CISA Urges Software Makers to Eliminate OS Command Injection Flaws
Vulnerabilities mentionedAll →
| CVE | Vulnerability | CVSS | EPSS | Flags | Affected | Exposure | Published |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-20399 | Authenticated Command Injection in Cisco NX-OS Grants Root Privileges CVE-2024-20399 is a command injection flaw (CWE-78) in the CLI of Cisco NX-OS Software, caused by insufficient validation of arguments passed to specific configuration CLI commands. An authenticated attacker who already holds Administrator credentials can trigger it by submitting crafted input as the argument of an affected configuration command, gaining the ability to execute arbitrary commands as root on the device's underlying operating system. Because Administrator access is required, the flaw is effectively a privilege-escalation issue following credential compromise, and it grants no additional privilege on Nexus 3000 Series, Nexus 7000 Series running NX-OS 8.1(1) or later, and Nexus 9000 Series in standalone NX-OS mode, which already allow administrative bash-shell access to the OS. Any organization running affected NX-OS on Cisco Nexus switching is in scope, with the practical risk concentrated in environments where admin credentials may have been stolen. Exploitation has been observed in the wild: the China-linked group 'Velvet Ant' (associated with Salt Typhoon) used it as a zero-day to compromise U.S. ISPs and telecom providers, and CISA added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2024-07-02. Do: Upgrade affected Nexus switches to a fixed NX-OS release per Cisco's security advisory, as required by the CISA KEV listing (apply mitigations per vendor instructions or discontinue use if fixes are unavailable). Restrict and audit Administrator-level CLI access on NX-OS devices, and hunt for suspicious configuration-command activity or unexplained root-level actions, given Velvet Ant/Salt Typhoon targeting of telecom and ISP networks. For Nexus 3000, Nexus 7000 (8.1(1)+), and Nexus 9000 standalone-mode devices the flaw adds no privilege, but patching is still recommended. | 6.7 | 4% | KEV |
| masshundreds of thousands of NX-OS/Nexus devices deployed across enterprise and data-center networks (no authoritative public install count) | |
| CVE-2024-21887 | Command Injection RCE in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure Ivanti Connect Secure (formerly Pulse Connect Secure) and Ivanti Policy Secure appliances contain a command injection flaw (CWE-77) in their web components, triggered when an authenticated administrator sends crafted requests to the appliance. The bug can be chained with the separate authentication bypass CVE-2023-46805, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to achieve the same result. Successful exploitation lets an attacker execute arbitrary commands and code on the appliance, providing a foothold into the networks behind the VPN or network access control gateway. Any organization running these appliances, typically enterprises and government agencies often deployed directly on the internet perimeter, is affected. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: the flaw was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2024-01-10 with known ransomware use and EPSS assigns a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days, although no public proof-of-concept is available. Do: Apply Ivanti's mitigations or patched builds immediately per vendor instructions, addressing the chained authentication bypass CVE-2023-46805 at the same time, and discontinue or restrict use of any appliance for which mitigations are unavailable, especially if it is internet-facing. Because exploitation with ransomware use is known, assume compromise is possible: review appliance web logs for suspicious requests and run Ivanti's integrity-checking guidance to verify appliance images before and after remediation. Where feasible, restrict direct internet exposure of the appliance web interface and monitor for further vendor advisories. | 9.1 | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC |
| largetens of thousands of appliances (roughly 20,000-30,000 internet-exposed ICS gateways at disclosure; total deployed base likely higher) | |
| CVE-2024-3400 | Unauthenticated Root Command Injection in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS GlobalProtect Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS contains a command injection flaw (CWE-77, with improper input validation per CWE-20) in its GlobalProtect feature, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary operating-system commands with root privileges on the affected firewall. The flaw is triggered through the GlobalProtect interface, which in most deployments is reachable from untrusted networks, so no valid user credentials or prior access are required. Successful exploitation yields full root control of the firewall, the most powerful position in a network perimeter, enabling traffic interception, configuration tampering, and use as a foothold for further compromise. All PAN-OS firewalls running affected releases with the GlobalProtect feature are exposed; CISA added the issue to the KEV catalog on 2024-04-12 with ransomware use noted, and EPSS puts the 30-day exploitation probability at 100% (100th percentile). No public proof-of-concept is recorded in the source data, but confirmed in-the-wild exploitation makes patching urgent. Do: Apply the PAN-OS patches released in Palo Alto Networks' bulletin according to its published patch schedule, prioritizing internet-facing firewalls. Until patched, enable the vendor's Threat Prevention signatures as required by CISA KEV, restrict exposure of the GlobalProtect interface to trusted sources where possible, and review logs and device configuration for signs of compromise given confirmed exploitation with known ransomware use. | 10.0 | 100% | KEV ransomware PoC ×2 |
| large≈10,000–100,000 internet-exposed PAN-OS firewalls with GlobalProtect enabled |
Full article642 words · extracted from infosecurity-magazine.com · click to collapse
The US government has urged software manufacturers to work towards the elimination of operating system (OS) command injection vulnerabilities.
The alert from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and FBI was issued in response to several high-profile threat actor campaigns in 2024 that exploited OS command injection defects in network edge devices to compromise users.
These vulnerabilities allowed unauthenticated malicious actors to remotely execute code on network edge devices:
- Chinese state hackers exploited a vulnerability, CVE-2024-20399, to compromise Cisco Nexus switches
- A critical zero day vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks’ PAN-OS software, CVE-2024-3400, that is being exploited in the wild
- The zero day vulnerability, CVE-2024-21887, in Ivanti products that was exploited by multiple threat actors globally
The agencies said OS command injection vulnerabilities are “entirely preventable,” arising because of software manufacturers failing to properly validate and sanitize user input when constructing commands to execute on the underlying OS.
“Designing and developing software that trusts user input without proper validation or sanitization can allow threat actors to execute malicious commands, putting customers at risk,” the alert stated.
Building a Roadmap for Elimination
The CISA and FBI have urged technology manufacturers to analyze past instances of OS command injection vulnerabilities and develop a plan to eliminate them in the future.
They emphasized that security should be built in from the design phase of software and continue through development, release and updates. This class of vulnerabilities are prevented by clearly separating user input from the contents of a command, the agencies noted.
Actions to focus on include:
- Use built-in library functions that separate commands from their arguments instead of constructing raw strings that are fed into a general-purpose system command
- Use input parameterization to keep data separate from commands; validate and sanitize all user-supplied input
- Limit the parts of commands constructed by user input to only what is necessary
Adopting Security by Design Principles
The new advisory is part of the US government’s focus on promoting software security by design, putting a greater cybersecurity burden on manufacturers. This ambition was set out in the US National Cybersecurity Strategy, published in March 2023.
CISA launched its Secure by Design initiative in line with the strategy, and over 150 manufacturers have signed the Secure by Design pledge, committing them to publicly provide updates on their progress on fulfilling the pledge goals. These include enhancing transparency around the disclosure of product vulnerabilities and reducing entire classes of vulnerabilities.
Speaking to Infosecurity, Jack Cable, Senior Technical Advisor at CISA, said the Secure by Design initiative aims to shift the burden of cybersecurity from those least capable, the end users, to those most able to bear it.
“The focus of our Secure by Design initiative is the technology manufacturers who make the products that underpin pretty much all the digital systems we use and our critical infrastructure. We're incredibly reliant on these systems but what we've seen time and again is that there are relatively basic preventable classes of vulnerabilities in these products that lead to harm,” he explained.
Cable added: “The goal of our Secure by Design initiative is to work with technology manufacturers to help them build products that are secure from the start and are resilient to these common classes of vulnerabilities.”
Before software manufacturers look to develop a roadmap for eventual vulnerability elimination Cable advised them to first undertake an assessment to understand what the most pressing and addressable classes of vulnerabilities are in their products.
Only then can the elimination of preventable classes of vulnerabilities, such as memory safety and OS command injection flaws, be achieved.
“Think in a prioritised manner how you’re going to reduce this class of vulnerability across your product,” he commented.
In February 2024, the White House called on the tech industry to adopt memory safe programming languages, eliminating the majority memory safety vulnerabilities.
Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/cisa-software-eliminate-command/