Search: “CaMeL”

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CVE-2026-80352: Apache Camel K: Camel K Master trait serviceAccountName YAML injection lets CR author apply arbitrary objects

Apache Camel K CVE-2026-80352 lets CR authors inject arbitrary Kubernetes objects via Master trait serviceAccountName YAML injection.

Apache disclosed a critical YAML injection vulnerability (CVE-2026-80352, improper control of code generation) in Apache Camel K's Master trait serviceAccountName setting. An authorized custom resource author can inject arbitrary Kubernetes objects, potentially enabling unauthorized resource manipulation. Affected versions are 2.0.0 before 2.9.3 and 2.10.1 before 2.10.2; fixes are available in 2.9.3 and 2.10.2.

oss-securitySep 10, 14:08 UTC · 5d agoVulnerability 3 sources CVE-2026-803521

Applying Security Engineering to Prompt Injection Security

Schneier on SecurityApr 29, 11:03 UTC · Apr 29, 2025AI safety & security

An Alternate Theory for How Life

404 MediaDec 7, 14:00 UTC · Dec 7, 2024Industry

EvoSafeHarness: Evolving Model- and Domain-Specific Harnesses for Securing Agents

EvoSafeHarness auto-synthesizes per-model, per-domain safety harnesses, cutting prompt-injection attack success on AgentDojo to 0.0% at 82.8% utility.

EvoSafeHarness is an optimization framework that synthesizes deployable safety harnesses for frozen LLM agents in a target domain, jointly searching natural-language policies and executable code logic guided by model behavior, domain specifications, and adversarial review. On DecodingTrust-Agent it reduces average attack success rate from 45.6% to 10.0% at a 3.3-point utility cost, and on AgentDojo reaches 82.8% utility at 0.0% ASR, twice CaMeL's utility at that operating point. It keeps mean ASR below 20% under adaptive PAIR attacks and transfers unchanged to unseen AgentDyn suites. The analysis finds domain semantics determine required safety relations while model and runtime behavior determine enforcement points.