Vulnerabilities

Open WebUI rendered terminal port content in an iframe sandbox that combined both allow-scripts and allow-same-origin, which provides no effective isolation because the terminal proxy serves that content from the Open WebUI origin itself. An authenticated user with access to a shared terminal server can host malicious script on a previewed port, and when another user opens that preview the script executes in the Open WebUI origin. The attacker's script can then hijack the victim's session and act on their behalf, yielding account takeover with high impact to confidentiality and integrity. All Open WebUI deployments running version 0.8.11 up to (but not including) 0.11.1 are affected, primarily multi-user instances where a terminal server is shared among users. No public proof of concept is known and the issue is not in CISA KEV, so there is no confirmed exploitation in the wild to date.

Do: Upgrade to Open WebUI 0.11.1 or later, which removes the sandbox misconfiguration in the port preview. Until patched, restrict access to the shared terminal server to trusted users, discourage or disable the terminal port-preview feature for untrusted users, or serve terminal proxy content from a separate origin. Verify your currently deployed version and audit which accounts have access to the shared terminal server.

open-webui before 0.3.14 contains a cross-origin resource sharing misconfiguration allowing arbitrary origins with allow_origins=* and authenticated requests to the /api/v1/functions endpoint. Attackers can execute arbitrary code on the openwebui instance by crafting malicious cross-site requests from attacker-controlled websites when an admin user visits them.

Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. Prior to 0.10.0, get_event_call delivered execute:python and execute:tool Socket.IO events to a client-supplied session_id after checking only that the session was connected, allowing authenticated users who learned another socket ID through ydoc:document:join to run code interpreter Python or tools in that user session. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.

Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py::_process_picture_url calls validate_url(picture_url) on the initial URL only, then invokes aiohttp.ClientSession.get(picture_url, ...) without allow_redirects=False. aiohttp's default is allow_redirects=True, max_redirects=10; the function does not pass the project's AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS env constant either. An attacker with a valid OAuth IdP identity can therefore submit a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address and read the internal response body via the attacker's own profile_image_url field. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6.