Session Cookie Vulnerability Lets Attackers Bypass Entra ID MFA and Impersonate Users
Resecurity found a yard-management app’s forged session cookies bypassed Entra ID MFA and impersonated users.
Resecurity’s authorized assessment of a supply-chain yard management platform found a custom session cookie that let an unauthenticated attacker impersonate employees after Entra ID single sign-on and MFA. The cookie was signed with a hard-coded secret matching the cookie name, and the signed value was a publicly exposed user database identifier. Testers impersonated 95 of 241 user IDs, including elevated accounts, and a forged administrator session completed a state-changing API call. Researchers said Entra ID cryptography was not broken, no production systems were tested, and an unauthenticated Swagger interface exposed 251 API routes.
- A hard-coded signing secret matched the cookie name; the value was a public user ID.
- Researchers impersonated 95 of 241 tested accounts, including elevated users.
- A forged admin cookie completed a state-changing API request.
- Entra ID was not broken; the application session layer was the flaw.
- An unauthenticated Swagger UI exposed 251 API routes.
- Vendors
- Microsoft
- Products
- Microsoft Entra ID
- Organizations
- Resecurity
From the original article
3 min read at cybersecuritynews.com
A flaw in a custom session-cookie system allowed an unauthenticated attacker to pose as employees and administrators in a yard management platform. The issue did not break Microsoft Entra ID itself. Instead, it let a weak application-side session layer accept a forged identity after the normal sign-in controls had been bypassed.
By Tushar Subhra Dutta · cybersecuritynews.com
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