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Attackers shadow Indian government domains to promote illegal gambling sites

Original title: Hackers Abuse Indian Government Domains to Push Illegal Gambling Websites Through Google Search

GBHackersby Mayura Kathir ()3 min read2 · 1 read
Part of a story covered by 2 sourcesInfoblox finds gambling SEO abuse of government and school DNSMerged summary & timeline
AI summary · x-ai/grok-4.7Summaries by Vani AI

Infoblox says unauthorized NS delegations on maharashtra.gov.in and a separate Hidden Hawk operation abused school and government domains for SEO.

Infoblox says attackers changed DNS on Indian government and education domains so malicious subdomains served illegal gambling pages while the main sites stayed up. On maharashtra.gov.in, unauthorized NS records delegated subzones including gam, games, search, live, and dpboss to ClouDNS; a similar delegation hit online.esic.gov.in. A separate operation, Hidden Hawk, used more than 850 entry points across eight domains in Bangladesh, India, and Mexico. Maharashtra records dated from at least August 2025 and were gone by mid-October 2026; how access was gained is unknown.

Unconfirmed: Initial access is unconfirmed; stolen credentials, insiders, or a compromised DNS provider are only possibilities.

Key facts
  • A wildcard under gam.maharashtra.gov.in let arbitrary subordinate names resolve.
  • Content moved from DigitalOcean to Amazon CloudFront and BunnyCDN.
  • Hidden Hawk mostly used CNAMEs to Cloudflare Pages for over 30 gambling brands.
  • The Kerala hostname suneethi.sjd.kerala.gov.in was remediated in July 2026.
  • Researchers did not attribute the Maharashtra delegations to Hidden Hawk.
Security assessment · AI, from the article

Impact: Government and school domains used to host gambling SEO pages

What to do
  1. 1.Audit zones for unexpected CNAMEs, external NS delegations, wildcards, and new hostnames.
  2. 2.Remove unauthorized records, review account activity, and rotate potentially compromised credentials.
  3. 3.Enforce multifactor authentication and block malicious hostnames rather than whole legitimate domains.
Analyze this story with Vani AIImpact, who is affected and what defenders should do, in a new chat

Indicators of compromise

auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll
TypeIndicatorContext
domaind9d9t8dndf89z.cloudfront.netand associated infrastructure instead. IOCs Indicator Notes d9d9t8dndf89z[.]cloudfront[.]net Actor-controlled content delivery 168[.]144[.]156[.]92
domainfree-bonus-no-deposit-betting-sites.dpboss.maharashtra.gov.inres as minimums. Screenshot of gambling content accessed at free-bonus-no-deposit-betting-sites[.]dpboss[.]maharashtra[.]gov[.]in (Source : Infoblox). Most malicious hostnames used
domaingames-maharashtra-gov-in.b-cdn.netch-maharashtra-gov-in[.]b-cdn[.]net BunnyCDN-hosted content games-maharashtra-gov-in[.]b-cdn[.]net BunnyCDN-hosted content Note: IP addresses and domains
domaingam.maharashtra.gov.inout repeatedly changing the parent zone. A wildcard beneath gam.maharashtra.gov.in also allowed arbitrary subordinate names to resolve, suppor
domainonline.esic.gov.inervers. Researchers observed a similar delegation involving online.esic.gov.in. How Domain Shadowing Supports the Operation (Source : Info
domainsearch-maharashtra-gov-in.b-cdn.net168[.]144[.]156[.]92 Earlier A record; observed as inactive search-maharashtra-gov-in[.]b-cdn[.]net BunnyCDN-hosted content games-maharashtra-gov-in[.]b-cd
domainsuneethi.sjd.kerala.gov.inngladeshi school domains, a Mexican educational domain, and suneethi.sjd.kerala.gov.in. The Kerala case was observed as remediated in July 2026. D
ipv4168.144.156.92ndf89z[.]cloudfront[.]net Actor-controlled content delivery 168[.]144[.]156[.]92 Earlier A record; observed as inactive search-maharas

From the original article

3 min read at gbhackers.com

Hackers have abused Indian government and educational domains to promote illegal gambling websites through Google Search, using unauthorized DNS changes to establish malicious subdomains while leaving legitimate websites operational. Another delegated government subzones to third-party nameservers, enabling broader control over subordinate DNS records.

GBHackers

By Mayura Kathir · gbhackers.com

Read the full article at GBHackers

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.