Multiple attackers are exploiting three JFrog Artifactory CVEs, including critical auth-bypass CVE-2026-82329, to gain admin access and install backdoors.
Wiz confirmed in-the-wild exploitation of all three JFrog Artifactory vulnerabilities: CVE-2026-42018 (high, improper authentication token leak), CVE-2026-42016 (high, privilege escalation), and CVE-2026-82329 (critical, unauthenticated authentication bypass). Starting August 15, attackers chained the first two bugs against self-hosted instances to gain admin access and dropped a custom Rust backdoor for C2; from September 1-8 several attackers exploited CVE-2026-82329. Post-exploitation included persistent admin accounts, Groovy plugins for remote code execution, web shells, token minting, key theft, and reconnaissance. Patching velocity has been slow, with 49-62% of organizations still vulnerable to individual bugs weeks after fixes were released.
Attackers chain JFrog Artifactory flaws CVE-2026-42018 and CVE-2026-42016 to gain admin tokens and deploy a Rust backdoor on self-hosted servers.
Wiz observed multiple threat actors chaining CVE-2026-42018 and CVE-2026-42016 against self-hosted JFrog Artifactory instances between August 15 and September 8, 2026, in some cases obtaining admin access in under five minutes. The critical authentication bypass CVE-2026-82329 was also exploited this month to mint administrator tokens. Attackers installed malicious Groovy plugins, dropped a Rust backdoor with C2 capabilities, uploaded webshells, stole configuration data and cluster join keys, and added SSH keys to new accounts. Wiz estimates 49-62% of internet-reachable Artifactory instances are vulnerable to at least one of the three flaws, and patched releases from 7.111.21 through 7.161.20 are available.
Wiz Research observes multiple attackers exploiting three JFrog Artifactory flaws, including default-configuration authentication bypass CVE-2026-82329, to gain admin access and deploy backdoors.
Attackers chain CVE-2026-42018 and CVE-2026-42016 to exchange anonymous JWTs for administrator-scoped tokens, or exploit CVE-2026-82329 directly via the registry join endpoint to obtain admin privileges under default configuration. Post-exploitation observed by Wiz includes persistent admin users created within five minutes, malicious Groovy plugins for command execution, and Rust-based backdoors dropped to /tmp, /var/tmp, and /dev/shm with C2 communications. Compromise exposes software artifacts, repository credentials, CI/CD integrations, and cluster secrets, creating supply chain risks. Fixed releases include 7.111.21, 7.117.28, 7.125.20, 7.133.29, 7.146.38, and 7.161.20.
Wiz observed active exploitation of three JFrog Artifactory flaws used to mint admin tokens, deploy malicious plugins, and install Rust backdoors on self-hosted servers.
JFrog Artifactory flaws CVE-2026-42016, CVE-2026-42018, and CVE-2026-82329 are being actively exploited against self-hosted instances, enabling token exposure, token scope abuse, and a critical default-configuration authentication bypass. Wiz observed attackers chaining CVE-2026-42018 and CVE-2026-42016 from August 15 to September 8, 2026, creating persistent administrator accounts in under five minutes, deploying malicious Groovy plugins, and installing Rust-based backdoors. At disclosure, 67-69 percent of Wiz-monitored organizations ran vulnerable instances; fixed releases include 7.111.21, 7.117.28, 7.125.20, 7.133.29, 7.146.38, and 7.161.20 or later depending on branch.
Attackers chained JFrog Artifactory flaws CVE-2026-42018 and CVE-2026-42016 for admin control, planting Rust backdoors; CVE-2026-82329 also mass-exploited.
Wiz observed attackers chaining CVE-2026-42018 (anonymous-token leak) and CVE-2026-42016 (token escalation) in self-hosted JFrog Artifactory between August 15 and September 8, gaining admin control, creating admin accounts, and installing malicious Groovy plugins and a custom Rust backdoor. Separately, critical authentication bypass CVE-2026-82329 (CVSS 9.8) was mass-exploited starting September 1, drawing ~406,000 exploitation attempts on September 2 per Fastly. CISA added CVE-2026-82329 to KEV on September 2 with a September 5 federal deadline. Patching does not revoke minted tokens or rotate stolen join keys; admins must review accounts and rotate credentials.
GBHackers ranks 10 CNAPP platforms for 2026, naming Wiz, Prisma Cloud, and Microsoft Defender for Cloud as category leaders.
The guide describes CNAPP as the umbrella combining CSPM, CWPP, CIEM, and DSPM, arguing that cross-pillar correlation of attack paths is the platform's core value. Wiz is ranked best for graph-based correlation, Prisma Cloud for the broadest module set, and Microsoft Defender for Cloud for Azure economics. It also cites Google's approximately $32 billion agreement to acquire Wiz, announced in March 2025, as buyer leverage and a reason to seek roadmap and neutrality protections in multi-year contracts.
Editorial scorecard ranks 2026 cloud workload protection platforms, placing Prisma Cloud first, Sysdig second, and CrowdStrike third on detection quality.
A research-based scorecard rates ten cloud workload protection (CWPP) platforms across runtime depth, container/Kubernetes support, coverage breadth, cloud context, and value. Palo Alto Prisma Cloud leads at 8.9, followed by Sysdig at 8.8 and CrowdStrike at 8.6, with Aqua Security tying CrowdStrike at 8.6. The piece argues agent-versus-agentless is a false choice, with leaders now pairing agentless visibility with eBPF-based runtime sensors. Scores are editorial assessments, not lab benchmarks.
2026 CSPM comparison ranks Wiz atop cloud posture tools and recaps Google's pending roughly $32 billion acquisition of Wiz.
An editorial guide rates ten cloud security posture management (CSPM) tools, with Wiz ranked first for agentless visibility and attack-path context, Microsoft Defender for Cloud highlighted for Azure-centric economics, and Palo Alto Prisma Cloud noted for the broadest code-to-cloud module set. The article's biggest market note is Google's agreement to acquire Wiz for approximately $32 billion, described as the largest deal in security history, still progressing through regulatory review. It advises buyers to include roadmap-protection language in multi-year commitments and to press on multicloud neutrality post-close.
Wiz Research confirms in-the-wild exploitation of three JFrog Artifactory vulnerabilities, chained to gain administrative control, deploy Groovy plugins, and install Rust backdoors.
Wiz Research identified active exploitation of CVE-2026-42016, CVE-2026-42018, and CVE-2026-82329 in JFrog Artifactory between August 15 and September 8, 2026. Attackers chain the anonymous-token exposure (CVE-2026-42018) with the token scope-validation flaw (CVE-2026-42016) to obtain admin-scoped tokens, while CVE-2026-82329 allows unauthenticated administrative access in default configurations. Observed post-exploitation includes persistent administrator accounts created in under five minutes, malicious Groovy plugin deployment, ad-hoc command execution, Rust-based C2 backdoors dropped to writable paths, and webshell uploads. Wiz measured that 59-62% of organizations running Artifactory remained vulnerable to the chained CVEs weeks after disclosure, and the vulnerabilities were already included in CISA KEV.
Wiz found multiple LiteLLM AI gateway flaws, including a CVE-2026-59822 MCP auth bypass added to CISA KEV, enabling root code execution and cloud credential theft.
An internet scan of 3,074 exposed LiteLLM instances found 294 (9.6%) accepting the default sk-1234 master key and 191 (6.2%) requiring no authentication. CVE-2026-59822 lets a single-character Bearer token establish a valid MCP session via an OAuth2 fallback in versions before 1.84.0; the flaw is in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. CVE-2026-59821 allows Python code execution as root in the gateway container via unsanitized Custom Code Guardrails registration before 1.82.0-stable, and CVE-2026-35029 permits config changes leading to RCE and admin takeover. Admin access plus pass-through endpoints can reach cloud metadata services to steal IAM credentials.
Wiz disclosed LiteLLM flaws including CVE-2026-59822 MCP auth bypass, now in CISA KEV, enabling root RCE and AWS credential theft from exposed gateways.
Wiz researchers disclosed weaknesses in the open-source LiteLLM AI gateway: CVE-2026-59821 allows authenticated administrators to execute code as root via the Custom Code Guardrails feature, while CVE-2026-59822 is an MCP authentication bypass where a meaningless Bearer token establishes a valid session. The MCP bypass was observed in the wild through Wiz honeypots and added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on September 2. A scan of 3,074 internet-facing instances found 294 (9.6%) accepting the default master key sk-1234 or lacking authentication. Fixes shipped in LiteLLM 1.82.0 (guardrail hardening) and 1.84.0 (MCP bypass); exposed instances can leak provider API keys and temporary AWS IAM credentials via the pass-through feature and metadata service, with a related config-check issue tracked as CVE-2026-35029.
Wiz for Gov achieved GovRAMP High authorization, validating NIST SP 800-53r5 controls for state, local government, and higher-education cloud security procurement.
Wiz announced that Wiz for U.S. Government has officially achieved GovRAMP High authorization, validating it against NIST SP 800-53r5 security controls required for highly sensitive state data and critical infrastructure. The 'verify once, serve many' designation is aimed at state, local government, and higher education procurement. Wiz positions its CNAPP as providing code-to-runtime visibility, risk prioritization, compliance automation, and AI pipeline security. Existing Wiz for Gov customers automatically inherit the high-baseline controls without migration.
Cyber Security News ranks 2026 server security platforms, favoring Trend Micro for hybrid estates, CrowdStrike for detection, Defender for Azure economics.
Cyber Security News published an editorial ranking of ten server security platforms for 2026, favoring Trend Micro for hybrid estates, CrowdStrike for detection quality, and Microsoft Defender for Servers for Azure-centric economics. The guide stresses that server security licensing differs (per server, per core, or per cloud-hour) and flags hypervisor protection as a commonly missed coverage gap.
Wiz found 294 of 3,074 internet-facing LiteLLM gateways accepted the documented default admin key sk-1234, exposing provider API keys and cloud IAM credentials.
Wiz Research's February Shodan scan found 3,074 LiteLLM gateways, 294 of which accepted the setup guide's sk-1234 admin key; 191 had no master key set and would accept any credential. The master key doubles as the authentication switch, and before 1.82.0-stable a gateway started without one granted every request full admin rights, exposing stored provider API keys, prompts, and MCP-connected tools. A documented pass-through endpoint lacks checks against private and cloud metadata addresses, letting an admin-key holder retrieve cloud IAM credentials, though no real-world abuse is reported. Related LiteLLM flaws include CVE-2026-59821 (disputed guardrail code execution), CVE-2026-59822 (CVSS 8.8, added to CISA KEV on September 2 and observed against Wiz honeypots), and CVE-2026-42271, used to install a cryptominer.
Wiz found LiteLLM auth bypass (CVE-2026-59822) and post-auth RCE (CVE-2026-59821) chainable to cloud compromise; the bypass is in CISA KEV with in-the-wild exploitation.
Wiz scanned roughly 3,074 internet-facing LiteLLM deployments and found 9.6% accepted the default master key sk-1234 or required no authentication, making post-auth attacks effectively pre-auth. The MCP endpoint accepts any Bearer token and grants a valid session (CVE-2026-59822), confirmed exploited in the wild via honeypots and added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Custom code guardrails allow post-auth root-level RCE via exec(compile(...)) (CVE-2026-59821), while pass-through endpoints lack URL validation, enabling cloud credential theft in post-auth scenarios. All assigned vulnerabilities have been patched; the research was presented at DEF CON 34.
Mars Security launches Real-Time Intel-Based Detection, converting threat intelligence advisories into validated, ATT&CK-mapped detection rules within minutes for SOCs.
Mars Security, an autonomous threat hunting and detection engineering platform founded by former offensive security operators, announced Real-Time Intel-Based Detection. The capability ingests advisories from sources like CISA, Mandiant, Unit 42, and Microsoft Threat Intelligence, maps indicators to MITRE ATT&CK, and authors native query logic across connected infrastructure including CrowdStrike Falcon, Wiz, Splunk, Sysmon, identity providers, Snowflake, and Databricks. Every rule is backtested against 30 days of historical telemetry to quantify false positives before analyst approval and one-click deployment. The feature is free for existing customers and available via AWS Marketplace.
Mars Security launched Real-Time Intel-Based Detection, converting advisories from CISA and Mandiant into backtested MITRE ATT&CK-mapped detection rules for CrowdStrike, Wiz, and Splunk.
Mars Security announced a capability that automatically turns newly published threat intelligence from sources like CISA, Mandiant, Unit 42, and Microsoft into MITRE ATT&CK-mapped detection rules. Each rule is written in the native query language of the customer's telemetry (CrowdStrike Falcon, Wiz, Splunk, firewalls, identity providers, AWS, Snowflake, Databricks) and backtested against 30 days of the customer's data before deployment, with indicator scoring to drop noisy or stale indicators. The platform also maps existing detection coverage, flags gaps such as AWS CloudTrail tampering and pass-the-hash movement, and delivers some recommendations as open pull requests for detection-as-code workflows.
Mars Security launched Real-Time Intel-Based Detection, converting advisories into MITRE ATT&CK-mapped, backtested detection rules for CrowdStrike, Wiz, and Splunk within minutes.
The capability turns newly published threat intelligence from CISA, Mandiant, Unit 42, and Microsoft Threat Intelligence into validated detection rules within minutes, each backtested against 30 days of the customer's own telemetry before deployment. Rules are written in native query languages across CrowdStrike Falcon, Wiz, Splunk, firewalls, Linux Sysmon, identity providers, AWS telemetry, and data lakes such as Snowflake and Databricks, with no data ingestion or stack changes. The feature is available at no additional cost to existing customers and on AWS Marketplace. Mars also flags detection coverage gaps and extends monitoring to credentials leaked by AI coding agents.
Wiz argues shift-left code-stage security cuts remediation costs and ships Wiz Code, WizOS, and WizCLI to catch flaws pre-deployment.
A Wiz blog post argues that fixing vulnerabilities at the code stage costs a fraction of production remediation, citing the node:20-slim base image which ships 14 known CVEs, three of them critical. It claims AI agents can now analyze open-source commits and generate working exploits in minutes, shrinking the window between a public fix and automated attacks. The post promotes WizOS near-zero-CVE base images, WizCLI and MCP-server checks inside developer and AI agent sessions, and Wiz Code scanning across pull requests, repositories, and pipelines covering SAST, SCA, secrets, and IaC misconfigurations.
Google releases Gemini 3.8 Flash, topping the DeepSWE coding leaderboard six weeks after 3.7 Flash, alongside the cybersecurity-focused 3.8 Flash Cyber.
Google shipped Gemini 3.8 Flash, its third Flash model in six weeks, placing it at the top of the DeepSWE software engineering leaderboard. The companion Gemini 3.8 Flash Cyber showed a reported 2.6x patch accuracy increase for the Chrome security team and found a critical vulnerability in two hours, but is limited to trusted testers and governments. Gemini 3.8 Flash improved over 3.7 Flash on the OSWorld-2.0 computer-use benchmark yet remains far behind Claude Opus.
Wiz launched Continuous Vulnerability Assessment (CVA), alerting customers to exposure against newly published vulnerabilities in real time.
Wiz introduced Continuous Vulnerability Assessment, a capability that detects exposure to newly published vulnerabilities the moment they are disclosed. The company positions CVA as real-time defense for the AI threat era, reducing the window between disclosure and remediation decisions. The item is a vendor product announcement with no incident details.
Wiz honeypots recorded 90 days of active campaigns attacking LiteLLM, MCP servers, and AI frameworks via RCE, blind prompt injection, and credential theft.
Wiz deployed AI infrastructure honeypots and observed active attack campaigns over a 90-day window. Attackers targeted LiteLLM, MCP servers, and popular AI frameworks using techniques including remote code execution, blind prompt injection, and memory credential theft. The findings show exposed AI infrastructure is being actively targeted in the wild.
Wiz details the multi-agent pipeline and feedback loops that evolved its bucket scanner into AI-powered data discovery.
Wiz published an engineering write-up on building its AI-powered data discovery capability, tracing the evolution from a bucket scanner to a context engine. The post explains the multi-agent pipeline and feedback loops behind the system. The article is a vendor engineering deep-dive with no disclosed vulnerabilities, incidents, or exploitation activity.
Wiz published a DFIR cheatsheet covering log visibility, incident readiness, and threat hunting across GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, and Azure DevOps.
Wiz researchers released a practitioner's guide to version control system forensics, incident response, and threat hunting. The cheatsheet maps log sources, audit capabilities, and hunting workflows across GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, and Azure DevOps. It aims to improve incident readiness for source code and CI/CD compromise scenarios.
Wiz sponsors a webinar on building AI-ready security operations, focusing on attack-path visibility, exposure prioritization, and faster detection-to-remediation workflows.
A contributed piece promotes next week's Wiz webinar, How to Build AI Threat Readiness Across Your Security Operations, featuring a Wiz expert. The session covers using unified security context to separate urgent exposures from noise, understand attack paths across cloud, code, identities, SaaS, and AI services, and connect validated risks to remediation owners.
Wiz promotes Service Catalog and Cloud Cost features that automate cost attribution to teams and services to enable developer-led FinOps optimization.
Wiz describes how its Service Catalog and Cloud Cost capabilities automate cloud cost allocation to engineering teams and services. The stated goal is to connect cloud spend to business value and power developer-led cost optimization. The post is vendor product marketing rather than a security disclosure.
Wiz Research's 2026 cloud risk report finds most high-severity findings lack a viable path to compromise, urging exposure-based prioritization.
Wiz Research telemetry underpins a State of Cloud Risk 2026 report arguing that the majority of high-severity security findings are not real attacker opportunities because they lack a path to compromise. The report pushes defenders to prioritize findings by exposure and exploitability rather than raw severity scores. No specific CVEs, victims, or incident counts are provided in the available text.
Compromised maintainer account published malicious versions of popular Rust crates with 245M downloads, delivering a build-time payload via typosquatted proc-macro1 dependency.
The Rust Project deleted malicious releases of arrayref 0.3.10, internment 0.8.7, and append-only-vec 0.1.9 from crates.io after a compromised maintainer account added a typosquatted dependency, proc-macro1, whose build script downloaded and executed a remote payload during compilation. Each malicious version was online for 86 to 107 minutes on August 20, 2026, before deletion. The build script disabled TLS validation and deployed OS-specific implants on Unix, macOS, and Windows, with builds alone sufficient to trigger execution. Wiz Research confirmed active exploitation, noting the impacted packages appear in 35% of cloud and code environments and over 75% of Rust-using environments; arrayref alone has 245 million all-time downloads and 403 dependent crates.
Wiz survey of Japanese business professionals finds AI adoption outranking cloud migration and 60% planning AI security investment.
A Wiz survey of Japanese business people found that accelerating AI adoption now outranks cloud migration as a priority. At the same time, more than 80% feel behind in preparing for AI-driven cyber-attacks, and 60% plan to invest in AI security. The findings highlight a preparedness gap as organizations adopt AI faster than they secure it.
Malicious versions of the Rust crate arrayref executed a compile-time backdoor, with infrastructure overlapping recent DPRK supply chain attacks on Mastra and axios.
Wiz researchers report that malicious versions of the arrayref Rust crate ran a backdoor during compilation, compromising developer build pipelines. The campaign's command-and-control infrastructure significantly overlaps with infrastructure used in recent DPRK supply chain attacks, including campaigns against Mastra and axios. Developers using affected crate versions should audit their builds and review dependencies.
Wiz announces general availability of Penetration Test Findings, unifying pen-test results with real-time cloud context for continuous exposure management.
Wiz has made its Penetration Test Findings capability generally available on its cloud security platform. The feature integrates point-in-time penetration test findings with real-time cloud context, aiming to turn static pen-test reports into continuous exposure management. This gives security teams a unified view for prioritizing cloud findings alongside offensive testing results.
Wiz details how adversaries use realistic device names in Entra ID registrations to evade detection and which behavioral signals still expose them.
Wiz researchers describe how adversaries generate realistic device names during Entra ID device registration instead of leaving recognizable fingerprints from public tooling, making rogue device joins blend into enterprise environments. The post explains how this trend changes Entra ID detection approaches. It also identifies behavioral signals that still expose these attacks. No specific CVE or victim was named.
Wiz's AI agent uncovered a critical flaw in Snowflake's GitHub Actions workflow that GitHub Advanced Security scans had missed.
A Wiz researcher, using the company's AI security agent, discovered a critical security flaw in Snowflake's GitHub Actions workflow. The flaw had been missed by a GitHub Advanced Security scan, highlighting gaps in automated coverage for CI/CD pipelines. No CVE identifier or evidence of active exploitation was provided in the report.
Wiz announces its 2026 Partner Alliance Award winners honoring partners in cloud security, AI risk management, and SOC modernization across three regions.
Wiz recognized partners, integrators, and visionaries with 2026 Partner Alliance Awards spanning the AMER, EMEA, and ANZ regions. The awards highlight work in cloud security transformation, AI risk management, and SOC modernization. The announcement is partner marketing with no direct security impact.
Wiz disclosed a GitHub Actions workflow injection in Snowflake's snowflake-connector-net repo that exposed Jira API tokens; Snowflake patched the flaw.
Wiz disclosed a workflow injection flaw in Snowflake's snowflake-connector-net repository, where attacker-controlled GitHub issue fields were expanded directly into a shell run block. Wiz's Red Agent exploited it during authorized security testing, received an out-of-band runner callback and retrieved a Jira API token with read access to engineering, security compliance and bug bounty projects. Snowflake merged a fix on June 23, 2026, rotated the token and said its investigation found no evidence of unauthorized access. No CVE, CVSS score or KEV entry has been assigned for the issue.
Wiz's autonomous Red Agent found and exploited a GitHub Actions injection in a Copilot-assisted PR, reaching Snowflake's internal Jira without human help.
Wiz's Red Agent autonomously discovered a GitHub Actions injection flaw in a GitHub Copilot-assisted pull request, five days after the flaw went live. It exploited the flaw to validate access to sensitive data in Snowflake's internal Jira, bypassing detection by GitHub Advanced Security, and assessed the blast radius without human intervention. The exercise demonstrates agentic AI performing end-to-end offensive security operations against production systems.
Wiz announces Workflows general availability and public preview of Remediation and Response for closed-loop, automated cloud remediation.
Wiz published a remediation playbook promoting a closed-loop approach to cloud security remediation. The company announced that Wiz Workflows is now generally available, while Remediation and Response capabilities are in public preview. The announcement is a vendor product release aimed at enabling self-healing cloud environments rather than reporting a new threat or vulnerability.
Wiz details how its internal FinOps team uses Wiz Cloud Cost to investigate and optimize cloud spend with deep security context.
Wiz published a walkthrough describing how its own FinOps team uses the Wiz Cloud Cost product for cloud cost investigation and optimization. The post emphasizes pairing cost data with deep cloud context to identify and act on spend drivers.
Wiz published guidance arguing AI adoption reshapes data risk, urging teams to identify what data is connected to AI services and exposed.
Wiz published a viewpoint on how AI adoption changes the context of data risk. The post argues that understanding what data is connected to AI systems, what is exposed, and why is now critical for managing that risk. No specific incident, vulnerability, or product release is described in the available text.
Wiz CIRT published an investigation playbook for GitHub PAT compromise after responding to a coordinated multi-organization campaign.
Wiz's Computer Incident Response Team shared lessons from its response to a coordinated campaign compromising GitHub personal access tokens across multiple organizations. The post provides a practical playbook covering detection, scoping, and investigation steps for token compromise. Specific victim names, affected counts, and attribution are not provided in the announcement.
Improper Authentication in JFrog Artifactory Allows Unauthenticated Admin Access
JFrog Artifactory contains an improper authentication flaw (CWE-287) that, under the product's default configuration, can let an unauthenticated attacker with network access obtain administrative privileges. The weakness is reachable over the network with no privileges or user interaction required, which is why it carries a critical 9.8 CVSS 3.1 score; an attacker who succeeds effectively gains full administrator control of the artifact repository, and public reporting describes attackers using the flaw to mint admin tokens days after disclosure. Any organization running JFrog Artifactory is in scope — CISA's entry lists the product without version detail, so deployments should verify their versions against JFrog's advisory (AV26-867, Update 1) — with internet-exposed instances at greatest risk. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: CISA added the CVE to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog on 2026-09-02, a public proof-of-concept is available, and news headlines report active exploitation alongside related Artifactory flaws CVE-2026-42016 and CVE-2026-42018.
Token Scope Validation Flaw Enables Privilege Escalation in JFrog Artifactory
JFrog Artifactory (Self-Hosted) versions before 7.133.11 fail to validate a token's scope, checking only the token's signature and issuer, which constitutes an incorrect authorization flaw (CWE-863). A remote, authenticated user with low privileges can obtain or present a token whose scope is never verified, bypassing authorization checks and escalating to higher privileges. Successful attackers gain administrative control of the Artifactory instance; in observed attacks this flaw has been chained with CVE-2026-42018 and CVE-2026-82329 to bypass authentication, take admin control, and deploy backdoor malware. Only self-hosted Artifactory deployments are within the stated affected scope. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild and the vulnerability was added to CISA's KEV catalog on 2026-09-11, although no public proof-of-concept code is known.
· JFrog Artifactory (Self-Hosted) All versions before 7.133.11 KEVlarge
Improper Authentication in JFrog Artifactory Exposes Internal Anonymous Tokens
JFrog Artifactory contains an improper authentication flaw (CWE-287) in which the server may return its internal anonymous-user token to an unauthenticated caller, even on instances where anonymous access is disabled. An attacker triggers the issue by sending unauthenticated requests to the affected Artifactory interface over the network; the vector requires no privileges or user interaction and is of low complexity. Successful abuse yields the internal anonymous-user token, which can then be used to reach sensitive resources (such as repositories or artifacts) that should be protected when anonymous access is disabled, with high confidentiality impact but no integrity or availability impact. Any organization running an affected JFrog Artifactory deployment - particularly those relying on disabled anonymous access as a control - is affected, though only instances where the vulnerable endpoint is reachable are actually exposed. Exploitation has been reported in the wild as part of an ongoing Artifactory attack campaign alongside CVE-2026-42016 and CVE-2026-82329, although there is no public PoC and the flaw is not yet in the CISA KEV catalog.
Unauthenticated MCP Endpoint Authentication Bypass in BerriAI LiteLLM
BerriAI LiteLLM, a widely used self-hosted AI gateway and proxy server for calling LLM APIs, fails to properly authenticate requests to its MCP Streamable HTTP endpoint in versions prior to 1.84.0. An unauthenticated attacker can send a fabricated Authorization header that triggers an OAuth2 passthrough fallback, which replaces failed LiteLLM key validation with an empty UserAPIKeyAuth() object and lets the request reach MCP tooling without any valid LiteLLM key. Successful exploitation grants unauthenticated access to the gateway's MCP tooling with high confidentiality impact per the CVSS 4.0 score of 8.8, and public reporting describes attackers chaining LiteLLM weaknesses from authentication bypass to root code execution and cloud credential theft. Any organization running LiteLLM before 1.84.0 is affected, particularly gateways exposed to the internet. The flaw is confirmed exploited in the wild: CISA added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2026-09-02, while EPSS currently estimates a 0.9% probability of exploitation in the next 30 days.
· BerriAI LiteLLM all versions prior to 1.84.0 (fixed in 1.84.0) KEVmoderate
LiteLLM is a proxy server (AI Gateway) to call LLM APIs in OpenAI (or native) format.
LiteLLM is a proxy server (AI Gateway) to call LLM APIs in OpenAI (or native) format. Prior to 1.82.0-stable, LiteLLM's Custom Code Guardrails production create and update paths did not apply the same sandboxing and validation used by the test endpoint, allowing a privileged user with access to create or update guardrails to submit custom Python code that executed in the LiteLLM proxy environment and could expose secrets available to the process. This issue is fixed in version 1.82.0-stable.
Broken Access Control in LiteLLM AI Gateway Enables Authenticated RCE
CVE-2026-35029 is a broken access control flaw (CWE-863, CWE-425) in LiteLLM, an open-source proxy server (AI Gateway) for calling LLM APIs, in which the /config/update endpoint fails to enforce admin-role authorization in versions prior to 1.83.0. Any user who is already authenticated to the proxy can call this network-accessible endpoint without admin rights and modify the proxy configuration and environment variables. Through this, an attacker can achieve remote code execution by registering pass-through endpoint handlers that point to attacker-controlled Python code, read arbitrary server files by setting UI_LOGO_PATH and fetching the file via /get_image, and take over other privileged accounts by overwriting the UI_USERNAME and UI_PASSWORD environment variables; related security coverage also highlights that vulnerable LiteLLM gateways can be turned into root-level code execution and cloud credential theft. Any organization running a LiteLLM proxy older than v1.83.0 is affected, particularly deployments where non-admin users hold authenticated accounts. No public proof-of-concept or confirmed in-the-wild exploitation is known and the flaw is not in CISA KEV, but EPSS assigns a 25.1% probability of exploitation within 30 days (98th percentile), signaling elevated near-term risk.
· LiteLLM proxy server (AI Gateway) all versions prior to 1.83.0; fixed in v1.83.0moderate
Unauthenticated SQL Injection in Metabase Grants Admin Access
CVE-2026-72898 is a critical SQL injection flaw (CWE-89, CVSS 4.0 score of 10) in Metabase, a widely used open-source business intelligence platform. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send crafted input to the '/reset_password' database endpoint to inject arbitrary SQL into the underlying database. Successful exploitation grants the attacker administrator access to the connected Metabase instance, with confidentiality, integrity, and availability impacts rated high in the CVSS 4.0 vector. Any organization running an affected Metabase instance, particularly one exposed to the internet, is at risk. The flaw is a zero-day being exploited in the wild, was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2026-08-11, and carries a 94.2% EPSS probability of exploitation within 30 days (100th percentile).
Command Injection in BerriAI LiteLLM AI Gateway Exploited in the Wild
CVE-2026-42271 is a command injection (CWE-77/CWE-78) in BerriAI LiteLLM's proxy server, a widely used AI gateway for calling LLM APIs. Two MCP preview endpoints (POST /mcp-rest/test/connection and POST /mcp-rest/test/tools/list) accept a full stdio server configuration, including command, args, and env fields, and spawn the supplied command as a subprocess on the proxy host; the endpoints are gated only by any valid proxy API key with no role check, so even low-privilege internal-user keys can trigger it. An attacker with any authenticated key gains arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the proxy process, and reporting indicates attackers are chaining the flaw into broader takeover of AI gateway servers, including reverse shells and crypto miners, in some cases via weak or default keys such as the example 'sk-1234' admin key. Any organization running LiteLLM versions 1.74.2 through before 1.83.7, including LiteLLM distributed with Red Hat OpenShift AI, is affected. The flaw was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2026-06-08 and is under active attack, with a very high EPSS of 83.6% for exploitation within 30 days.
· BerriAI LiteLLM (proxy server / AI Gateway) 1.74.2 up to but not including 1.83.7 (fixed in 1.83.7) · Red Hat OpenShift AI KEVmoderate
HTTP Request Smuggling in Kludex Starlette (CVE-2026-48710)
Kludex Starlette prior to version 1.0.1 did not validate the HTTP Host request header before using it to reconstruct request.url, an inconsistency classified as HTTP request/response smuggling (CWE-444). Because routing operates on the raw ASGI scope path while request.url is rebuilt from the unvalidated Host header, an attacker can send a malformed Host header so that request.url.path differs from the path the router actually processed. Any middleware or endpoint that enforces security restrictions based on request.url rather than the raw scope path can then be tricked into approving requests that should have been blocked, bypassing those controls. All Starlette deployments below 1.0.1 are affected, both direct users and downstream products that bundle the library, including Red Hat offerings such as Ansible Automation Platform, OpenShift AI, OpenShift Lightspeed, Satellite, AI Inference Server, Migration Toolkit for Applications, and Enterprise Linux AI. CISA added the flaw to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2026-09-02, confirming active exploitation; related reporting describes attackers deploying reverse shells and crypto miners, and EPSS ranks it in the 98th percentile with a 36.3% probability of exploitation within 30 days.
· Kludex (Encode) Starlette All versions prior to 1.0.1 · Red Hat AI Inference Server KEV PoC ×3mass
Metabase open source before 0.46.6.1 and Metabase Enterprise before 1.46.6.1 allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands on the server, at the server's privil
Metabase open source before 0.46.6.1 and Metabase Enterprise before 1.46.6.1 allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands on the server, at the server's privilege level. Authentication is not required for exploitation. The other fixed versions are 0.45.4.1, 1.45.4.1, 0.44.7.1, 1.44.7.1, 0.43.7.2, and 1.43.7.2.
Entities are extracted by the model from each article. Watching an entity keeps it in this browser only (no account); the watchlist page and dashboard alerts use it.