Fast and Secure Simultaneous Authentication of Equals for WPA3
A modified WPA3 SAE handshake moves costly crypto to clients and uses tickets to limit AP DoS.
WPA3 Simultaneous Authentication of Equals resists offline dictionary attacks on a pre-shared key, but Password Element derivation is expensive enough that access points can face CPU-exhaustion denial of service. The paper shifts iterative cryptographic discovery to the client so the AP keeps a fixed handshake cost, adds a slow-path derivation using PBKDF2 or Argon2 with deliberate supplicant delay, and issues tickets so known devices can re-authenticate cheaply. Experiments indicate the design reduces denial-of-service exposure without blocking legitimate access. No CVE or observed exploitation is reported.
- SAE Password Element derivation can exhaust access-point CPU.
- Clients do iterative discovery so the AP cost stays fixed.
- Slow-path PBKDF2 or Argon2 delays brute-force attempts.
- Tickets let known devices skip expensive re-authentication.
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgThe Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE) protocol, introduced in WPA3, provides robust protection against offline dictionary attacks against a network Pre-Shared Key (PSK) and also protection of session keys from other people knowing that PSK. However, its high computational cost for the Password Element (PE) derivation makes Access Points (APs) vulnerable to CPU exhaustion Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks.
By João Ferreira · arxiv.org
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