ZeroHour
DashboardNewsCVEsExploitsIncidentsAIBriefAnalyticsEntitiesWatchlistIOCsAsk the feedSourcesFeeds & APIKiosk mode

Search: “revocation”

39 stories

Searchkeywordsmart Sortlatesthotimportancerelevance
DomainAllCyberAIWindow24h3d7d30dAllIn the wildImportant onlyShow duplicates
CategoryAllVulnerability 57Industry 40Malware 35Data breach 29Ransomware 28Policy & legal 24Phishing & fraud 23Exploit / PoC 21AI tools & infra 18Threat actor 17Research 13AI safety & security 12Advisory 5Tools 4
SeverityAllcritical 102high 55medium 63low 70info 40

This Key Will Self-Destruct: An Open Standard for Revocable API Keys

SecurityWeek opinion piece proposes ORKS, an open standard adding issuer prefixes, discovery files, and unauthenticated revocation endpoints to make leaked API keys quickly revocable.

The article argues that plain API keys leak frequently yet lack any standardized revocation mechanism, unlike OAuth tokens which gained RFC 7009 revocation in 2013, and that GitHub's Secret Scanning Partner Program solves this only in a proprietary, invite-only way. The author proposes ORKS (Open Revocable Key Standard), with a draft spec on GitHub, built on four parts: keys embedding their issuer domain in a fixed prefix format, a discoverable /.well-known/api-key-config JSON file, unauthenticated revocation by possession of the full key, and declared constraints such as IP allowlists, expiry, scopes, and mTLS. An optional quarantine mode inspired by Toyota's andon cord restricts a reported key to read-only and throttled operation for a default 24-hour window before automatic revocation. The piece frames AI agents as making this urgent, since agents hold many credentials, can exfiltrate them via prompt injection, and can leak secrets into logs at machine speed.

SecurityWeek · 7d agoTools1

Revoked but Still Authoritative: An Empirical Study of Revocation Enforcement in Agent-Memory Systems

An empirical study finds no major agent-memory system enforces fact revocation at retrieval, causing agents to act on superseded, unsafe information.

Researchers tested five agent-memory systems across nine policy scenarios, nine models, and six defense conditions, tracking whether revoked facts are returned and acted upon. No system enforces revocation by default: revoked records are returned whenever the revocation label is visible to the retrieval layer, outrank their replacements, and lead agents to unsafe actions. The authors propose a backend-agnostic guard that sits between the agent and any memory store and withholds revoked or conflicting records at retrieval time.

arXiv cs.CR · 8d agoAI safety & security

Apple Reference Image: A New Approach for Verified Photography

Apple introduces Reference Image, hardware-backed verifiable photography on iPhone 18 Pro using sensor signing and Private Cloud Compute to counter AI-generated fakes.

Apple announced Reference Image, an opt-in camera mode debuting on the main sensor of iPhone 18 Pro and iPhone 18 Pro Max that produces securely timestamped, verifiable photographs. The design splits into two phases: a secure digital negative created by cryptographically signing pixel data at the sensor immediately after capture (preventing injection or tampering), then developing that negative into a reference image. Private Cloud Compute handles processing without exposing image contents to anyone, including Apple, and fraudulent reference images can be revoked without revealing the photographer's identity. Apple positions the system as stronger than C2PA-based approaches, which sign metadata after capture, are vulnerable to editing-chain compromise, and can tie images to a device or individual.

Hacker News · security · 12h agoResearchHN 25↑ · 18 comments

ResidualAuth: What Authorization State Must Language Agents Preserve under Revocable Delegation?

Formalizes residual authorization state language agents must preserve under revocable delegation; token-budget summaries mostly fail while hard gates stop unauthorized effects.

The paper shows two authorization histories with identical current permissions can require opposite decisions after the same direct-edge revocation, formalizing the needed information as residual authorization state. Exponentially many future-distinct states can share one transitive closure, with exact or tight asymptotic bounds on the state an exact monitor requires. Across four open-weight models, fixed 256-token summaries solved at most 2 of 16 paired episodes while authenticated current-query reads solved 15-16 of 16. A hard effect gate reduced eight observed unauthorized effects to zero without changing preceding attempts.

arXiv cs.CR · 8d agoResearch

CISA and NIST Release Technical Checklist for Safeguarding Identity Tokens From Theft and Misuse

CISA and NIST published NIST IR 8587, final guidance for protecting identity tokens from forgery, theft, replay, and signing-key compromise.

NIST Interagency Report 8587 (September 15, 2026) expands the IA-13 'Identity Providers and Authorization Servers' control from NIST SP 800-53 R5.1.1, guiding federal agencies and cloud providers on SSO, identity federation, and machine-to-machine authentication. It requires hardware-backed signing-key storage for moderate-impact systems, 90-day key rotation for high-impact systems, token lifetimes under one hour, and sender-constrained mechanisms such as mutual TLS and DPoP. The report cites incidents including forged SAML assertions that exposed over 60,000 emails from a federal agency. It also extends guidance to agentic AI systems using signed tokens and urges post-quantum cryptography migration planning.

Cyber Security News · 22h agoAdvisory1

RightCrowd Pass unifies mobile, physical, and biometric credentials

RightCrowd launched Pass, a credentialing platform unifying mobile, physical, and biometric access credentials, cutting credential revocation from 12.2 minutes to under 60 seconds.

RightCrowd announced Pass, a solution that issues and manages mobile, physical, and biometric access credentials from a single platform instead of fragmented badge programs. Mobile credentials are provisioned through a web-based API and can be suspended or revoked individually or in groups in under 60 seconds, versus an average 12.2 minutes for handling a lost or damaged physical badge. Each mobile credential is tied to a device via two-factor authentication, works with HID, Wavelynx, and LEGIC infrastructure, and counts toward LEED and BREEAM sustainability credits. The product is available now to new and existing customers and can be added to current RightCrowd SmartAccess deployments.

Help Net Security · 21d agoTools

NIST and CISA finalize playbook to stop token theft and forgery

NIST and CISA finalized NIST IR 8587, a playbook helping federal agencies and cloud providers defend identity tokens against theft and forgery.

The finalized NIST IR 8587 guidance covers protecting token signing keys, verifying tokens, lifetimes, revocation, session management, and dividing security responsibilities between cloud providers and customers. It cites an incident in which foreign actors forged tokens with a stolen commercial signing key to steal more than 60,000 emails from one government agency. It also recommends extending token protections to AI agents and preparing identity systems for a future post-quantum cryptography transition.

Help Net Security · 7h agoAdvisory 2 sources

12 Best Endpoint Privilege Management (EPM) Tools Compared (2026): Features & Pricing

A 2026 buyer's guide compares 12 endpoint privilege management tools, ranking CyberArk and BeyondTrust as enterprise leaders.

An editorial comparison evaluates 12 endpoint privilege management (EPM) tools on elevation control, manageability, and pricing model. The guide argues that standing local-admin rights fuel ransomware and lateral movement, making their removal a high-impact control that cyber insurers increasingly mandate. CyberArk and BeyondTrust are positioned as enterprise-depth leaders, with Delinea, Heimdal, and ManageEngine for the mid-market, and Admin By Request and CyberFOX AutoElevate for SMBs and MSPs. Pricing is generally per endpoint or per user, and the article is explicitly an assessment rather than a product release or incident report.

GBHackersupdated · 5h agofirst · 5d agoIndustry 13 sources

Sakana AI Launches Fugu Max and Fugu Ultra v2 for Cheaper, Stronger Multi-Agent Orchestration

Sakana AI released Fugu Max and Fugu Ultra v2, API-only orchestrator models that route tasks across model pools to cut costs and boost multi-step reasoning.

Sakana AI released Fugu Max and Fugu Ultra v2, two orchestrator models that route queries across a pool of third-party and open-weights models, including the NVIDIA Nemotron family. Fugu Max is priced at $2 per million input and $6 per million output tokens, 40-60% cheaper per output token than Sonnet 5, GPT 5.6 Terra, and Kimi K3, and reportedly wins 6 benchmarks including Terminal Bench 2.1 and GPQA Diamond. Fugu Ultra v2 targets complex multi-step reasoning, scoring 48.3 on Chartography and 74.3 on DeepSWE. Both are live through Sakana's OpenAI-compatible API only, with no open weights and no EU/EEA availability.

MarkTechPost · 5d agoModel release

A new open standard locks AI weights to approved hardware

OPAQUE releases Weight Custody Manifest, an open standard keeping AI model weights encrypted until receiving hardware cryptographically attests to builder-specified conditions.

OPAQUE, a confidential computing company, released the Weight Custody Manifest (WCM) standard as a developer-preview specification with a Python SDK and a public test suite of 91 cases. WCM keeps model weights encrypted until the receiving infrastructure proves via CPU/GPU attestation that it matches builder-signed conditions, and decryption access can be revoked later if conditions change. OPAQUE says it ran the attestation exchange on an NVIDIA H100 and on AMD and Intel confidential servers hosted on Azure and Google Cloud, with two independent SDK builds producing identical output across 5,948 files. The public quickstart only exercises protocol logic on synthetic evidence and skips GPU cryptographic verification, and the standard cannot distinguish an authorized key from one physically extracted from hardware.

Help Net Security · 6d agoAI safety & security

AD Rights Management Service (Part 2): Extraction, Offline Decryption, and the Unrotatable Key

Huntress research shows AD RMS SLC root key is unrotatable and never expires, so its compromise permanently exposes all RMS-protected documents.

Part 2 of Huntress's AD RMS series details server-side attacks: extracting the Server Licensor Certificate (SLC) private key and performing offline decryption of protected documents. The SLC key has no expiry or rotation mechanism, with a 255-year certificate validity (2002–2258), so whoever recovers it can decrypt every document the deployment ever protected, indefinitely. The author released SharpRMS, a unified tool combining the 2016 DisARMS client-side attacks with new server-side key extraction and decryption capabilities. The research frames the SLC as comparable to KRBTGT and the DPAPI domain backup key, though not equivalent to domain compromise.

Huntress · 6d agoResearch

Why Johnny Can't Encrypt: A Usability Evaluation of PGP 5.0 (1999)

Seminal 1999 USENIX study finds most novice users cannot correctly sign and encrypt email with PGP 5.0 in 90 minutes.

Whitten and Tygar's USENIX Security Symposium paper evaluates whether cryptography novices can use PGP 5.0 effectively, using cognitive walkthrough analysis and a laboratory user test. The majority of test participants failed to successfully sign and encrypt a message within 90 minutes, despite PGP 5.0 having a well-regarded graphical interface. The authors argue that security requires usability standards beyond those of general consumer software and propose domain-specific UI design principles for security. The paper is a foundational reference in usable security research.

Lobsters · security · 7d agoResearch

Securing AI agents: Key controls and best practices

Security experts warn AI agents with employee-level privileges outpace human access controls and advise layered enforcement, sandboxing, and approval gates.

CSO reports that enterprises granting AI agents credentials, tools, and network access face risks that human-focused identity controls cannot contain, including machine-speed action chaining and sub-agent spawning. Experts from Strike Graph, Veracode, Delinea, and XBOW recommend treating agents as privileged insiders with hard technical boundaries: egress proxies with allowlists, short-lived brokered tokens, separated read/write rights, and approval for high-risk actions. XBOW describes a layered architecture with a guardian model reviewing agent actions and per-agent audit files. OWASP guidance on excessive agency urges limiting agent functions, permissions, and autonomy with authorization enforced downstream.

CSO Online · 8d agoAI safety & security

When Intelligence Becomes Agency: A Theory of Governed, Proactive Agency for Symbiotic AI Systems

Researchers propose a formal framework for governed proactive AI agency, linking activation decisions to continuing authorization, accountability, and bounded delegation in symbiotic systems.

The paper defines the activation problem: persistent AI assistants must decide whether a situation warrants behavior, and whether to act, ask, monitor, defer, or deliberately refrain. It distinguishes autonomous from delegated agency and defines symbiotic agency as delegation under a standing, revocable mandate, coupled to the principal's situation with calibrated inference and bounded personalization. The framework links activation decisions to authorized perception, behavior selection, authority containment, traceable restraint, and constrained adaptation, and provides an agency classification method, evaluation framework, benchmark scenarios, and reference architecture for always-present assistants and embodied support systems.

arXiv cs.AI / cs.LG / cs.CL · 8d agoAI safety & security

How to secure edge AI in customer-owned environments

Microsoft outlines security architecture guidance for edge AI, urging runtime attestation, artifact provenance, and deterministic mediation of model actions.

Microsoft details how edge AI shifts trust responsibilities to customers operating their own infrastructure, where prompt injection, model tampering, and malicious firmware updates can occur alongside model weights, credentials, and physical-system access. The guidance recommends verifying runtimes with attestation, verifying AI artifacts with provenance, and constraining model actions through a deterministic mediator outside the model. It also covers new exposure surfaces from MCP, multi-agent systems, and computer-use agents running in disconnected or hostile edge environments.

Microsoft Security Blog · 11d agoAI safety & security

What vulnerability prioritization looks like when KEV, EPSS, and CVSS disagree

Cohesity field CISO Joye Purser ranks KEV over EPSS over CVSS and urges 24-72 hour patching of exploited internet-facing systems.

In a Help Net Security interview, Cohesity Global Field CISO Joye Purser lays out a vulnerability prioritization framework that puts active exploitation (KEV) first, then exploit likelihood (EPSS), then technical severity (CVSS), adjusted for asset exposure, business criticality, and compensating controls. She endorses 24-72 hour remediation targets for critical exploited internet-facing vulnerabilities and describes the organizational tradeoffs and emergency procedures needed to hit them. The interview also covers honeypot failure modes when deception systems are over-connected or over-trusted, and budget guidance recommending OT/IT segmentation, phishing-resistant MFA, and tested recovery for a 400-person manufacturer.

Help Net Security · 16d agoIndustry

CISA Red Team Compromised Two Critical Infrastructure Orgs, One Detected Nothing

CISA red teams fully compromised two critical infrastructure orgs with similar tradecraft; one detected nothing, the other contained phishing within minutes.

CISA advisory AA26-237A, 'A Tale of Two SOCs,' describes two simultaneous red team assessments of a Government Services organization and a Water and Wastewater Systems organization, both compromised to the domain level. Organization A never detected the intrusion, enabled by default credentials, a misconfigured AD CS template (ESC1), cleartext credentials, non-expiring static AWS keys, and over-permissioned Entra ID applications. Organization B detected and isolated phishing within 2-20 minutes, though the red team still reached krbtgt via DCSync from cleartext SCCM credentials. CISA attributes the outcome gap to people and processes rather than the security tools themselves.

The Hacker News · 21d agoAdvisory

Microsoft Copilot Personal Flaws Could Let One Click Exfiltrate Data From Connected Apps

Varonis discloses CoSnitch (CVE-2026-24301), three Microsoft Copilot Personal flaws enabling one-click exfiltration of connected-app data; patched August 18, 2026.

Varonis Threat Labs found that an undocumented autorun=1 parameter, paired with the q parameter, lets an attacker-supplied prompt run automatically on page load in a victim's authenticated Copilot session, then exfiltrate data from connected services such as mail, calendar, Google Drive, chat history and the memory store via Copilot's built-in URL fetch to an attacker webhook. A separate memory-poisoning path through web summarization lets a crafted page persist attacker instructions in the user's memory, surviving password changes, session revocation and device re-enrollment. Microsoft shipped patches on August 18, 2026, tracked as CVE-2026-24301, and Varonis found no evidence of in-the-wild exploitation. The flaws were found via 'meta-hacking', asking Copilot itself to reveal the autorun parameter and its protections.

The Hacker News · 28d agoAI safety & securityCVE-2026-24301CVE-2026-242991