ClickFix Campaigns Abuse Legitimate Services for Persistent Access
Dark Reading reports two ClickFix social engineering campaigns abusing legitimate services to compromise organizations and maintain persistent access.
Dark Reading describes two separate attacks in which threat actors used the ClickFix social engineering tactic to compromise organizations. The campaigns abuse legitimate, trusted services to gain and maintain persistent access to victim environments. No specific victims, actors, or indicators were named in the available text.
ClickFix Campaign Compromises 31 Orgs, Abuses Polygon Blockchain
A ClickFix social engineering campaign compromised 31 organizations, abusing the Polygon blockchain via EtherHiding for dynamically updated command-and-control.
The campaign uses ClickFix-style social engineering to compromise victims, with 31 organizations affected. It employs EtherHiding to dynamically update its command-and-control server, abusing the Polygon blockchain as an attacker-controlled address book. This blockchain-based C2 approach makes the infrastructure more resilient and harder to take down.
Threat Actors Don’t Want Better Attacks. They Want Repeatable Ones
Opinion piece argues attackers prioritize repeatable playbooks like ClickFix (47% of Microsoft-notified attacks) and living-off-the-land over novel techniques.
The column analyzes why commodity techniques scale: Microsoft observed ClickFix as the top initial access method at 47% of its notifications last year, while Bitdefender found 84% of 700,000 analyzed high-severity incidents involved binaries already present on machines. Verizon's DBIR shows vulnerability exploitation rising to 31% of initial access vectors, up from 20%, and ransomware leak-site rankings show Qilin (roughly 1,600 claimed victims) and The Gentlemen (121 claimed victims in June) competing on throughput. The author argues attackers behave like a generics business, standardizing repeatable procedures rather than investing in novel tradecraft.
Novel macOS Infostealer AmnesiaStealer Spread via ClickFix
Novel macOS infostealer AmnesiaStealer spreads via ClickFix social engineering and lets attackers remotely control victims' browsers to steal cookie data.
Infosecurity Magazine reports on AmnesiaStealer, a novel macOS infostealer distributed through the ClickFix social engineering technique. The malware includes capabilities that let attackers take remote control of the victim's browser in order to steal cookie data. The novel remote-browser-control function distinguishes it from commodity macOS infostealers.
ThreatsDay: GhostJacking AI Attacks, EtherHiding ClickFix, Cursor CLI Flaw + 17 More Stories
A weekly bulletin aggregating short security updates, including the City-Forum data-theft campaign, a ShipMonk breach, a Cursor CLI flaw, and GhostJacking AI attacks.
The Hacker News ThreatsDay Bulletin bundles roughly 20 short updates across cloud services, AI tools, malware, breaches, and scams. Highlights include the City-Forum campaign pulling data from unauthenticated guest access in Salesforce Experience Cloud and ServiceNow Service Portals since March 2025, and a ShipMonk breach exposing Trezor customer order data for orders in seven countries between May 10 and August 8, 2026. Other items cover a patched Cursor CLI flaw that let cloned repositories run commands before the workspace-trust prompt, Okta's analysis of the Work Panel vishing console used by actors like UNC6671, and GhostJacking AI agent hijacking via a patched Claude Desktop sandbox escape. Meta also launched an on-device WhatsApp Scam Alert machine learning model that keeps message content on the device.
Atomic macOS (AMOS) Stealer Activitynew
Unit 42 details an August 2026 AMOS macOS stealer infection delivered via fake 'macOS toolkit' pages and Terminal paste commands, exfiltrating credentials to C2.
Unit 42 analyzed an AMOS (Atomic macOS Stealer) infection from August 5, 2026, initiated via a page at getmacouscloud[.]com instructing users to paste a command into Terminal. The command fetched a Zsh script from ferncore13[.]com that delivered a Mach-O installer to /tmp/helper and supporting files under /Library/Application Support/.com.apple.accountsd/ and .com.apple.metadata.mds/. AMOS collected browser data, credentials, cryptocurrency wallets (Binance, TonKeeper), Telegram data, and FileGrabber content such as AWS and gcloud files, uploading it via HTTP POST to C2 server 161.35.146[.]120. AMOS has been advertised on Telegram since April 2024 and distributed via ClickFix campaigns, malicious ads, and cracked-software sites.
ThreatsDay: 296K IoT Botnet, 100+ Water Systems Targeted, SharePoint RCE Chain + 27 New Stories
Weekly ThreatsDay bulletin details a ShinyHunters-style social engineering hit on ReliaQuest, the 296,000-device Dysphoria IoT botnet, and several new malware families.
ReliaQuest confirmed a social engineering attack on August 22, 2026, in which an attacker used a fake SSO page and MFA push approval to gain brief view-only access to an identity dashboard, with tactics matching ShinyHunters, which has since listed the firm on its leak portal. The Shadowserver Foundation reported the Dysphoria botnet has compromised nearly 296,000 IoT devices for DDoS attacks and recently added residential proxy capability. Cisco Talos documented JWR, an operator-driven phishing-as-a-service framework linked to The Outsider that harvests credentials, identity documents, and 2FA codes over an encrypted WebSocket. New malware coverage includes the Octagon Android fraud bot ($1,400/month), the C2Looper Rust backdoor delivered via ClickFix, and the Aeternum loader that moved C2 to the Polygon blockchain.
TerminalFix Uses Fake Cloudflare CAPTCHAs to Deploy Reverse
Microsoft details TerminalFix, a ClickFix variant using fake Cloudflare CAPTCHAs to make users run PowerShell payloads with reverse-tunnel implants.
Microsoft disclosed TerminalFix campaigns that direct users to run commands in Windows Terminal or PowerShell instead of the Run dialog, increasing the chance multi-line scripts execute. Compromised websites serve fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA verifications; the resulting PowerShell command downloads a ZIP with legitimate LockScreenContentServer.exe and rogue dui70.dll for DLL sideloading, retrieves payloads hidden in PNG images from attacker domains, persists via Registry Run keys and scheduled tasks, and performs domain trust and Active Directory reconnaissance. A Python-based reverse-tunnel implant (client.py) tunnels arbitrary TCP traffic over an encrypted WebSocket to gitnow[.]dev:443, giving attackers network-level proxy access that could enable privilege escalation, security-tool tampering, data theft or ransomware. Microsoft recommends AppLocker restrictions, PowerShell script block logging and ClickFix awareness training.
E4del and PINHOLE RATs Turn FTP Banners Into Dead Drops for Malware Commands
Researchers identified two new RATs, E4del and PINHOLE, using FTP banners as dead drop resolvers to fetch C2 commands via ClickFix-style lures.
SOCRADAR documented two previously unreported RATs, E4del and PINHOLE, that use FTP banners as dead drop resolvers, a first in-the-wild use of this technique. E4del is a Node.js-based RAT hidden in a digitally signed Electron application masquerading as Discord, with tiered-jitter beaconing, reverse shell, screenshot capture and desktop streaming. PINHOLE is more advanced, using Pinterest, SurveyMonkey and Cloudflare Workers for C2 resolution, six layers of unpacking, Halo's Gate EDR evasion and Early Bird APC injection. A related WebDAV delivery chain overlaps with ClearFake campaigns distributing WordlistLoader and Amatera Stealer.
StopAndProtect Uses Nearly 2,000 Hacked WordPress Sites to Spread Malware and Steal Data
Check Point details StopAndProtect: ~2,000 compromised WordPress sites deliver ClickFix fake-CAPTCHA malware toolkit combining ransomware, credential theft, screenshots, and WhatsApp surveillance.
Check Point researcher Jaromír Hořejší reports the campaign begins with ClickFix fake-CAPTCHA prompts that trigger a PowerShell command, then two .NET downloader stages that launch six components: SilentEncryptor, NetworkShareScanner, a VBS spreader, LockScreen, SimpleChatProxy, and SilentDataCollector. Hacked WordPress sites host malware stages, serve C2 commands, and receive exfiltrated logs; the actors installed a self-deleting WordPress plugin enabling arbitrary PHP upload anywhere under the WordPress root. From mid-May to late July 2026 the operators exfiltrated more than 700 archives including screenshots every 30 seconds, keylogger output, and WhatsApp contact data, and opsec failures exposed their Visual Basic automation tooling and lists of nearly 2,000 compromised domains.