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Part of a story covered by 2 sources: “NightEagle, Hacking Cat, and Toy Ghouls Target Russian Enterprises With Exchange Backdoors, Gorilla RAT, and Destructive Monkey Ransomware” — merged summary and timeline →

Three Threat Groups Target Russian Enterprises With Backdoors, Ransomware, and Wipers

AI summary · glm-5.3-flash

Kaspersky details NightEagle, Hacking Cat, and Toy Ghouls targeting Russian enterprises with Exchange backdoors, Gorilla RAT, and destructive Monkey ransomware.

Kaspersky reports three threat clusters targeting Russian enterprises: NightEagle (APT-Q-95), the pro-Ukrainian hacktivist group Hacking Cat, and Toy Ghouls. NightEagle uses compromised VPN credentials and the GhostContainer modular backdoor to fully compromise Microsoft Exchange servers, chaining CVE-2020-0688 exploitation, BlueKeep (CVE-2019-0708), Active Directory vulnerabilities, and DCSync to seize domain controllers. Hacking Cat exploits Exchange flaws including CVE-2021-26855 and CVE-2026-42897 to deliver the Gorilla RAT and multiple Monkey ransomware variants written in Rust, .NET, C++, and Golang targeting Windows, Linux, and VMware ESXi, with some variants acting as wipers that never store the encryption key.

  • NightEagle uses compromised VPN credentials, GhostContainer Exchange backdoor, and DCSync for domain compromise
  • Hacking Cat shifted from defacements to encryption and destructive attacks, collaborating with Cyber Anarchy Squad
  • Monkey ransomware variants written in Rust, .NET, C++, and Golang target Windows, Linux, and ESXi
  • Some Monkey variants discard the encryption key, acting as wipers while leaving ransom notes

Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →

CVEVulnerabilityCVSSEPSSFlagsAffectedExposurePublished
CVE-2019-0708
Unauthenticated RCE in Microsoft Remote Desktop Services (BlueKeep)

CVE-2019-0708 is a use-after-free (CWE-416) vulnerability in Microsoft Remote Desktop Services, formerly Terminal Services, in which an unauthenticated attacker can connect to a target system over RDP and send specially crafted requests to trigger the flaw. Because the trigger requires no authentication, the flaw is wormable: a successful exploit grants remote code execution on the target host, potentially with elevated privileges, and could allow self-propagating attacks similar to WannaCry. Organizations running the affected Microsoft Remote Desktop Services, particularly legacy Windows releases still accepting inbound RDP connections, are in scope. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw (nicknamed BlueKeep) is listed in CISA's KEV catalog (added 2021-11-03), CISA notes known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns it a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days.

Do: Apply Microsoft's security updates for CVE-2019-0708 per vendor instructions, prioritizing legacy or end-of-support Windows systems exposed to inbound RDP. As mitigation, restrict RDP (TCP 3389) to trusted networks or VPN access, require Network Level Authentication (NLA), and audit perimeter firewalls and public scans for open RDP listeners. The vulnerability is in the CISA KEV catalog, so patching is treated as a required action for federal and high-risk environments.

9.8100% KEV ransomware PoC ×4
  • Microsoft Remote Desktop Services
masson the order of millions of internet-exposed RDP endpoints and far more internal systems
CVE-2020-0688
RCE in Microsoft Exchange Server from Shared Install-Time Validation Keys

CVE-2020-0688 is a remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange Server caused by the validation key not being uniquely created at install time, leaving deployments with a predictable, shared key (CWE-287, improper authentication). A remote attacker who can reach an affected Exchange server and knows the common install-time key can supply maliciously crafted, cryptographically signed payloads that the server trusts, triggering code execution without needing per-server secrets. Successful exploitation gives the attacker code execution on the Exchange server, which can be used to access mail data, move laterally, and stage follow-on activity; CISA notes known use in ransomware campaigns. All organizations running the affected on-premises Microsoft Exchange Server are in scope per CISA's listing, though the affected version range is not specified in the source data. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw was added to CISA's KEV on 2021-11-03 with known ransomware use, and EPSS rates 30-day exploitation probability at 100% (top percentile).

Do: Apply Microsoft's Exchange security updates addressing CVE-2020-0688 (released in February 2020) to every on-premises Exchange server, per CISA's required action. As an interim mitigation, configure a unique ASP.NET machineKey in each Exchange server's web.config instead of the default shared install-time key, and hunt for indicators of exploitation given the known ransomware use.

8.8100% KEV ransomware PoC ×2
  • Microsoft Exchange Server
masshundreds of thousands of on-premises Exchange servers (≈500,000)
CVE-2021-26855
Unauthenticated SSRF/RCE in Microsoft Exchange Server (ProxyLogon)

CVE-2021-26855 is a server-side request forgery flaw (CWE-918) in Microsoft Exchange Server that allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to send specially crafted HTTP requests and have the Exchange server process them as itself, disclosing sensitive session information. When chained with sibling Exchange flaws (the 'ProxyLogon' chain), it yields authentication bypass and arbitrary file write, escalating to full remote code execution with SYSTEM-level privileges on the on-premises Exchange server. Any organization running an affected on-premises Exchange server reachable over HTTP/HTTPS (typically outbound webmail) is exposed; Exchange Online was not affected. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild at large scale: the flaw was mass-exploited beginning in early 2021 (notably by the HAFNIUM group), is on the CISA KEV with documented ransomware use, and has a maximum EPSS score of 100% (100th percentile), despite no public PoC listing.

Do: Apply the vendor's March 2021 Exchange security updates (or later cumulative updates) immediately, per the CISA required action; until patched, limit Exchange (ECP/OWA) exposure to the internet via firewall/VPN rules. Hunt for compromise: review IIS logs for unrecognized authenticated activity against FrontEnd HttpProxy endpoints, and check for malicious files or webshells under inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client, given the known ransomware use.

9.1100% KEV ransomware PoC ×4
  • Microsoft Exchange Server On-premises Exchange Server editions supported in the vendor's March 2021 guidance (Exchange Server 2013, 2016, and 2019), prior to the March 2021 security upda
masshundreds of thousands of on-premises deployments; tens of thousands of internet-exposed Exchange servers
CVE-2026-42897
Cross-Site Scripting in Microsoft Exchange Server Actively Exploited by Laundry Bear

CVE-2026-42897 is an improper-neutralization flaw (CWE-79) in Microsoft Exchange Server that lets an unauthenticated remote attacker perform cross-site scripting and carry out spoofing. Per the CVSS vector (AV:N/PR:N/UI:R), exploitation requires a victim to interact with attacker-controlled content — reported attacks by the Russian actor Laundry Bear (TA488) trigger when a crafted email is opened in Exchange's webmail interface (Outlook Web Access). The attacker gains the ability to spoof the victim within their webmail session, and reported intrusions show mailbox access persisting even after organizations rotate credentials. Any organization running on-premises Microsoft Exchange Server or Exchange Server Subscription Edition is potentially exposed, particularly those publishing webmail to the internet; specific affected version ranges are not provided in the available data. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw was added to CISA KEV on 2026-05-15 and carries a very high EPSS score of 71.2%, though no public proof-of-concept is known.

Do: Apply Microsoft's security update for CVE-2024-42897 to all on-premises Exchange and Exchange Subscription Edition servers per vendor guidance — no specific patch versions are provided in the available data, so consult the vendor advisory for build numbers. Federal agencies must patch or apply mitigations per BOD 22-01 given the KEV listing. Because reported attacks (Laundry Bear/TA488) maintain mailbox access after password resets, treat any suspected compromise as persistent: review OWA access logs and inbox rules for anomalies, and invalidate active webmail sessions and tokens, not just credentials.

6.171% KEV
  • Microsoft Exchange Server
  • Microsoft Exchange Server Subscription Edition
large≈20,000+ internet-exposed Exchange servers (public-scan reporting)

Indicators of compromiseAll →

TypeIndicatorContext
domainasp.netxtraction of cryptographic keys used by the server from the ASP.NET configuration, followed by overwriting the VIEWSTATE framew
domainipapi.cobtain the public IP address by querying api.ipify[.]org and ipapi[.]co, and disable a number of backup, database, and recovery m
domainipify.orgommand Prompt, obtain the public IP address by querying api.ipify[.]org and ipapi[.]co, and disable a number of backup, database,
Full article1,605 words · extracted from thehackernews.com · click to collapse

Enterprises in Russia have emerged as the target of three threat activity clusters tracked as NightEagle, Hacking Cat, and Toy Ghouls, according to multiple reports from Kaspersky.

The cybersecurity vendor said it has identified attacks mounted by NightEagle (aka APT-Q-95), a threat actor known to be active since at least 2023, that involve new techniques for persistence and lateral movement.

"In most incidents, the attackers used compromised valid credentials to gain access to corporate VPNs," Kaspersky said in an analysis published today. "VPN connections originated from IP addresses in the Russian segment linked to Cloudflare WARP tunnels, as well as from IP addresses associated with European virtual infrastructure providers."

The attacks, as highlighted in July 2025, involve the deployment of GhostContainer, a known modular backdoor that grants the operators complete access to a victim's Microsoft Exchange Server, as well as run arbitrary code, perform file operations, and load additional modules.

To sidestep detection, the malware masquerades as a common server component to blend in with regular operations. It can also function as a traffic redirection or tunnel. Prior attacks involving the malware have targeted a government agency and a high-tech company located in Asia.

"It incorporates components from several open-source projects, including the Neo-reGeorg tunnel, an exploit for the CVE-2020-0688 vulnerability, and the GhostWebShell class from the ysoserial utility," Kaspersky explained. "All of these components are publicly available on GitHub."

The exact method used by the attackers to deliver GhostContainer to Microsoft Exchange servers is unknown, although it's believed to have involved the extraction of cryptographic keys used by the server from the ASP.NET configuration, followed by overwriting the VIEWSTATE framework parameter, and injecting a payload into it, causing the backdoor to be launched in memory.

To move laterally within the internal network, NightEagle has been observed downloading tunneling tools to redirect network traffic via RDP using Microsoft dev tunnels and an open-source program called rdp2tcp.

"To obtain elevated privileges and move laterally through the network, NightEagle exploited various vulnerabilities in Active Directory," Kaspersky added. "The attackers used previously established tunnels to connect to internal infrastructure systems."

This includes the exploitation of CVE-2019-0708 (aka BlueKeep) to create a local account on the system and add it to the Administrators and Remote Desktop Users groups. Furthermore, the attackers have attempted to impersonate the domain controller by means of a DCSync attack.

The end goal is to establish persistence in the victim infrastructure, get password hashes for domain accounts, use long-lived Kerberos tickets to gain legitimate access to target resources, and ultimately break into domain controllers and the victim's entire Active Directory infrastructure.

Pro-Ukrainian Hacking Cat Deploys Gorilla RAT and Monkey Ransomware

The second group to single out Russian enterprises is Hacking Cat, a pro-Ukrainian hacktivist entity with a history of conducting website defacements and data breaches since February 2024. In recent months, however, the group is said to have shifted tactics and pivoted to encryption and destructive attacks.

"Hacking Cat actively collaborates with other hacktivists such as Cyber Anarchy Squad and the Ukrainian Cyber Alliance, which can complicate the attribution of tools to specific attackers," Kaspersky said.

Attacks mounted by the group have weaponized vulnerabilities in Exchange servers (e.g., CVE-2021-26855 and CVE-2026-42897) to deliver a Go-based remote access trojan dubbed Gorilla RAT, which can tunnel traffic to allow the operator to access the victim's internal network.

Once launched, the malware establishes a connection with a remote server, registers the victim, and awaits further instructions that allow it to run arbitrary commands, enumerate processes, gather system information, upload/download files, and open or close a TCP tunnel.

Also delivered by the threat actor are multiple variants of a ransomware family dubbed Monkey that are written in Rust, .NET, C++, and Golang to target Windows, Linux, and VMware ESXi systems. The earliest Monkey ransomware artifact dates back to late summer 2025. The malware also takes steps to terminate unnecessary processes and inhibit system recovery before starting the encryption process.

"A Rust-based variant of Monkey Ransomware generates a 32-byte key and encrypts the victim's files using ChaCha20-Poly1305," Kaspersky said. "Some variants do not store the key anywhere, which effectively turns them into full-fledged wiper malware, yet they still leave a ransom note. Other variants, on the other hand, store the key but do not include any contact information in the note."

Some of the notable features spread across the other three variants are listed below -

  • The .NET variant generates a 32-byte key, sends it to the command-and-control (C2) server, and encrypts victim files using AES-256-CBC. It's equipped to escalate privileges and disable Windows recovery mechanisms, extract Microsoft Outlook credentials and send them to the C2 server, delete files with .bak, .backup, .bkf, .bck extensions, and remove itself after execution.
  • The C++ variant offers similar functionality, but can establish persistence via a scheduled task or a RunOnce registry key, clear system logs, disable logging, wipe PowerShell Command History and Windows Command Prompt, bypass AMSI, turn off Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), configure Microsoft Defender exclusions for the encryptor, make Registry modifications to disable Task Manager and Windows Command Prompt, obtain the public IP address by querying api.ipify[.]org and ipapi[.]co, and disable a number of backup, database, and recovery mechanisms, including the Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS).
  • The Golang variant, which is mainly used to target Linux and ESXi systems, establishes persistence via a crontab entry, disables SELinux and AppArmor, and attempts to delete volume shadow copies.

"This [Golang] version also includes functionality for removing shadow volume copies, which serves no purpose in Linux and ESXi environments – a fact that suggests the attackers were careless and likely used AI in developing the toolkit," Kaspersky theorized.

Hacking Cat has also been observed teaming up with the Cyber Anarchy Squad, another pro-Ukraine hacktivist group, to deliver a different ransomware strain known as ClearWater by means of a batch script. ClearWater is assessed to be distributed under a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) to pro-Ukrainian hacktivist crews.

In another collaborative operation with the Ukrainian Cyber Alliance, the threat actor is said to have deployed a wiper malware called Nemo Wiper that overwrites files with random bytes and fills the remaining free disk space with files containing random alphanumeric names and the .lock extension.

"Different hacktivist groups are using the same self-written tools in different attacks, including multi-stage infection chains," Kaspersky noted. "This may indicate the existence of a common source for such tools – for example, a developer or a small group of developers who create, maintain, and modify the malware, which is subsequently used by various hacktivist groups."

However, following the publication of the report, Hacking Cat posted on its Telegram channel that "a couple of the tools are ours, but the lockers are definitely not." It has also alleged Kaspersky is attributing tools from completely unrelated actors to them and that it should "learn to reverse-engineer groups better."

Toy Ghouls Deploys Custom Backdoor for the First Time

Rounding off the list of groups targeting Russian organizations is Toy Ghouls (aka Bearlyfy, Laboo.boo, and Feral Wolf), which has moved from using leaked Babuk and LockBit ransomware builders to its own custom GenieLocker ransomware and now to a bespoke backdoor. The financially motivated group is known to be active since 2025.

The backdoor, first detected in July 2026, appears in two variants -

  • mqtt-bird-agent 0.1.0, which uses HiveMQ MQTT broker for C2
  • matrix-bird-agent 0.1.0, which uses Element, a Matrix-based end-to-end encrypted messenger app, for C2

"In this campaign, the attackers use Windows Remote Management (WinRM) to deliver the backdoors and their configuration files to compromised systems," Kaspersky said. "The group relies on open-source tools such as Evil-WinRM and WinRM-fs to do this."

The Bird Agent backdoor can run within an interactive command-line session, as well as set up persistence as a Windows service. Once launched, it looks for a configuration file ("config.toml") in the same directory from where it's located. Alternatively, the full path to the file can be specified via the "-c" or "--config" option while running it.

The malware then proceeds to read the file and partially encrypts it with a key derived from the victim machine's MachineGuid value stored in the Windows Registry so that the configuration is bound to that specific system. The backdoor stops execution if it cannot decrypt the configuration on subsequent runs.

The configuration, depending on the variant used, contains either the cluster identifier used to communicate with the HiveMQ MQTT broker or the Element internal room identifier along with the access token necessary to access that room. If this parameter is empty, the backdoor is designed such that it prompts for the token during installation, after which it gets stored.

Once the connection is established, the backdoor proceeds to send system information and issues HTTP GET requests to the HiveMQ broker to fetch commands from the C2 server, execute them via PowerShell in hidden mode (-NonInteractive -NoProfile -Command), and transmit the results back to the server.

The Element variant of Bird Agent is functionally similar to its HiveMQ counterpart, the main difference being that the received commands are executed through the Windows command-line interface (CLI) and send the command output back to the C2 server.

"The new tools use unconventional channels to communicate with their C2 server: the HiveMQ MQTT broker and the Matrix-based Element messenger," Kaspersky said. "This shift away from publicly available open-source projects toward custom-built tools suggests that Toy Ghouls is working to make its attacks more sophisticated and to evade detection for longer."

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