MASAR links telecom architecture threats to protocol attack paths
Original title: MASAR: Multi-stage Attack Surface Analysis and Reasoning Framework for Telecom Networks
On a 5G-ready IMS, it models SIP early-media billing bypass and Diameter Cx disclosure using MiniZinc.
Researchers present MASAR, a three-layer framework connecting STRIDE-style architectural threats with MITRE FiGHT for telecom networks. The layers cover strategic threat mapping, directed-acyclic-graph attack paths, and synthesis of tactics, techniques and procedures. A 5G-ready IMS case study examines two signaling scenarios. MiniZinc models check whether unsafe protocol states are reachable.
- The paper says STRIDE and MITRE FiGHT remain poorly connected.
- One scenario is early-media billing bypass through SIP signaling.
- The other is subscriber disclosure and topology discovery via the Diameter Cx interface.
- MiniZinc constraint models analyze reachability of unsafe protocol states.
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgThe increasing complexity of modern telecommunications networks introduces security challenges that require systematic threat analysis. However, a gap remains between architectural threat modeling frameworks, such as Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, and Elevation of Privilege (STRIDE), and operational knowledge bases, such as the MITRE Five-G Hierarchy of Threats (FiGHT).
By Heba Osama · arxiv.org
A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.