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Nearly 1 in 10 Exposed LiteLLM Gateways Accepted the Example "sk-1234" Admin Key

Wiz found 294 of 3,074 internet-facing LiteLLM gateways accepted the documented default admin key sk-1234, exposing provider API keys and cloud IAM credentials.

Wiz Research's February Shodan scan found 3,074 LiteLLM gateways, 294 of which accepted the setup guide's sk-1234 admin key; 191 had no master key set and would accept any credential. The master key doubles as the authentication switch, and before 1.82.0-stable a gateway started without one granted every request full admin rights, exposing stored provider API keys, prompts, and MCP-connected tools. A documented pass-through endpoint lacks checks against private and cloud metadata addresses, letting an admin-key holder retrieve cloud IAM credentials, though no real-world abuse is reported. Related LiteLLM flaws include CVE-2026-59821 (disputed guardrail code execution), CVE-2026-59822 (CVSS 8.8, added to CISA KEV on September 2 and observed against Wiz honeypots), and CVE-2026-42271, used to install a cryptominer.

The Hacker Newsupdated · 5d agofirst · 5d agoVulnerability in the wild 4 sourcesCVE-2026-59821CVE-2026-59822CVE-2026-42271+2 CVEs

Related CVEs

  • Unauthenticated MCP Endpoint Authentication Bypass in BerriAI LiteLLM
    BerriAI LiteLLM, a widely used self-hosted AI gateway and proxy server for calling LLM APIs, fails to properly authenticate requests to its MCP Streamable HTTP endpoint in versions prior to 1.84.0. An unauthenticated attacker can send a fabricated Authorization header that triggers an OAuth2 passthrough fallback, which replaces failed LiteLLM key validation with an empty UserAPIKeyAuth() object and lets the request reach MCP tooling without any valid LiteLLM key. Successful exploitation grants unauthenticated access to the gateway's MCP tooling with high confidentiality impact per the CVSS 4.0 score of 8.8, and public reporting describes attackers chaining LiteLLM weaknesses from authentication bypass to root code execution and cloud credential theft. Any organization running LiteLLM before 1.84.0 is affected, particularly gateways exposed to the internet. The flaw is confirmed exploited in the wild: CISA added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2026-09-02, while EPSS currently estimates a 0.9% probability of exploitation in the next 30 days.
    · BerriAI LiteLLM all versions prior to 1.84.0 (fixed in 1.84.0) KEVmoderate
  • Command Injection in BerriAI LiteLLM AI Gateway Exploited in the Wild
    CVE-2026-42271 is a command injection (CWE-77/CWE-78) in BerriAI LiteLLM's proxy server, a widely used AI gateway for calling LLM APIs. Two MCP preview endpoints (POST /mcp-rest/test/connection and POST /mcp-rest/test/tools/list) accept a full stdio server configuration, including command, args, and env fields, and spawn the supplied command as a subprocess on the proxy host; the endpoints are gated only by any valid proxy API key with no role check, so even low-privilege internal-user keys can trigger it. An attacker with any authenticated key gains arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the proxy process, and reporting indicates attackers are chaining the flaw into broader takeover of AI gateway servers, including reverse shells and crypto miners, in some cases via weak or default keys such as the example 'sk-1234' admin key. Any organization running LiteLLM versions 1.74.2 through before 1.83.7, including LiteLLM distributed with Red Hat OpenShift AI, is affected. The flaw was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2026-06-08 and is under active attack, with a very high EPSS of 83.6% for exploitation within 30 days.
    · BerriAI LiteLLM (proxy server / AI Gateway) 1.74.2 up to but not including 1.83.7 (fixed in 1.83.7) · Red Hat OpenShift AI KEVmoderate
  • HTTP Request Smuggling in Kludex Starlette (CVE-2026-48710)
    Kludex Starlette prior to version 1.0.1 did not validate the HTTP Host request header before using it to reconstruct request.url, an inconsistency classified as HTTP request/response smuggling (CWE-444). Because routing operates on the raw ASGI scope path while request.url is rebuilt from the unvalidated Host header, an attacker can send a malformed Host header so that request.url.path differs from the path the router actually processed. Any middleware or endpoint that enforces security restrictions based on request.url rather than the raw scope path can then be tricked into approving requests that should have been blocked, bypassing those controls. All Starlette deployments below 1.0.1 are affected, both direct users and downstream products that bundle the library, including Red Hat offerings such as Ansible Automation Platform, OpenShift AI, OpenShift Lightspeed, Satellite, AI Inference Server, Migration Toolkit for Applications, and Enterprise Linux AI. CISA added the flaw to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2026-09-02, confirming active exploitation; related reporting describes attackers deploying reverse shells and crypto miners, and EPSS ranks it in the 98th percentile with a 36.3% probability of exploitation within 30 days.
    · Kludex (Encode) Starlette All versions prior to 1.0.1 · Red Hat AI Inference Server KEV PoC ×3mass
  • LiteLLM through 2026-04-08 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via bytecode rewriting at the /guardrails/test_custom_code URI.
    LiteLLM through 2026-04-08 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via bytecode rewriting at the /guardrails/test_custom_code URI.
    · litellm litellm PoC
  • LiteLLM is a proxy server (AI Gateway) to call LLM APIs in OpenAI (or native) format.
    LiteLLM is a proxy server (AI Gateway) to call LLM APIs in OpenAI (or native) format. Prior to 1.82.0-stable, LiteLLM's Custom Code Guardrails production create and update paths did not apply the same sandboxing and validation used by the test endpoint, allowing a privileged user with access to create or update guardrails to submit custom Python code that executed in the LiteLLM proxy environment and could expose secrets available to the process. This issue is fixed in version 1.82.0-stable.
    · litellm litellm

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