Credential pooling attacks on EUDI Wallet relying parties
Original title: Fooling Relying Parties of the EUDI Wallet Architecture: Credential Pooling Attacks and CRESTA, a Standard-Compliant Countermeasure
Colluding users pool credentials via proxy to fool EUDI Wallet; CRESTA countermeasure uses standard crypto to preserve unlinkability.
Colluding users cooperate through a proxy that presents all requested credentials using individual wallets. Every signature is genuine and computed by certified hardware. The European Commission reference implementation was tested on Android phones. CRESTA binds sets of keys generated in the same secure hardware with attestations at issuance; a relying party performs one additional signature verification per presentation.
Unconfirmed: No real-world exploitation reported; theoretical attack with implementation testing
- Attack works against any credentials sharing the same public key per credential
- CRESTA requires issuers to certify that keys were generated in the same secure hardware
- Countermeasure preserves unlinkability and integrates with existing EUDI Wallet framework
Impact: Colluding users gain multiple credentials without forging signatures
- Vendors
- European Commission
- Products
- EUDI Wallet
- Countries
- European Union
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgThe European Digital Identity (EUDI) Wallet will let millions of EU citizens prove who they are and what they are entitled to, disclosing only what is needed. Many services need several credentials at once, such as an identity card and a university degree, so combined presentations are essential. We present credential pooling attacks on relying parties of the EUDI Wallet reference architecture.
By Leonardo Rufini · arxiv.org
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