AI-powered campaign compromises 600 FortiGate systems worldwide
Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →
| CVE | Vulnerability | CVSS | EPSS | Flags | Affected | Exposure | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2019-7192 | Unauthenticated Improper Access Control in QNAP Photo Station CVE-2019-7192 is a critical improper access control flaw (CWE-863) in QNAP Photo Station, the web-based photo application that runs on QNAP QTS NAS devices. Because the flaw is reachable over the network without credentials or user interaction (CVSS 3.1 9.8), remote attackers can gain unauthorized access to vulnerable systems. A public proof of concept demonstrates chaining the bug into remote command execution on Photo Station 6.0.3 under QTS, giving attackers the ability to execute commands on the NAS. Any QNAP NAS running an outdated Photo Station, particularly when its web interface is exposed to untrusted networks, is affected. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: CISA added it to the KEV on 2022-06-08 with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns a 88.2% probability of exploitation in the next 30 days (top percentile). Do: Update Photo Station to the latest version per QNAP's security advisory, and verify the installed Photo Station version on every QTS NAS. Where updating is not immediately possible, disable Photo Station or restrict its web endpoints to trusted networks, and check devices for signs of compromise given the known ransomware exploitation. | 9.8 | 88% | KEV ransomware PoC |
| largetens of thousands of internet-exposed QNAP NAS running Photo Station (public scan counts) | |
| CVE-2023-27532 | Missing Authentication in Veeam Backup & Replication Exposes Stored Credentials Veeam Backup & Replication (VBR) contains a missing-authentication flaw (CWE-306) in its Cloud Connect component that lets an unauthenticated network attacker obtain encrypted credentials stored in VBR's configuration database. It is triggered simply by connecting to the exposed service, because the function that serves credential material performs no authentication check; no privileges or user interaction are required (CVSS 3.1: 7.5, network vector). With the recovered credentials, an attacker can gain access to backup infrastructure hosts, which has been used as an entry point and pivot for ransomware operations. Any organization running Veeam Backup & Replication is potentially affected, with the greatest risk where the VBR/Cloud Connect service is reachable from the internet. Exploitation is confirmed: CISA added the bug to its KEV catalog on 2023-08-22 with known ransomware use, the Cuba ransomware group has been observed stealing credentials through this exploit, and EPSS assigns a 77.6% near-term exploitation probability (100th percentile). Do: Apply the fixes Veeam provides in its security advisory immediately — per CISA's KEV listing, patch per vendor instructions or discontinue use — prioritizing internet-facing Cloud Connect servers. After patching, rotate all credentials stored in the configuration database, since they should be considered exposed, and review those accounts for signs of misuse. Restrict network access to the VBR service from untrusted networks and check servers for exploitation indicators such as unexpected connections to the service or anomalous logins with stored credentials. | 7.5 | 78% | KEV ransomware |
| largetens of thousands of deployments, of which thousands are internet-exposed (estimate) | |
| CVE-2024-40711 | Unauthenticated Deserialization RCE in Veeam Backup & Replication Veeam Backup & Replication contains a deserialization of untrusted data flaw (CWE-502) that allows an unauthenticated attacker to send a maliciously crafted serialized payload to the product's network-facing service and achieve remote code execution, with no privileges or user interaction required (CVSS 3.1: 9.8). Successful exploitation yields full code execution on the backup server with high impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability, and is especially valuable to attackers because backup infrastructure typically stores credentials and ransomware operators seek to destroy or encrypt backups before attacking production systems. Any organization running Veeam Backup & Replication is in scope; the provided data does not specify exact affected version ranges, so consult Veeam's advisory for the affected/fixed builds. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw was added to CISA's KEV on 2024-10-17 with known ransomware use, a public proof-of-concept has been published by watchTowr, EPSS estimates a 90.4% probability of exploitation within 30 days (100th percentile), and the exploit has been reused in Frag ransomware attacks. Do: Apply Veeam's security updates immediately (the vendor released fixes for 18 flaws, including 5 critical ones); per the KEV required action, apply mitigations per Veeam's instructions or discontinue use if mitigations are unavailable. Until patched, restrict network access to the backup server from untrusted networks and remove unnecessary internet exposure. Given confirmed ransomware exploitation, also hunt for signs of compromise on backup servers and review backup job integrity and stored credentials. | 9.8 | 90% | KEV ransomware PoC |
| mass≈ hundreds of thousands of on-prem backup server deployments plausibly affected (tens of thousands internet-exposed) |
Full article706 words · extracted from securityaffairs.com · click to collapse
Pierluigi Paganini
February 23, 2026
A Russian-speaking cybercriminal used commercial generative AI tools to hack over 600 FortiGate devices across 55 countries.
Amazon Threat Intelligence reports that a Russian-speaking, financially motivated threat actor used commercial generative AI services to compromise more than 600 FortiGate devices in 55 countries. The activity, observed between January 11 and February 18, 2026, highlights how cybercriminals are increasingly leveraging AI tools to scale and automate attacks against exposed network infrastructure worldwide.
The attacker did not exploit any FortiGate vulnerabilities. Instead, the threat actor abused exposed management ports and weak single-factor credentials.
“Amazon Threat Intelligence observed a Russian-speaking financially motivated threat actor leveraging multiple commercial generative AI services to compromise over 600 FortiGate devices across more than 55 countries from January 11 to February 18, 2026.” reads the report published by Amazon. “No exploitation of FortiGate vulnerabilities was observed—instead, this campaign succeeded by exploiting exposed management ports and weak credentials with single-factor authentication, fundamental security gaps that AI helped an unsophisticated actor exploit at scale.”
Researchers found the actor used multiple commercial GenAI tools to automate and scale familiar attack techniques, despite limited skills.
During routine monitoring, Amazon experts uncovered infrastructure hosting the attacker’s tools, along with AI-generated attack plans, victim configs, and custom code, offering rare insight into an AI-driven workflow. The actor scanned the Internet for exposed FortiGate management ports, abused weak credentials, and stole full configurations containing VPN, admin, and network data.
“Following VPN access to victim networks, the threat actor deploys a custom reconnaissance tool, with different versions written in both Go and Python. Analysis of the source code reveals clear indicators of AI-assisted development: redundant comments that merely restate function names, simplistic architecture with disproportionate investment in formatting over functionality, naive JSON parsing via string matching rather than proper deserialization, and compatibility shims for language built-ins with empty documentation stubs.” continues the report. “While functional for the threat actor’s specific use case, the tooling lacks robustness and fails under edge cases—characteristics typical of AI-generated code used without significant refinement.”
AI-assisted scripts parsed and decrypted the loot, enabling VPN access, Active Directory compromise, credential dumping, lateral movement, and attempts to target Veeam backups. This last step is a classic tactic observed in ransomware attacks
Custom reconnaissance tools, seemingly AI-generated, automated network mapping and vulnerability scanning but lacked depth, often failing against patched or hardened systems. The actor relied on multiple commercial LLMs for planning and code generation, creating a large toolkit that mimicked a full team’s output. Still, when exploits failed or defenses were strong, they moved on, showing AI amplified scale and efficiency, not true technical sophistication.
Once inside, the attacker used common open-source tools to escalate access. They compromised Active Directory, extracting NTLM hashes and, in some cases, entire credential databases—sometimes helped by weak or reused admin passwords. After gaining domain control, they moved laterally using pass-the-hash and NTLM relay attacks, and targeted Veeam backup servers to steal credentials and weaken recovery options. However, when systems were patched or hardened, their more advanced exploitation attempts largely failed.
“The threat actor’s operational notes reference multiple CVEs across various targets (CVE-2019-7192, CVE-2023-27532, and CVE-2024-40711, among others). However, a critical finding from this analysis is that the threat actor largely failed when attempting to exploit anything beyond the most straightforward, automated attack paths.”
Amazon Threat Intelligence experts believe the attacker is financially motivated, Russian-speaking individual or small group with low-to-medium skills boosted heavily by AI. Their post-exploitation skills are shallow, often failing against hardened targets and moving on. Poor operational security exposed detailed plans, credentials, and victim data.
Amazon Threat Intelligence investigated and disrupted the campaign, sharing actionable indicators of compromise with partners and working across the industry to expand visibility and coordinate defenses.
“Through these efforts, Amazon helped reduce the threat actor’s operational effectiveness and enabled organizations across multiple countries to take steps to disrupt the efficacy of the campaign.” concludes the report that includes Indicators of compromise (IOCs) along with recommendations.
The case shows how AI lowers the barrier to cybercrime. Experts warn AI-driven attacks will grow in 2026, urging strong patching, credential hygiene, segmentation, and detection.
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(SecurityAffairs – hacking, FortiGate)
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