CosmicBeetle Deploys Custom ScRansom Ransomware, Partnering with RansomHub
Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →
| CVE | Vulnerability | CVSS | EPSS | Flags | Affected | Exposure | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2017-0144 | Remote Code Execution in Microsoft SMBv1 (EternalBlue) affecting Windows and Siemens devices CVE-2017-0144 is a remote code execution flaw in the SMBv1 server component of Microsoft Windows, commonly known as EternalBlue, and one of the SMB flaws fixed by Microsoft in the March 2017 MS17-010 bulletin. An attacker who can reach the SMB service over the network sends specially crafted packets that trigger memory corruption in the SMBv1 implementation, gaining the ability to execute arbitrary code on the target without user interaction. Successful exploitation yields full system compromise and has been heavily weaponized for wormable spread and ransomware delivery, notably via the leaked NSA exploit and in the WannaCry/NotPetya-era outbreaks, and the flaw has repeatedly been bundled into botnets and ransomware tooling since. Anyone running unpatched Windows Vista SP2 through Windows 10 1607 / Windows Server 2016 with SMBv1 enabled is affected, as are Siemens medical and laboratory devices (ACUSON ultrasound, syngo SC2000, Tissue Preparation System, VERSANT kPCR systems) whose firmware depends on SMBv1. Exploitation is actively ongoing: the flaw is in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2022-02-10) with known ransomware use, carries a 99.2% EPSS exploitation probability (100th percentile), and multiple public exploits and PoCs are available. Do: Apply the Microsoft MS17-010 (March 2017) security updates on every listed Windows version and the corresponding Siemens firmware updates for ACUSON, syngo SC2000, Tissue Preparation System, and VERSANT kPCR devices, per CISA's required action to apply vendor updates. Where patching is not yet possible, disable SMBv1 or block inbound TCP 445 (and UDP 137/138) at network boundaries and isolate legacy/medical systems from the internet. Sweep exposed and legacy hosts for compromise indicators, including DOUBLEPULSAR implants delivered over SMB, as public tooling for detecting and neutralizing this implant is available. | 8.8 | 99% | KEV ransomware PoC ×6 |
| massorder of hundreds of thousands of internet-exposed SMB endpoints, and millions of unpatched Windows systems when internal enterprise and medical-device… | |
| CVE-2020-1472 | Unauthenticated Privilege Escalation (Zerologon) in Microsoft Netlogon Domain Controllers CVE-2020-1472, widely known as "Zerologon," is an elevation-of-privilege flaw in how the Netlogon secure channel is established over the Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC) on Microsoft domain controllers. An unauthenticated attacker with network reachability to a domain controller sends specially crafted Netlogon messages to establish a vulnerable secure channel and then runs a specially crafted application on the network to obtain domain administrator access. Successful exploitation yields domain administrator privileges, effectively full compromise of the Active Directory environment, and the flaw is known to be used in ransomware operations. Any organization running affected Windows Server versions (2008 through 20H2) as domain controllers is exposed, along with environments using Netlogon implementations from Samba and distributions or products from Fedora, openSUSE, Canonical (Ubuntu), Debian, Synology, and Oracle. Exploitation is highly active: a public Zerologon PoC/exploit is available, the flaw is on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2021-11-03, with known ransomware use), and EPSS estimates a 99.4% probability of exploitation within 30 days. Do: Apply the vendor updates on all domain controllers and other affected systems immediately, following Microsoft's two-phase Netlogon secure channel guidance (the enforcement phase of the phased rollout began in Q1 2021). Audit Netlogon secure-channel connections and event logs for clients still using vulnerable connections before enabling full enforcement, and install updated packages for Samba and other Netlogon implementations from Fedora, openSUSE, Ubuntu, Debian, Synology, and Oracle. Given known ransomware use, prioritize patching any domain controller reachable from user networks, VPNs, or the internet. | 5.5 | 99% | KEV ransomware PoC |
| massmillions of domain controllers worldwide (essentially every Active Directory domain), with hundreds of thousands of domain controllers/RPC endpoints… | |
| CVE-2021-42287 +1 in the same advisory: …42278 | Privilege Escalation in Microsoft Active Directory Domain Services CVE-2021-42287 is an elevation-of-privilege vulnerability in Microsoft Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) affecting multiple supported Windows Server releases. An attacker with any low-privileged domain account can trigger it — commonly in combination with the related sAMAccountName spoofing flaw CVE-2021-42278 — by manipulating account name attributes so the Kerberos Key Distribution Center issues tickets that grant rights normally reserved for domain controllers. The result is escalation from a standard user to domain administrator, giving the attacker full control over the Windows domain, a capability that is directly useful for ransomware deployment and data theft. Any organization running Active Directory on the affected Windows Server versions is exposed, which amounts to essentially every enterprise Windows network. The flaw is actively exploited: it was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2022-04-11 with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns it a 77.2% probability of exploitation within 30 days. Do: Apply Microsoft's security updates to every domain controller — writable and read-only — as soon as possible (the fix shipped in Microsoft's November 2021 security releases), prioritizing internet-exposed and VPN-facing DCs. Hunt domain controller logs for anomalous Kerberos TGT requests by user accounts with domain-controller-style names (a hallmark of CVE-2021-42278/42287 abuse) and monitor for ransomware staging activity, given documented ransomware use. | 7.5 | 77% | KEV ransomware |
| masswell over 100,000 Windows Server domain controllers and millions of domain users worldwide | |
| CVE-2022-42475 | Unauthenticated Heap Overflow in Fortinet FortiOS/FortiProxy SSL-VPN (Critical RCE) CVE-2022-42475 is a critical (CVSS 9.8) heap-based buffer overflow in the SSL-VPN service of Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can trigger it by sending specifically crafted requests to an exposed SSL-VPN interface, with no user interaction or credentials required. Successful exploitation yields arbitrary code or command execution on the appliance, giving attackers a foothold on the perimeter device from which they can pivot into internal networks. Any organization running the listed FortiOS (6.0 through 7.2) or FortiProxy (7.0/7.2) versions with SSL-VPN enabled is affected. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw is in CISA KEV with known ransomware use, has near-certain exploitation probability (EPSS 99.5%), and has been used in targeted government attacks and a Chinese-nexus espionage campaign that compromised over 20,000 systems, with attackers also noted to retain access even after patching. Do: Upgrade FortiOS and FortiProxy to fixed releases per Fortinet advisory FG-IR-22-398 (any version beyond the listed affected ranges), and reboot the appliance after patching to clear lingering SSL-VPN sessions since attackers have been observed retaining access post-patch. Check for indicators of compromise such as unknown local accounts, unexpected processes, and anomalous historical logins, and rotate SSL-VPN credentials if compromise is suspected. If SSL-VPN is not required, disable it or restrict exposure to trusted sources until patched. | 9.8 | 99% | KEV ransomware PoC |
| masshundreds of thousands of internet-exposed FortiGate/FortiProxy SSL-VPN endpoints (well over 100,000; 20,000+ confirmed victims in a single campaign) | |
| CVE-2023-27532 | Missing Authentication in Veeam Backup & Replication Exposes Stored Credentials Veeam Backup & Replication (VBR) contains a missing-authentication flaw (CWE-306) in its Cloud Connect component that lets an unauthenticated network attacker obtain encrypted credentials stored in VBR's configuration database. It is triggered simply by connecting to the exposed service, because the function that serves credential material performs no authentication check; no privileges or user interaction are required (CVSS 3.1: 7.5, network vector). With the recovered credentials, an attacker can gain access to backup infrastructure hosts, which has been used as an entry point and pivot for ransomware operations. Any organization running Veeam Backup & Replication is potentially affected, with the greatest risk where the VBR/Cloud Connect service is reachable from the internet. Exploitation is confirmed: CISA added the bug to its KEV catalog on 2023-08-22 with known ransomware use, the Cuba ransomware group has been observed stealing credentials through this exploit, and EPSS assigns a 77.6% near-term exploitation probability (100th percentile). Do: Apply the fixes Veeam provides in its security advisory immediately — per CISA's KEV listing, patch per vendor instructions or discontinue use — prioritizing internet-facing Cloud Connect servers. After patching, rotate all credentials stored in the configuration database, since they should be considered exposed, and review those accounts for signs of misuse. Restrict network access to the VBR service from untrusted networks and check servers for exploitation indicators such as unexpected connections to the service or anomalous logins with stored credentials. | 7.5 | 78% | KEV ransomware |
| largetens of thousands of deployments, of which thousands are internet-exposed (estimate) |
Full article1,079 words · extracted from thehackernews.com · click to collapse
The threat actor known as CosmicBeetle has debuted a new custom ransomware strain called ScRansom in attacks targeting small- and medium-sized businesses (SMBs) in Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America, while also likely working as an affiliate for RansomHub.
"CosmicBeetle replaced its previously deployed ransomware, Scarab, with ScRansom, which is continually improved," ESET researcher Jakub Souček said in a new analysis published today. "While not being top notch, the threat actor is able to compromise interesting targets."
Targets of ScRansom attacks span manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, legal, education, healthcare, technology, hospitality, leisure, financial services, and regional government sectors.
CosmicBeetle is best known for a malicious toolset called Spacecolon that was previously identified as used for delivering the Scarab ransomware across victim organizations globally.
Also known as NONAME, the adversary has a track record of experimenting with the leaked LockBit builder in an attempt to pass off as the infamous ransomware gang in its ransom notes and leak site as far back as November 2023.
It's currently not clear who is behind the attack or where they are from, although an earlier hypothesis implied that they could be of Turkish origin due to the presence of a custom encryption scheme used in another tool named ScHackTool. ESET, however, suspects the attribution to no longer hold water.
"ScHackTool's encryption scheme is used in the legitimate Disk Monitor Gadget," Souček pointed out. "It is likely that this algorithm was adapted [from a Stack Overflow thread] by VOVSOFT [the Turkish software firm behind the tool] and, years later, CosmicBeetle stumbled upon it and used it for ScHackTool."
Attack chains have been observed taking advantage of brute-force attacks and known security flaws (CVE-2017-0144, CVE-2020-1472, CVE-2021-42278, CVE-2021-42287, CVE-2022-42475, and CVE-2023-27532) to infiltrate target environments.
The intrusions further involve the use of various tools like Reaper, Darkside, and RealBlindingEDR to terminate security-related processes to sidestep detection prior to deploying the Delphi-based ScRansom ransomware, which comes with support for partial encryption to speed up the process and an "ERASE" mode to render the files unrecoverable by overwriting them with a constant value.
The connection to RansomHub stems from the fact that the Slovak cybersecurity company spotted the deployment of ScRansom and RansomHub payloads on the same machine within a week's time.
"Probably due to the obstacles that writing custom ransomware from scratch brings, CosmicBeetle attempted to leech off LockBit's reputation, possibly to mask the issues in the underlying ransomware and in turn to increase the chance that victims will pay," Souček said.
Cicada3301 Unleashes Updated Version
The disclosure comes as threat actors linked to the Cicada3301 ransomware (aka Repellent Scorpius) have been observed using an updated version of the encryptor since July 2024.
"Threat authors added a new command-line argument, --no-note," Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 said in a report shared with The Hacker News. "When this argument is invoked, the encryptor will not write the ransom note to the system."
Another important modification is the absence of hard-coded usernames or passwords in the binary, although it still retains the capability to execute PsExec using these credentials if they exist, a technique highlighted recently by Morphisec.
In an interesting twist, the cybersecurity vendor said it observed signs that the group has data obtained from older compromise incidents that predate the group's operation under the Cicada3301 brand.
This has raised the possibility that the threat actor may have operated under a different ransomware brand, or purchased the data from other ransomware groups. That having said, Unit 42 noted it identified some overlaps with another attack carried out by an affiliate that deployed BlackCat ransomware in March 2022.
BURNTCIGAR Becomes an EDR Wiper
The findings also follow an evolution of a kernel-mode signed Windows driver used by multiple ransomware gangs to turn off Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) software that allows it to act as a wiper for deleting critical components associated with those solutions, as opposed to terminating them.
The malware in question is POORTRY, which is delivered by means of a loader named STONESTOP to orchestrate a Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attack, effectively bypassing Driver Signature Enforcement safeguards. Its ability to "force delete" files on disk was first noted by Trend Micro in May 2023.
POORTRY, detected as far back as in 2021, is also referred to as BURNTCIGAR, and has been used by multiple ransomware gangs, including CUBA, BlackCat, Medusa, LockBit, and RansomHub over the years.
"Both the Stonestop executable and the Poortry driver are heavily packed and obfuscated," Sophos said in a recent report. "This loader was obfuscated by a closed-source packer named ASMGuard, available on GitHub."
POORTRY is "focused on disabling EDR products through a series of different techniques, such as removal or modification of kernel notify routines. The EDR killer aims at terminating security-related processes and rendering the EDR agent useless by wiping critical files off disk."
The rogue drivers take advantage of what the company described as a "virtually limitless supply of stolen or improperly used code signing certificates" in order to bypass Microsoft's Driver Signature Verification protections.
The use of an improved version of POORTRY by RansomHub bears notice in light of the fact that the ransomware crew has also been observed utilizing another EDR-killer tool dubbed EDRKillShifter this year.
That's not all. The ransomware group has also been detected utilizing a legitimate tool from Kaspersky called TDSSKiller to disarm EDR services on target systems, indicating that the threat actors are incorporating several programs with similar functionality in their attacks.
"It's important to recognize that threat actors have been consistently experimenting with different methods to disable EDR products — a trend we've been observing since at least 2022," Sophos told The Hacker News. "This experimentation can involve various tactics, such as exploiting vulnerable drivers or using certificates that have been unintentionally leaked or obtained through illegal means."
"While it might seem like there's a significant increase in these activities, it's more accurate to say that this is part of an ongoing process rather than a sudden rise."
"The use of different EDR-killer tools, such as EDRKillShifter by groups like RansomHub, likely reflects this ongoing experimentation. It's also possible that different affiliates are involved, which could explain the use of varied methods, though without specific information, we wouldn't want to speculate too much on that point."
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