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U.S. Agencies Warn of Iranian Hacking Group's Ongoing Ransomware Attacks

Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →

CVEVulnerabilityCVSSEPSSFlagsAffectedExposurePublished
CVE-2019-19781
Unauthenticated path traversal RCE in Citrix ADC, Gateway, and SD-WAN WANOP

CVE-2019-19781 is a path-traversal flaw (classified CWE-22, though CISA's description calls it unspecified) in Citrix ADC (formerly NetScaler ADC), Citrix Gateway, and Citrix SD-WAN WANOP appliances that lets an unauthenticated remote attacker traverse directories via crafted requests and execute arbitrary commands on the appliance, typically with root privileges. It is triggered by sending specially crafted directory-traversal requests (crafted URLs/requests to the appliance's management or VPN endpoints), which lets the attacker write files and run commands with no credentials. Successful exploitation yields arbitrary code execution on the appliance, enabling theft of VPN/ADC credentials, lateral movement into the corporate network, and installation of persistent backdoors. Any organization running affected ADC, Gateway, or SD-WAN WANOP firmware is affected, with internet-facing gateways used for remote access at the highest risk. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the vulnerability is on CISA's KEV (added 2021-11-03) with known ransomware use, EPSS assigns near-certain (100.0%) probability of exploitation within 30 days, and no public PoC is listed despite confirmed abuse.

Do: Upgrade Citrix ADC, Gateway, and SD-WAN WANOP appliances to the fixed firmware builds listed in Citrix advisory CTX267020; if patching cannot be done immediately, apply Citrix's published interim mitigation and restrict internet exposure to the appliance. Because exploitation grants root code execution and persistence, after patching hunt for indicators of compromise (unexpected nsroot account, modified system files, crontab/scheduled entries), kill all active and inactive sessions, and rotate appliance and VPN credentials. Prioritize internet-facing gateways and comply with CISA's required action to apply vendor updates.

9.8100% KEV ransomware
  • Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) Supported ADC firmware lines in effect at disclosure (10.5, 11.0, 11.1, 12.0, 12.1, 13.0) prior to patched builds, per Citrix advisory CTX267020; exact builds n
  • Citrix Gateway Supported Gateway firmware lines (sharing the ADC codebase, same affected releases 10.5-13.0) prior to patched builds, per Citrix advisory; exact builds not spe
  • Citrix SD-WAN WANOP Appliance Affected appliance models (4000, 4100, 5000, 5100) running pre-patch firmware in the 10.2.1-11.4.1 range, per Citrix advisory; exact builds not specified in the
massroughly 80,000-100,000+ internet-exposed Citrix ADC/Gateway appliances at the time of disclosure, with a far larger total installed base (including…
CVE-2022-1388
Unauthenticated RCE in F5 BIG-IP via Missing Authentication

F5 BIG-IP contains a critical missing-authentication flaw (CWE-306) in its iControl REST control plane: an unauthenticated attacker with network reachability to the management interface, or to self IPs exposing the REST service on TCP 443, can bypass authentication completely. By sending specially crafted HTTP requests, the attacker gains the ability to execute arbitrary code, create or delete files, and disable services, effectively achieving full takeover of the load balancer or security appliance and the traffic it handles. All F5 BIG-IP deployments running unpatched software are affected; the provided data does not enumerate exact version ranges, which are listed in F5's May 2022 security advisory. The flaw was added to CISA's KEV catalog on 2022-05-10 with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days (100th percentile), indicating active in-the-wild exploitation. No public proof-of-concept is catalogued in the provided data, but the KEV listing and known ransomware use confirm real-world attacks.

Do: Upgrade affected F5 BIG-IP systems to the fixed releases listed in F5's May 2022 security advisory (K23605340) immediately, prioritizing appliances whose management interface or self IPs on TCP 443 are reachable from untrusted networks; as an interim mitigation, block untrusted access to the management interface and the iControl REST service. Because this flaw is in CISA's KEV catalog with known ransomware use, also hunt for signs of compromise (unexpected files, disabled services, unknown persistence) on any system that was exposed before patching.

9.8100% KEV ransomware PoC ×4
  • F5 BIG-IP
large~10,000 internet-exposed BIG-IP systems (public scans at disclosure counted 8k-10k+), with a far larger installed base behind firewalls
CVE-2023-3519
Unauthenticated RCE in Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway

CVE-2023-3519 is a critical (CVSS 9.8) unauthenticated remote code execution flaw caused by improper code-injection handling (CWE-94) in Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway. A remote attacker with no credentials can trigger it by sending crafted requests to an appliance configured as a Gateway (VPN/ICA proxy/RDP proxy) or AAA authentication virtual server, gaining arbitrary code execution on the appliance. Exploitation typically yields a foothold behind the VPN edge — access to internal networks, credential theft, and follow-on activity such as espionage or ransomware deployment. Any organization running unpatched NetScaler ADC/Gateway appliances, especially internet-facing remote-access endpoints, is affected; NetScaler is one of the most widely deployed enterprise VPN/ADC platforms. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw was added to CISA's KEV on 2023-07-19 with known ransomware use, EPSS estimates a 99.7% exploitation probability, and researchers have linked activity to China-nexus espionage (Silk Typhoon) and ransomware operations.

Do: Immediately upgrade internet-facing NetScaler ADC/Gateway appliances to the fixed builds in Citrix's advisory (14.1-8.50+, 13.1-49.13+, 13.0-82.45+, 12.1-55.300+, including FIPS/NDcPP equivalents) — per CISA KEV, apply these mitigations or discontinue use if patching is unavailable. Confirm whether each appliance is configured as a Gateway or AAA virtual server (only those are affected), and hunt for compromise — unexpected configuration changes, unfamiliar accounts, webshells, or anomalous VPN sessions — rotating credentials on any suspected compromise.

9.8100% KEV ransomware PoC
  • Citrix NetScaler ADC Supported releases before the July 2023 fixes, per Citrix advisory: 14.1 before 14.1-8.50; 13.1 before 13.1-49.13; 13.0 before 13.0-82.45; 12.1 before 12.1-55.3
  • Citrix NetScaler Gateway Same affected builds as NetScaler ADC (before 14.1-8.50, 13.1-49.13, 13.0-82.45, 12.1-55.300, and FIPS/NDcPP equivalents); affected when the appliance serves as
largetens of thousands of internet-exposed NetScaler Gateway/ADC appliances (order 10k-100k at disclosure), serving hundreds of thousands to millions of downstream…
CVE-2024-24919
Information Disclosure in Internet-Facing Check Point Quantum Security Gateways

Check Point Quantum Security Gateways contain an information disclosure flaw (CWE-200) that can expose information stored on the appliance to unauthorized parties. It is triggered when an attacker targets a gateway connected to the internet with IPSec VPN, Remote Access VPN, or Mobile Access enabled, sending crafted requests to the exposed VPN services. A successful attacker gains unauthorized access to information on the gateway, and CISA notes known use of this flaw in ransomware campaigns. The issue spans multiple Check Point product lines: CloudGuard Network, Quantum Scalable Chassis, Quantum Security Gateways, and Quantum Spark Appliances. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw was added to CISA's KEV catalog on 2024-05-30 with ransomware use listed, and EPSS assigns a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days, though no public proof-of-concept is known.

Do: Apply the hotfix Check Point distributes per its advisory (SK170863) to all internet-facing gateways running IPSec VPN, Remote Access VPN, or Mobile Access; this is also the CISA KEV required action. Where the hotfix cannot be applied immediately, restrict or disable the Remote Access VPN and Mobile Access software blades as an interim mitigation. Review gateway and VPN logs for signs of exploitation and prioritize remediation given confirmed ransomware use.

8.6100% KEV ransomware
  • Check Point Quantum Security Gateways
  • Check Point CloudGuard Network
  • Check Point Quantum Scalable Chassis
  • +1 more
largetens of thousands of internet-exposed VPN gateways (10k-100k systems)
CVE-2024-3400
Unauthenticated Root Command Injection in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS GlobalProtect

Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS contains a command injection flaw (CWE-77, with improper input validation per CWE-20) in its GlobalProtect feature, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary operating-system commands with root privileges on the affected firewall. The flaw is triggered through the GlobalProtect interface, which in most deployments is reachable from untrusted networks, so no valid user credentials or prior access are required. Successful exploitation yields full root control of the firewall, the most powerful position in a network perimeter, enabling traffic interception, configuration tampering, and use as a foothold for further compromise. All PAN-OS firewalls running affected releases with the GlobalProtect feature are exposed; CISA added the issue to the KEV catalog on 2024-04-12 with ransomware use noted, and EPSS puts the 30-day exploitation probability at 100% (100th percentile). No public proof-of-concept is recorded in the source data, but confirmed in-the-wild exploitation makes patching urgent.

Do: Apply the PAN-OS patches released in Palo Alto Networks' bulletin according to its published patch schedule, prioritizing internet-facing firewalls. Until patched, enable the vendor's Threat Prevention signatures as required by CISA KEV, restrict exposure of the GlobalProtect interface to trusted sources where possible, and review logs and device configuration for signs of compromise given confirmed exploitation with known ransomware use.

10.0100% KEV ransomware PoC ×2
  • Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS
large≈10,000–100,000 internet-exposed PAN-OS firewalls with GlobalProtect enabled
Full article1,259 words · extracted from thehackernews.com · click to collapse

U.S. cybersecurity and intelligence agencies have called out an Iranian hacking group for breaching multiple organizations across the country and coordinating with affiliates to deliver ransomware.

The activity has been linked to a threat actor dubbed Pioneer Kitten, which is also known as Fox Kitten, Lemon Sandstorm (formerly Rubidium), Parisite, and UNC757, which it described as connected to the government of Iran and uses an Iranian information technology (IT) company, Danesh Novin Sahand, likely as a cover.

"Their malicious cyber operations are aimed at deploying ransomware attacks to obtain and develop network access," the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3) said. "These operations aid malicious cyber actors in further collaborating with affiliate actors to continue deploying ransomware."

Targets of the attacks include education, finance, healthcare, and defense sectors, as well as local government entities in the U.S., with intrusions also reported in Israel, Azerbaijan, and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) to pilfer sensitive data.

The goal, the agencies assessed, is to gain an initial foothold to victim networks and subsequently collaborate with ransomware affiliate actors associated with NoEscape, RansomHouse, and BlackCat (aka ALPHV) to deploy file-encrypting malware in exchange for a cut of the illicit proceeds, while keeping their nationality and origin "intentionally vague."

The attack attempts are believed to have commenced as early as 2017 and are ongoing as recently as this month. The threat actors, who also go by the online monikers Br0k3r and xplfinder, have been found to monetize their access to victim organizations on underground marketplaces, underscoring attempts to diversify their revenue streams.

"A significant percentage of the group's U.S.-focused cyber activity is in furtherance of obtaining and maintaining technical access to victim networks to enable future ransomware attacks," the agencies noted. "The actors offer full domain control privileges, as well as domain admin credentials, to numerous networks worldwide."

"The Iranian cyber actors' involvement in these ransomware attacks goes beyond providing access; they work closely with ransomware affiliates to lock victim networks and strategize on approaches to extort victims."

Initial access is accomplished by taking advantage of remote external services on internet-facing assets that are vulnerable to previously disclosed flaws (CVE-2019-19781, CVE-2022-1388, CVE-2023-3519, CVE-2024-3400, and CVE-2024-24919), followed by a series of steps to persist, escalate privileges, and set up remote access through tools like AnyDesk or the open-source Ligolo tunneling tool.

Iranian state-sponsored ransomware operations are not a new phenomenon. In December 2020, cybersecurity companies Check Point and ClearSky detailed a Pioneer Kitten hack-and-leak campaign called Pay2Key that specifically singled out dozens of Israeli companies by exploiting known security vulnerabilities.

"The ransom itself ranged between seven and nine Bitcoin (with a few cases in which the attacker was negotiated down to three Bitcoin)," ClearSky noted at the time. "To pressure victims into paying, Pay2Key’s leak site displays sensitive information stolen from the target organizations and makes threats of further leaks if the victims continue to delay payments."

Some of the ransomware attacks are also said to have been conducted through an Iranian contracting company named Emennet Pasargad, according to documents leaked by Lab Dookhtegan in early 2021.

The disclosure paints the picture of a flexible group that operates with both ransomware and cyber espionage motives, joining other dual-purpose hacking outfits like ChamelGang and Moonstone Sleet.

Peach Sandstorm Delivers Tickler Malware in Long-Running Campaign

The development comes as Microsoft said it observed Iranian state-sponsored threat actor Peach Sandstorm (aka APT33, Curious Serpens, Elfin, and Refined Kitten) deploying a new custom multi-stage backdoor referred to as Tickler in attacks against targets in the satellite, communications equipment, oil and gas, as well as federal and state government sectors in the U.S. and U.A.E. between April and July 2024.

"Peach Sandstorm also continued conducting password spray attacks against the educational sector for infrastructure procurement and against the satellite, government, and defense sectors as primary targets for intelligence collection," the Microsoft Threat Intelligence team said, adding it detected intelligence gathering and possible social engineering targeting higher education, satellite, and defense sectors via LinkedIn.

These efforts on the professional networking platform, which date back to at least November 2021 and have continued into mid-2024, materialized in the form of phony profiles masquerading as students, developers, and talent acquisition managers supposedly based in the U.S. and Western Europe.

The password spray attacks serve as a conduit for the Tickler custom multi-stage backdoor, which comes with capabilities to download additional payloads from an adversary-controlled Microsoft Azure infrastructure, perform file operations, and gather system information.

Some of the attacks are notable for leveraging Active Directory (AD) snapshots for malicious administrative actions, Server Message Block (SMB) for lateral movement, and the AnyDesk remote monitoring and management (RMM) software for persistent remote access.

"The convenience and utility of a tool like AnyDesk is amplified by the fact that it might be permitted by application controls in environments where it is used legitimately by IT support personnel or system administrators," Microsoft said.

Peach Sandstorm is assessed to be operating on behalf of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). It's known to be active for over a decade, carrying out espionage attacks against a diverse array of public and private sector targets globally. Recent intrusions targeting the defense sector have also deployed another backdoor called FalseFont.

Iranian Counterintelligence Operation Uses HR Lures to Harvest Intel

In what's evidence of ever-expanding Iranian operations in cyberspace, Google-owned Mandiant said it uncovered a suspected Iran-nexus counterintelligence effort that's aimed at collecting data on Iranians and domestic threats who may be collaborating with its perceived adversaries, including Israel.

"The collected data may be leveraged to uncover human intelligence (HUMINT) operations conducted against Iran and to persecute any Iranians suspected to be involved in these operations," Mandiant researchers Ofir Rozmann, Asli Koksal, and Sarah Bock said. "These may include Iranian dissidents, activists, human rights advocates, and Farsi speakers living in and outside Iran."

The activity, the company said, shares "weak overlap" with APT42 and aligns with IRGC's track record of conducting surveillance operations against domestic threats and individuals of interest to the Iranian government. The campaign has been active since 2022.

The attack lifecycle's backbone is a network of over 40 fake recruitment websites that impersonate Israeli human resources firms that are then disseminated via social media channels like X and Virasty to trick prospective victims into sharing their personal information (i.e., name, birth date, email, home address, education, and professional experience).

These decoy websites, posing as Optima HR and Kandovan HR, state their alleged purpose is to "recruit employees and officers of Iran's intelligence and security organizations" and have Telegram handles that reference Israel (IL) in their handles (e.g., PhantomIL13 and getDmIL) to give the impression that they are affiliated with the country.

Mandiant said further analysis of the Optima HR websites led to the discovery of a previous cluster of fake recruitment websites that targeted Farsi and Arabic speakers affiliated with Syria and Lebanon (Hezbollah) under a different HR firm named VIP Human Solutions between 2018 and 2022.

"The campaign casts a wide net by operating across multiple social media platforms to disseminate its network of fake HR websites in an attempt to expose Farsi-speaking individuals who may be working with intelligence and security agencies and are thus perceived as a threat to Iran's regime," Mandiant said.

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Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://thehackernews.com/2024/08/us-agencies-warn-of-iranian-hacking.html