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Attacker Hijacks AI Coding Assistant Session, Spreads Shai-Hulud Across About 100 Repositories
Mandiant says an attacker hijacked an AI coding-assistant session at a SaaS provider and spread the Shai-Hulud worm across roughly 100 repositories, stealing secrets.
Mandiant's September 2026 report describes an attacker hijacking an active AI coding-assistant session at an unnamed SaaS provider, then getting a poisoned package recommendation accepted and installing an infostealer via a malicious PyPI package. The attacker stole GitHub OAuth tokens, deployed the self-spreading Shai-Hulud worm across approximately 100 internal repositories, and stole repository secrets and product source code. Poisoning a package in the company's official namespace caused a second employee to pull the compromised version and become infected. Mandiant recommends verifying AI-recommended dependencies against checksums and allowlists, keeping secrets out of extension reach, and routing dependency traffic through internal repositories.
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Microsoft Links 30+ Rotating Domains to MacSync Stealer Infrastructure
Microsoft links 30+ rotating domains to the MacSync macOS infostealer, confirming active credential and file exfiltration through chunked HTTP PUT uploads.
Microsoft Defender Experts correlated 30+ domains with MacSync Stealer, requiring aligned endpoint and network behaviors (process ancestry, command-line patterns, /curl/, /dynamic?txd=, and /gate?buildtxd= paths, API-key headers, chunked HTTP PUT parameters) to link infrastructure. Execution begins from an interactive zsh session consistent with ClickFix social engineering, with curl retrieving and Base64/gunzip decoding the payload, followed by collection of Keychain data, browser credentials, SSH keys, AWS credentials, Kubernetes configs, and Apple Notes. Data is zipped to /tmp/osalogging.zip, chunked, uploaded via HTTP PUT, and artifacts are deleted afterward; the analysis builds on RST Cloud's May 8 findings and overlaps with Microsoft's earlier 250+ domain ClickFix campaign distributing MacSync and Atomic Stealer (AMOS).
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TuxBot v3: Inside an IoT Botnet Framework With LLM
Unit 42 uncovers TuxBot v3, an LLM-assisted IoT botnet framework with 17-architecture builds, Telnet brute-forcing, and DDoS capabilities.
Palo Alto Unit 42 identified TuxBot v3 Evolution, a modular IoT botnet framework derived from AISURU, Wuhan-lineage botnets, and MHDDoS. The C-based bot brute-forces Telnet with 1,496 credential pairs, targets over 30 IoT device families, and communicates with a Go-based C2 over encrypted TCP with multiple fallback mechanisms including DGA, P2P, and DNS TXT. LLM-assisted development left hallucinated crypto implementations and broken exploit modules in the analyzed samples, though roughly 70% of core functionality works. Researchers warn polished production builds likely exist, raising the threat potential.
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Hundreds of fake government websites target users in Central Asia
F6 uncovered 360+ fake government and news websites scamming Central Asians with bogus state payouts that harvest personal data and install mobile malware.
F6 researchers identified more than 360 fraudulent domains impersonating government portals and regional news outlets in Uzbekistan, Belarus and Tajikistan. Sites promise weekly payments such as 15 million Uzbek sums (about $1,300) to lure victims into submitting names and phone numbers. Scammers then call posing as personal managers, demanding fees, requesting passport scans, or directing victims to install a malicious mobile app that grants device control. The group behind the campaign is unidentified and victim counts are unknown.
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Fake Apple Support AI Calls Target Stolen-Device Owners for Passcodes and 2FA Codes
SOCRadar details AnonyMousKIT, a phishing-as-a-service platform using AI voice agents posing as Apple Support to steal passcodes and 2FA codes.
SOCRadar's Threat Research Unit documented AnonyMousKIT, a credit-metered phishing-as-a-service platform that strips Activation Lock from stolen Apple devices across email, SMS, WhatsApp, recorded calls and AI voice agents. The 'Alice from Apple Support' personas request the device passcode, Apple ID credentials and a live 2FA code, with lures citing the handset's model identifier and live Find My status. Of 200 recovered AI calls made between August 31, 2025 and May 30, 2026, 179 targeted Brazil, and the calls cost $19.24 total via voice platform Vapi. Exposed log paths revealed 30 kit installations on 42 domains and 6,092 send attempts family-wide between March and July 2026.
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