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AWS Systems Manager Agent Vulnerability Allows Attackers to Bypass Port-Forwarding Restrictions
Critical SSRF flaw in AWS SSM Agent (CVE-2026-89049) lets authenticated users bypass link-local denylists and reach EC2 Instance Metadata Service for IAM credentials.
CVE-2026-89049 (Critical, CVSS v3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) affects Amazon SSM Agent versions earlier than 3.3.4851.0, with the fix shipping in 3.3.4851.0. The remote-host port-forwarding feature's denylist for link-local addresses can be bypassed because equivalent address representations are not validated, enabling SSRF to restricted endpoints such as the EC2 Instance Metadata Service at 169.254.169.254. An attacker with authenticated AWS access and ssm:StartSession permission could retrieve instance profile IAM credentials and pivot to S3, Secrets Manager, Lambda, or other cloud resources depending on role permissions.
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Off Guard: Breaking LiteLLM from authentication bypass to cloud compromise
Wiz found LiteLLM auth bypass (CVE-2026-59822) and post-auth RCE (CVE-2026-59821) chainable to cloud compromise; the bypass is in CISA KEV with in-the-wild exploitation.
Wiz scanned roughly 3,074 internet-facing LiteLLM deployments and found 9.6% accepted the default master key sk-1234 or required no authentication, making post-auth attacks effectively pre-auth. The MCP endpoint accepts any Bearer token and grants a valid session (CVE-2026-59822), confirmed exploited in the wild via honeypots and added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Custom code guardrails allow post-auth root-level RCE via exec(compile(...)) (CVE-2026-59821), while pass-through endpoints lack URL validation, enabling cloud credential theft in post-auth scenarios. All assigned vulnerabilities have been patched; the research was presented at DEF CON 34.
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UAT-10608: Inside a large-scale automated credential harvesting operation targeting web applications
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Hackers Leverage Claude to Exfiltrate Secrets from 1.8M Android apps
ShinyHunters-linked operators used Claude to scan 1.8M Android apps for hardcoded secrets, fueling intrusions across 40+ tenants.
Anthropic's September 2026 threat intelligence report describes a French-speaking operator (aliases MeowSHA, frkoo, blazespider) tied to ShinyHunters who ran 10 AWS EC2 workers and used Claude to decompile and scan 1.8 million Android APKs for hardcoded secrets with TruffleHog. Verified credentials were sorted into 100+ Telegram channels and paired with GitHub PAT harvesting, providing initial access for confirmed intrusions. In one supply-chain incident the actors extracted data from roughly 200 downstream customer organizations and dumped 2,100+ Azure AD token sets across 40+ corporate tenants in about 34 hours using AI agents. Anthropic banned tied accounts and stressed its own systems were not compromised.
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Threat Actors Use Claude AI Agents to Automate Cyberattacks and Steal Sensitive Data
Anthropic reports state-linked and criminal actors used Claude AI agents to automate espionage, extortion, and exploit development, stealing 300,000+ identity records and drone IP.
Anthropic's threat report details AI-driven campaigns disrupted between December 2025 and August 2026, including suspected Russian cluster GTG-20006, which targeted Ukrainian and European governments, defense firms, and drone supply chains using fully automated attack chains. The group stole over 300,000 national identity records and commercial-registry data on 500,000+ companies from a North African government technology authority, plus a proprietary drone-vision SDK. Suspected ShinyHunters affiliates decompiled 1.8 million Android APKs on 10 Amazon EC2 workers to find hardcoded secrets and abused stolen AI API keys, while the Chinese-speaking GTG-10007 cluster generated over a dozen potential zero-day findings against network appliances in one month.
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