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How RingCentral builds AI-native work from engineering to ops
OpenAI's case study describes RingCentral using ChatGPT Work and Codex to accelerate AI product development and centralize operational intelligence across engineering and operations.
OpenAI published a customer story on RingCentral's adoption of ChatGPT Work and Codex. RingCentral reportedly uses the tools to speed up AI product development and centralize operational intelligence across engineering and operations. The post is promotional rather than technical and describes no security incidents.
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Risky Bulletin: White House lets private companies carry out offensive cyber ops
A White House memo directs DHS to create a program letting vetted private companies conduct US-government-directed offensive cyber operations against cybercrime.
A presidential memo tasks the DHS National Coordination Center with building a program, under DOJ and DHS oversight, through which private-sector companies can conduct offensive cyber operations against large-scale cybercrime organizations. Requirements include secure facilities, vetted personnel, a $1 million escrow for damages, and written approvals co-signed by DHS and DOJ executive directors. The program must launch within 60 days, around October 11, expanding a March executive order targeting scam compounds, ransomware, and other large-scale cybercrime.
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Phishing Attacks Serve Browser-in-the-Browser Pages, Rogue RMM Persistence
Phishing emails with browser-in-the-browser fake Adobe pages trick users into installing rogue ScreenConnect clients granting persistent remote access.
Huntress SOC investigated two August incidents where phishing links led to fake CAPTCHA checks and Adobe PDF Reader lures rendered as browser-in-the-browser (BiTB) pages spoofing legitimate domains like get.adobe.com. Victims downloaded what they believed was Acrobat Reader but actually installed ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.exe from attacker infrastructure, yielding two rogue ScreenConnect clients with service-based persistence. The attacker used cmd.exe and curl to stage a second client connecting to 144.172.115.59, leveraged a ScreenConnect Trial Relay domain for stealth, and ran HideCursor.exe as a defense-evasion binary. Incident 2 arrived via AT&T Office@Hand (RingCentral), with both chains stopped before broader impact.
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