35
35
North Korean Remote Workers Are Infiltrating Government and Businesses: How to Expose Them Before Hiring
Researchers expose DPRK remote IT worker infiltration tactics, including forged identities and AI-assisted interview behavior.
A joint investigation by Mauro Eldritch, Heiner García, and ANY.RUN hired suspected DPRK developers linked to Lazarus Group into controlled sandboxes, revealing forged IDs, remote-access tools, AI-assisted workflows, and VPN/VPS infrastructure. The FBI is investigating a North Korean remote IT worker who reportedly worked for a U.S. federal agency. The article outlines verification steps and indicators including VPS and AstrillVPN exit node IPs.
48
30
30
35
30
30
Almost Half of Malware Samples Communicate Direct to IP
Unit 42 analysis of 4 million malware reports finds 45% of C2-active samples connect directly to hard-coded IPs, bypassing DNS defenses.
Palo Alto Unit 42 analyzed over 4 million Advanced WildFire dynamic analysis reports and found that 45.32% of malware samples with C2 activity made at least one direct-to-IP connection, accounting for 23.17% of all C2 connection attempts. The firm proposes zero trust IP (ZT-IP), an enforcement approach that verifies whether outbound destinations were ever sanctioned by a DNS response. ZT-IP analysis surfaced Phorpiex ransomware droppers fetching payloads directly from C2 IPs, a persistent data exfiltration campaign using an obfuscated \GET protocol, and Mozi P2P botnet payloads delivered to IoT devices without DNS. Only 1% of benign samples connected directly to untrusted IP addresses.
55
30
30
30