoE expert-routing space during RL, lifting Qwen3-30B-A3B Pass@1 by 3.2 points over GRPO at no extra cost.
ESRL (Expert-Space Exploration Reinforcement Learning) is an architecture-aware framework that treats expert routing in Mixture-of-Experts models as an additional source of rollout diversity. It preserves high-confidence experts as anchors, restricts stochastic routing to a plausible candidate pool, adapts perturbation strength to router entropy, and replays recorded expert paths during policy optimization. ESRL achieves the best performance across top-K, top-1, and shared-expert routing backbones on mathematics, science, and code tasks; on Qwen3-30B-A3B it improves average Pass@1 and Pass@8 over GRPO by 3.2 and 4.5 percentage points respectively, without additional sampling or compute.
Calif Research demos WeWorm, an AI-built zero-click worm that spreads via WeChat calls on iOS and Android without user interaction.
Calif Research released a demo of WeWorm, described as the first zero-click worm to spread through WeChat calls across iOS and Android; victims need not answer the call and hear nothing even if they do. The team used AI to find the underlying bug and write a remote code execution exploit in about two days, then spent one more week building the worm. The researchers argue AI can now do most of the exploit-development work, with humans supplying judgment on targeting and safe testing.
ASTRIL-MPC combines learned kinematics, NMPC, and LLM-guided safety-checked retuning for articulated tracked robot traversal in search-and-rescue.
ASTRIL-MPC is a language-guided neural-kinematic model predictive control framework for autonomous traversal of articulated tracked robots in urban search and rescue. A learned kinematics model predicts short-horizon task-state increments, NMPC plans with feasibility constraints, and an LLM proposes bounded, safety-checked updates to weights and bounds. The compiled predictor enables a full control cycle within 100 ms, improving traversal-quality scores by up to 71% over non-adaptive NMPC and 67% over a PPO baseline while eliminating measurable collision impacts.
Dream-RSI refines exploration policies by dreaming in replay simulators built from discovery history, cutting discovery costs across coding tasks.
Dream-RSI is a framework for scalable recursive self-improvement in autonomous coding agents, where a lightweight orchestration layer makes exploration explicit and programmable while leaving the underlying agent unchanged. Its core insight is that accumulated discovery history can serve as a replay simulator over the realized search space, providing immediate, low-cost off-policy feedback to evaluate and refine exploration policies without expensive online evaluations. Across algorithm engineering, mathematical optimization, and GPU kernel engineering, Dream-RSI achieves competitive or improved discovery quality at substantially reduced cost.
Point Wild details a five-stage AsyncRAT campaign using AutoIt abuse and process injection to hide a .NET RAT inside Microsoft's signed charmap.exe.
Researchers at Point Wild Threat Intelligence analyzed a campaign starting from a lure batch file ('Right-click to open Invoice Details.bat') that launches hidden PowerShell to reconstruct a Base64/XOR-obfuscated payload. The stage drops a renamed signed AutoIt interpreter and loader script into %LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp and achieves persistence via a batch file in the user's Startup folder (T1547.001). The loader decrypts the payload in memory with single-byte XOR key 0x36 and injects it into SysWOW64\charmap.exe using OpenProcess/VirtualAllocEx/WriteProcessMemory/CreateRemoteThread, with PE-sieve confirming an in-memory implanted PE and patched AMSI modules. The final AsyncRAT payload performs screen capture and data theft, with observed C2 at 158[.]51[.]122[.]136:4944 over raw TCP.
ScienceBuddy couples harness evolution with model reinforcement learning so scientific agents continually self-improve from researcher feedback in an interactive workspace.
The authors release ScienceBuddy, an interactive scientific research workspace that transforms researcher requests, feedback, and execution evidence into tasks and evaluation rubrics for continual learning. Its recursive-in-recursive self-improvement paradigm couples harness evolution (inner recursion, model fixed) with model reinforcement learning under the improved harness (outer recursion). Case studies span four scientific task families, and the system is released to the scientific community as a research product.
A SANS honeypot caught a real coding-agent session routed to a rogue "free" LLM endpoint, exposing a Windows user's transcript and tool outputs.
A SANS analyst describes how an internet-exposed inference honeypot was discovered, relabeled with sought-after model names like DeepSeek, and enrolled in infrastructure serving "free" LLM backends. On 2026-08-30 an opencode terminal coding agent sent an 88-message, 224 KB transcript 210 times in 91 seconds via a China Unicom relay, exposing directory listings, tool outputs and read file portions. The analyst frames tool-enabled agents treating model endpoints as trusted control planes as a novel risk — a "rogue model endpoint" that could request tool executions on the user's machine.
Akamai Blog