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Log-To-Leak prompt injection extracts MCP agent data after real calls

Original title: Log-To-Leak: Prompt Injection Attacks on Tool-Using LLM Agents via the Model Context Protocol

arXiv cs.CRby Yuepeng Hu ()1 min read1
Part of a story covered by 2 sourcesResearchers report Log-To-Leak prompt injection on MCP agentsMerged summary & timeline
AI summary · x-ai/grok-4.7Summaries by Vani AI

Across 18 model-server pairs, attack success is 62.64–100%, and defenses still exceed 55% ASR on GitHub MCP with GPT-4o.

Researchers describe Log-To-Leak, a post-hoc prompt-injection attack on tool-using LLM agents that use the Model Context Protocol. Poisoned natural-language tool metadata induces an extra attacker-controlled call after the last legitimate call, targeting the user query, MCP server name, server response, and agent response. On 18 model-server pairs with valid tool execution, they report attack success of 62.64–100% and conditional logging accuracy of 76.55–95.64%, while 16 pairs change target-task completion by at most 6.63 percentage points. Three defenses still leave residual success above 55% on GitHub MCP with GPT-4o, and an instruction detector flags 85.53% of benign descriptions.

Unconfirmed: Success rates are from the authors' lab evaluation, not reported real-world incidents.

Key facts
  • The payload is built from Trigger, Tool Binding, Justification, and Pressure.
  • Five MCP servers and four LLM agents were evaluated with five metrics.
  • Sixteen pairs shift legitimate task completion by at most 6.63 percentage points.
  • An instruction detector flags 85.53% of benign tool descriptions.
  • Authors argue hosts should authorize secondary tool calls.
Security assessment · AI, from the articlePublic proof of concept

Impact: Unauthorized disclosure of queries and agent and tool responses

ProductAffected
Model Context Protocol tool-using LLM agents—
What to do
  1. 1.Require host-controlled authorization before secondary tool calls.
  2. 2.Review MCP tool descriptions for injected logging directives.
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From the original article

1 min read at arxiv.org

LLM agents increasingly access external tools through the Model Context Protocol (MCP), but the natural-language metadata used to describe those tools creates a prompt-injection surface. Within this established tool-poisoning surface, we study Log-To-Leak, an additive post-hoc logging attack that induces a separate attacker-controlled call after the final legitimate call.

arXiv cs.CR

By Yuepeng Hu · arxiv.org

Read the full article at arXiv cs.CR

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.