57
60
New Passkey Attacks Can Recover Synced Private Keys or Bypass Phishing
Three research teams showed passkey bypasses: WebAuthn assertion replay in Microsoft Entra ID, synced-passkey key recovery in Google Password Manager, and Windows Hello key reuse.
SpecterOps' Pass-the-Passkey research showed Windows stored past YubiKey signatures in cleartext and chained this with Microsoft Entra ID passkey validation weaknesses to impersonate privileged users despite phishing-resistant MFA; the Windows Event Logging Service issue is tracked as CVE-2026-34348 (CVSS 6.5) and fixed in July 2026 updates. Unit 42's Golden Pass-ta-key attack recovered the 32-byte Security Domain Secret protecting Google Password Manager synced passkeys from Chrome on Windows via pre-existing malware. Dirk-jan Mollema showed in-session malware can use a hardware-bound Windows Hello for Business key without a fresh PIN or biometric check. Microsoft applied Entra-side mitigations for the relay assertion issue; no real-world exploitation has been reported.
65
42
45
30
45
55
30
Apple iCloud Private Relay Can Expose Real IPs Through WebKit Proxy Bypasses
Researchers found WebKit features bypass proxies and iCloud Private Relay, leaking users' real IP addresses; Apple patched in iOS 26.6.1 and macOS 26.6.2.
Researchers Talal Haj Bakry and Tommy Mysk found that three WebKit features — DNS prefetching, WebAuthn Related Origin Requests, and WebTransport — bypass configured proxies and send traffic directly from the device. This leaks the user's real IP address in Safari and all WebKit-based iOS browsers and undermines iCloud Private Relay's dual-hop privacy design. Any website can trigger the leak via WebAuthn without user interaction or passkey use; a proof-of-concept site, leaks.psylo.app, demonstrates the issue. Apple investigated and patched the leaks in iOS 26.6.1 and macOS 26.6.2.
58
30
57
30
57
60
57
55
30
42
30
30
Stop Telling People Not To Click Links
Tailscale CEO argues link-clicking is not the problem; deploying phishing-resistant authentication like passkeys and WebAuthn eliminates entire attack classes.
Tailscale CEO Avery Pennarun argues in an opinion piece that clicking links is a symptom, not the disease, and that weak authentication is the real failure behind phishing damage. He advocates phishing-resistant FIDO/WebAuthn, passkeys, and device-bound tokens, plus continuous identity-anchored network access so unexpected login prompts become suspicious signals. He argues this approach makes security less burdensome for users while neutralizing credential replay and fake login pages.
15
iAuthFlow v2: The $10,000 Phishing Toolkit That Survives Your Password Reset
Abnormal Security details iAuthFlow v2, a $10,000 phishing kit that enrolls attacker-controlled passkeys on Google accounts, persisting through password resets.
Abnormal Security analyzed iAuthFlow v2, a phishing toolkit sold on a Russian-language cybercrime forum for a $10,000 base price with additional capability modules sold separately. Using a browser-in-the-middle relay behind a trycloudflare.com subdomain with valid TLS, it captures Google logins and uses the authenticated session to enroll an attacker-controlled passkey within six seconds of login. Because the passkey persists after password changes and session revocation, operators regain mailbox access even after victims reset credentials. The build examined targets Google, while the seller advertises versions for Microsoft, iCloud, and LinkedIn.
63
57
60
30
57
45
55
30
42
45
30
30
30
30
30
55
60
30