rApp/xApp Attestation: A New Security Use Case for O-RAN
Researchers propose runtime rApp and xApp attestation for O-RAN, with a prototype under 40 milliseconds.
The paper argues that O-RAN onboarding and authentication controls do not verify that deployed rApps and xApps stay untampered at runtime. It defines rApp/xApp attestation as a RIC-native use case that reuses existing integrity checks through attestation modules, agents, RIC interfaces, and SMO policy, and maps needed O-RAN Alliance extensions. A lightweight hash-based prototype on the Near-RT RIC completed attestation in under 40 ms across several hash functions. Remaining gaps include trusted verification, known-good runtime states, scalability, and mitigation policy.
- O-RAN specs lack runtime integrity checks for deployed rApps and xApps.
- The paper maps attestation into RIC interfaces and SMO policy coordination.
- A hash-based Near-RT RIC prototype attested apps in under 40 milliseconds.
- Open issues include trusted verification, known-good states, and mitigation policy.
- Products
- O-RANNear-RT RIC
- Organizations
- O-RAN Alliance
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgThe disaggregation and softwarization introduced by the Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) architecture enable multi-vendor innovation but also expose the RAN Intelligent Controller (RIC) ecosystem to new runtime security risks.
By Hamed Alimohammadi · arxiv.org
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