Witchetty APT used steganography in attacks against Middle East
Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →
| CVE | Vulnerability | CVSS | EPSS | Flags | Affected | Exposure | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2021-26855 | Unauthenticated SSRF/RCE in Microsoft Exchange Server (ProxyLogon) CVE-2021-26855 is a server-side request forgery flaw (CWE-918) in Microsoft Exchange Server that allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to send specially crafted HTTP requests and have the Exchange server process them as itself, disclosing sensitive session information. When chained with sibling Exchange flaws (the 'ProxyLogon' chain), it yields authentication bypass and arbitrary file write, escalating to full remote code execution with SYSTEM-level privileges on the on-premises Exchange server. Any organization running an affected on-premises Exchange server reachable over HTTP/HTTPS (typically outbound webmail) is exposed; Exchange Online was not affected. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild at large scale: the flaw was mass-exploited beginning in early 2021 (notably by the HAFNIUM group), is on the CISA KEV with documented ransomware use, and has a maximum EPSS score of 100% (100th percentile), despite no public PoC listing. Do: Apply the vendor's March 2021 Exchange security updates (or later cumulative updates) immediately, per the CISA required action; until patched, limit Exchange (ECP/OWA) exposure to the internet via firewall/VPN rules. Hunt for compromise: review IIS logs for unrecognized authenticated activity against FrontEnd HttpProxy endpoints, and check for malicious files or webshells under inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client, given the known ransomware use. | 9.1 | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC ×4 |
| masshundreds of thousands of on-premises deployments; tens of thousands of internet-exposed Exchange servers | |
| CVE-2021-31207 | Security feature bypass in Microsoft Exchange Server (ProxyShell) enables webshell RCE CVE-2021-31207 is a security feature bypass in Microsoft Exchange Server, classified as an unrestricted file-write issue (CWE-434) that lets an attacker bypass intended restrictions and write files of their choosing to the server. It is the final bug in the ProxyShell chain: chained with the autodiscover SSRF and PowerShell backend elevation flaws, it allows an unauthenticated attacker to reach the Exchange PowerShell API, write arbitrary files such as an ASPX webshell, and execute code with SYSTEM privileges. A successful attacker gains full control of the on-premises Exchange server, including mailbox access, stolen credentials, and a foothold for lateral movement; the bug has been used to deploy ransomware and keyloggers. On-premises deployments of Microsoft Exchange Server (2013, 2016, and 2019 per vendor advisories) are affected, while Exchange Online/cloud mailboxes are not. Exploitation is essentially certain and ongoing: the flaw is in CISA's KEV (added 2021-11-03) with known ransomware use, public ProxyShell PoC/exploit code is available, and EPSS puts the 30-day exploitation probability at 99.8%. Do: Apply Microsoft's July 2021 security updates for Exchange Server 2013, 2016, and 2019 (or any later security/cumulative update) per vendor instructions, and restrict untrusted access to Exchange's autodiscover and PowerShell endpoints. Hunt for ASPX webshells under the Exchange FrontEnd directories and review IIS logs for autodiscover.json requests chaining PowerShell, since many servers were compromised before patching. Given known ransomware use and KEV listing, treat any server that was unpatched or internet-exposed during the exploitation window as potentially compromised. | 6.6 | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC |
| massHundreds of thousands of on-premises Exchange servers (public scans around the July 2021 ProxyShell disclosure showed roughly 400,000-600,000 internet-exposed… | |
| CVE-2021-34473 +1 in the same advisory: …34523 | SSRF (CWE-918) in Microsoft Exchange Server Enabling RCE (ProxyShell) Microsoft Exchange Server contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF, CWE-918) in the Autodiscover service that unauthenticated remote attackers can reach over HTTP. This flaw is the first stage of the widely documented 'ProxyShell' chain, in which the SSRF is combined with privilege escalation and an arbitrary file write in the Exchange PowerShell backend to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution on the server. An attacker who successfully exploits it gains the ability to run code on the Exchange server, and ransomware operators (e.g., Cuba ransomware) leveraged this chain to deploy payloads. Organizations running on-premises Microsoft Exchange Server (2013, 2016, and 2019 per the vendor's advisories) are affected; hosted Exchange Online is a separately managed cloud service. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: CISA added the flaw to the KEV catalog on 2021-11-03 with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns it a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days (100th percentile). Do: Apply Microsoft's July 2021 (or later) Exchange Server security updates, which include the ProxyShell fixes, to all on-premises servers. If patching is delayed, restrict internet access to the Autodiscover/EWS frontend endpoints and consider the URL Rewrite mitigation Microsoft published for ProxyShell. Given the KEV listing and known ransomware use, treat internet-facing, unpatched Exchange servers as potentially compromised and hunt for webshells, unusual Exchange processes, and suspicious account or mailbox activity. | 9.1 group max | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC |
| masshundreds of thousands of on-prem Exchange servers; public internet scans at the time of disclosure showed roughly 400,000+ internet-exposed Exchange instances,… |
Full article512 words · extracted from securityaffairs.com · click to collapse
Pierluigi Paganini
September 30, 2022

A cyberespionage group, tracked as Witchetty, used steganography to hide a previously undocumented backdoor in a Windows logo.
Broadcom’s Symantec Threat Hunter Team observed a threat actor, tracked as Witchetty, using steganography to hide a previously undocumented backdoor in a Windows logo. The group used the backdoor in attacks against Middle Eastern governments.
The cyber espionage group Witchetty (aka LookingFrog) was first spotted by cybersecurity firm ESET in April 2022, the experts argue it is a sub-group of the China-linked TA410 group (aka APT10, Cicada, Stone Panda, and TA429)).
The APT group has been continuously improving its toolset by employing new malware in attacks aimed at governments, diplomatic missions, charities, and industrial/manufacturing organizations in the Middle East and Africa.
Witchetty’s operations were characterized by the use of two pieces of malware, a first-stage backdoor dubbed X4 and a second-stage modular malware known as LookBack.
Between February and September 2022, the group targeted the governments of two Middle Eastern countries and the stock exchange of an African nation.
The threat actors exploited the ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207) and ProxyLogon (CVE-2021-26855 and CVE-2021-26855) vulnerabilities to deploy web shells on public-facing servers before performing malicious actions, such as stealing credentials, moving laterally across networks, and drop addition malicious payload.
In recent attacks the group the group started using a previous undetected implant tracked as Backdoor.Stegmap, which relies on steganography to conceal the malicious payload in a bitmap image of an old Microsoft Windows logo hosted on a GitHub repository. Hiding the malicious code within an image hosted on a trusted service allowed the attackers to evade detection.
“A DLL loader downloads a bitmap file from a GitHub repository. The file appears to be simply an old Microsoft Windows logo. However, the payload is hidden within the file and is decrypted with an XOR key.” reads the analysis published by Broadcom’s Symantec Threat Hunter researchers. “Disguising the payload in this fashion allowed the attackers to host it on a free, trusted service.”
The implant supports the following commands:
| Code | Command |
|---|---|
| 6 | Create a directory |
| 7 | Remove a directory |
| 8 | Copy files |
| 9 | Move files |
| 10 | Delete files |
| 11 | Start a new process |
| 12 | Download and run an executable from [REMOTE HOSTNAME]/master/cdn/site.htm |
| 13 | Unknown (Possibly reading standard output from a process created by command 12) |
| 14 | Terminate the process created by command 12 |
| 15 | Steal a local file |
| 19 | Enumerate processes |
| 20 | Kill a process |
| 21 | Read a registry key |
| 22 | Create a registry key |
| 23 | Set a registry key value |
| 24 | Delete a registry key |
“Witchetty has demonstrated the ability to continually refine and refresh its toolset in order to compromise targets of interest.” the researchers concluded. “Exploitation of vulnerabilities on public-facing servers provides it with a route into organizations, while custom tools paired with adept use of living-off-the-land tactics allow it to maintain a long-term, persistent presence in targeted organizations.”
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Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://securityaffairs.com/136477/apt/witchetty-apt-steganography.html