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[kubernetes] CVE-2026-76654: Subpath symlinking on Windows nodes permits NTLM coercion

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Part of a story covered by 2 sourcesTwo Kubernetes CVEs disclosed: StatefulSet cross-namespace pod creation (CVE-2026-2270) and Windows subPath NTLM coercion (CVE-2026-76654)Merged summary & timeline
AI summary · grok-4.7Summaries by Vani AI

Kubernetes Windows nodes can be coerced into NTLM authentication via a subPath symlink to an attacker UNC share.

CVE-2026-76654 is an NTLM coercion flaw on Kubernetes Windows nodes. If a pod volumeMount subPath is a symbolic link to an attacker-controlled UNC share, kubelet resolves the link and does not reject the UNC target. The kubelet then attempts NTLM authentication to the share, allowing capture of a NetNTLMv2 response. The disclosure does not report exploitation in the wild.

Key facts
  • Windows kubelet follows a volume subPath symlink to a UNC path.
  • It does not reject targets that resolve to an attacker network share.
  • The kubelet then authenticates to that share using NTLM.
  • An attacker can capture the resulting NetNTLMv2 authentication response.
Analyze CVE-2026-76654 with Vani AIImpact, affected versions, exploitation, mitigations and detection

Vulnerabilities mentioned

All
CVEVulnerabilityCVSSEPSSSignalsPublished
CVE-2026-76654
NTLM coercion via subPath symlink on Windows Kubernetes nodes
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From the original article

Posted by Nathan Herz on Sep 23 Hello Kubernetes Community, An NTLM coercion vulnerability exists on Windows nodes when the subPath supplied in a pod's volumeMounts is set to a symbolic link that points to an attacker-controlled network share. When a kubelet resolves symlinks, it does not reject a target that resolves to a UNC path.

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