ZDI-26-701: Linux Kernel TLS Protocol Out-Of-Bounds Read Information Disclosure Vulnerability
ZDI discloses Linux Kernel TLS protocol out-of-bounds read (CVE-2026-64046) allowing high-privileged local attackers to disclose sensitive information, CVSS 6.7.
ZDI-26-701 covers an out-of-bounds read information disclosure vulnerability in the Linux Kernel TLS protocol implementation, tracked as CVE-2026-64046 with a CVSS rating of 6.7. Exploitation requires the attacker to already have the ability to execute high-privileged code on the target system. Impact is limited to disclosure of sensitive information from affected installations.
OpenSSL 4.1.0 Alpha1 Released With DTLS 1.3 and Faster Post-Quantum Cryptography
OpenSSL 4.1.0 Alpha1 adds DTLS 1.3 support, ML-DSA and ML-KEM post-quantum optimizations, and GREASE TLS compatibility, intended for testing only.
The alpha preview of OpenSSL 4.1.0 implements RFC 9147 DTLS 1.3 for UDP-based applications and integrates DTLS into the SSL listener API. It accelerates ML-DSA signatures and ML-KEM encapsulation with AVX-512 and VAES optimizations on x86_64, and adds GREASE (RFC 8701), IKEv2 KDF support, and Elbrus2000 (e2k) targets. The release is intended for testing and development, not production, and removes Windows-on-Itanium and Windows CE build targets.
Signing TLS handshakes inside a TPM
Blog post demonstrates signing TLS handshakes in Go with a TPM-held private key; full text was unavailable behind an Anubis challenge.
The title indicates a technique write-up on using a TPM-protected private key to sign TLS handshakes from Go. The full article text was not retrievable because the site serves an Anubis Hashcash-style proof-of-work challenge to automated fetchers, so no additional technical details (code, library, or threat model) could be extracted at collection time.
What your vendor says about PQC tells you if they are ready
Allot CTO outlines a telecom post-quantum migration playbook: inventory crypto, deploy hybrid ML-KEM on TLS first, and avoid missed interfaces.
Dr. Yaakov Stein, VP CTO of Allot, explains how mobile operators should triage post-quantum migration by data shelf life, protecting subscriber identity mappings, billing records, and call metadata that stay sensitive for years. He recommends starting with a comprehensive crypto inventory, then hybrid ML-KEM key exchange on TLS-protected 5G SBA and management interfaces, followed by IPsec backhaul and roaming links. Stein warns that migrations most often fail operationally through missed legacy interfaces such as SSH, RADIUS, or forgotten load balancers, and cites the early Kyber multi-packet TLS client hello issue as an example of middlebox incompatibility.