uBlock Origin element picker allowed one-click universal XSS
Original title: Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven element picker
A site could learn the Firefox extension UUID and, after one click, install a trusted filter that runs JavaScript on any site.
A researcher found a one-click universal XSS in the Firefox MV2 build of uBlock Origin. A malicious page could discover the extension’s internal UUID, embed the element-picker page, and trick the user into creating a trusted filter that injects script on another site. A similar but less severe issue affected uBO Lite, the MV3 build. The issue is fixed; one fix requires a secret the real picker obtains from the content script.
Unconfirmed: No CVE is named, and the post does not say whether the flaw was exploited outside the author’s tests.
- Trusted element-picker filters can inject JavaScript until a filter recompile.
- The reported leak used the default lootdest no-fetch-if rule, though other UUID leaks exist.
- The author verified the bug; GPT-5.6 Sol proposed it and Claude wrote most of the PoC.
- Filters stay trusted until the user changes custom filters and triggers a recompile.
Impact: Arbitrary JavaScript in the context of any website
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| uBlock Origin (Firefox MV2) | — | fixed; see GitHub advisory |
| uBlock Origin uBO Lite | — | — |
- 1.Update uBlock Origin and uBO Lite to the fixed releases.
- Vendors
- uBlock Origin
- Products
- uBO Lite
- AI models
- GPT-5.6 Sol
From the original article
4 min read at iter.ca
Earlier this month I found a one-click universal XSS issue with uBlock Origin (the MV2 Firefox version, although a similar but less problematic issue also affected the MV3 version, uBO Lite), where a malicious website could trick the extension into adding arbitrary trusted filters.
By iter.ca via pgr0ss · iter.ca
A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.