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CVEVulnerabilityCVSSEPSSFlagsAffectedExposurePublished
CVE-2021-31207
Security feature bypass in Microsoft Exchange Server (ProxyShell) enables webshell RCE

CVE-2021-31207 is a security feature bypass in Microsoft Exchange Server, classified as an unrestricted file-write issue (CWE-434) that lets an attacker bypass intended restrictions and write files of their choosing to the server. It is the final bug in the ProxyShell chain: chained with the autodiscover SSRF and PowerShell backend elevation flaws, it allows an unauthenticated attacker to reach the Exchange PowerShell API, write arbitrary files such as an ASPX webshell, and execute code with SYSTEM privileges. A successful attacker gains full control of the on-premises Exchange server, including mailbox access, stolen credentials, and a foothold for lateral movement; the bug has been used to deploy ransomware and keyloggers. On-premises deployments of Microsoft Exchange Server (2013, 2016, and 2019 per vendor advisories) are affected, while Exchange Online/cloud mailboxes are not. Exploitation is essentially certain and ongoing: the flaw is in CISA's KEV (added 2021-11-03) with known ransomware use, public ProxyShell PoC/exploit code is available, and EPSS puts the 30-day exploitation probability at 99.8%.

Do: Apply Microsoft's July 2021 security updates for Exchange Server 2013, 2016, and 2019 (or any later security/cumulative update) per vendor instructions, and restrict untrusted access to Exchange's autodiscover and PowerShell endpoints. Hunt for ASPX webshells under the Exchange FrontEnd directories and review IIS logs for autodiscover.json requests chaining PowerShell, since many servers were compromised before patching. Given known ransomware use and KEV listing, treat any server that was unpatched or internet-exposed during the exploitation window as potentially compromised.

6.6100% KEV ransomware PoC
  • microsoft Exchange Server On-premises Microsoft Exchange Server 2013, 2016, and 2019 (per vendor advisory; CISA lists 'Microsoft Exchange Server' generically)
massHundreds of thousands of on-premises Exchange servers (public scans around the July 2021 ProxyShell disclosure showed roughly 400,000-600,000 internet-exposed…
CVE-2021-34473
+1 in the same advisory: …34523
SSRF (CWE-918) in Microsoft Exchange Server Enabling RCE (ProxyShell)

Microsoft Exchange Server contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF, CWE-918) in the Autodiscover service that unauthenticated remote attackers can reach over HTTP. This flaw is the first stage of the widely documented 'ProxyShell' chain, in which the SSRF is combined with privilege escalation and an arbitrary file write in the Exchange PowerShell backend to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution on the server. An attacker who successfully exploits it gains the ability to run code on the Exchange server, and ransomware operators (e.g., Cuba ransomware) leveraged this chain to deploy payloads. Organizations running on-premises Microsoft Exchange Server (2013, 2016, and 2019 per the vendor's advisories) are affected; hosted Exchange Online is a separately managed cloud service. Exploitation is confirmed in the wild: CISA added the flaw to the KEV catalog on 2021-11-03 with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns it a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days (100th percentile).

Do: Apply Microsoft's July 2021 (or later) Exchange Server security updates, which include the ProxyShell fixes, to all on-premises servers. If patching is delayed, restrict internet access to the Autodiscover/EWS frontend endpoints and consider the URL Rewrite mitigation Microsoft published for ProxyShell. Given the KEV listing and known ransomware use, treat internet-facing, unpatched Exchange servers as potentially compromised and hunt for webshells, unusual Exchange processes, and suspicious account or mailbox activity.

9.1
group max
100% KEV ransomware PoC
  • Microsoft Exchange Server On-premises Exchange Server deployments not yet patched with Microsoft's July 2021 (or later) security updates; the source data does not enumerate specific vers
masshundreds of thousands of on-prem Exchange servers; public internet scans at the time of disclosure showed roughly 400,000+ internet-exposed Exchange instances,…
CVE-2022-41040
+1 in the same advisory: …41082
Server-Side Request Forgery in Microsoft Exchange Server (ProxyNotShell)

CVE-2022-41040 is a server-side request forgery (SSRF, CWE-918) vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange Server, publicly tracked under the name "ProxyNotShell" together with CVE-2022-41082. It is triggered when an attacker sends crafted HTTP requests to exposed Exchange web endpoints (such as Autodiscover), causing the server to issue attacker-influenced requests to itself. On its own the SSRF coerces authenticated server-side requests, but when chained with the CVE-2022-41082 remote code execution flaw it gives the attacker code execution on the Exchange server, typically followed by web shells, data access, and — in observed campaigns — ransomware deployment. Organizations running on-premises Microsoft Exchange Server are affected; the source data lists only Microsoft Exchange Server and does not specify affected version ranges, and hosted Exchange Online is a separate product not listed here. The vulnerability is being actively exploited in the wild: it was added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2022-09-30 with known ransomware use, and EPSS assigns it a 100% probability of exploitation within 30 days; no public PoC is listed.

Do: Apply Microsoft's Exchange Server security updates per vendor instructions immediately, as required by the CISA KEV catalog. As interim mitigation, restrict or block untrusted internet access to Exchange web endpoints (e.g., Autodiscover, OWA, ECP), and review IIS logs for suspicious crafted requests indicating SSRF or the chained CVE-2022-41082 exploitation. Given documented ransomware use, prioritize any internet-facing Exchange server and hunt for web shells and post-exploitation activity.

8.8
group max
100% KEV ransomware PoC
  • Microsoft Exchange Server
mass≈250,000+ internet-exposed Exchange servers (public scans of exposed OWA/ECP/Exchange endpoints)
Full article681 words · extracted from thehackernews.com · click to collapse

The Hacker NewsOct 04, 2022

Nicknamed ProxyNotShell, a new exploit used in the wild takes advantage of the recently published Microsoft Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability CVE-2022-41040 and a second vulnerability, CVE-2022-41082 that allows Remote Code Execution (RCE) when PowerShell is available to unidentified attackers.

Based on ProxyShell, this new zero-day abuse risk leverage a chained attack similar to the one used in the 2021 ProxyShell attack that exploited the combination of multiple vulnerabilities - CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-34473, and CVE-2021-31207 – to permit a remote actor to execute arbitrary code.

Despite the potential severity of attacks using them, ProxyShell vulnerabilities are still on CISA’s list of top 2021 routinely exploited vulnerabilities.

Meet ProxyNotShell

Recorded on September 19, 2022, CVE-2022-41082 is an attack vector targeting Microsoft’s Exchange Servers, enabling attacks of low complexity with low privileges required. Impacted services, if vulnerable, enable an authenticated attacker to compromise the underlying exchange server by leveraging existing exchange PowerShell, which could result in a full compromise.

With the help of CVE-2022-41040, another Microsoft vulnerability also recorded on September 19, 2022, an attacker can remotely trigger CVE-2022-41082 to remotely execute commands.

Though a user needs to have the privilege to access CVE-2022-41040, which should curtail the vulnerability accessibility to attackers, the required level of privilege is low.

At the time of writing, Microsoft has not yet issued a patch but recommends that users add a blocking rule as a mitigation measure.

Both vulnerabilities were uncovered during an active attack against GTSC, a Vietnamese organization called GTSC, granting attackers access to some of their clients. Though neither vulnerability on its own is particularly dangerous, exploits chaining them together could potentially lead to catastrophic breaches.

The chained vulnerabilities could grant an outsider attacker the ability to read emails directly off an organization‘s server the ability to breach the organization with CVE-2022-41040 Remote Code Execution and implant malware on the organization’s Exchange Server with CVE-2022-41082.

Though it appears that attackers would need some level of authentication to activate the chained vulnerabilities exploit, the exact level of authentication required – rated “Low” by Microsoft – is not yet clarified. Yet, this required low authentication level should effectively prevent a massive, automated attack targeting every Exchange server around the globe. This hopefully will prevent a replay of the 2021 ProxyShell debacle.

Yet, finding a single valid email address/password combination on a given Exchange server should not be overly difficult, and, as this attack bypasses MFA or FIDO token validation to log into Outlook Web Access, a single compromised email address/password combination is all that is needed.

Mitigating ProxyNotShell Exposure

At the time of writing, Microsoft has not yet issued a patch but recommends that users add a blocking rule as a mitigation measure of unknown efficacy.

Blocking incoming traffic to Exchange Servers holding critical asserts is also an option, though only practicable if such a measure does not impact vital operations and should ideally be perceived as a temporary measure pending Microsoft’s issuance of a verified patch.

Assessing ProxyNotShell Exposure

As the current mitigation options are either of unverified efficacy or potentially damaging to the smooth running of operations, evaluating the degree of exposure to ProxyNotShell might prevent taking potentially disruptive unnecessary preventative measures, or indicate which assets to preemptively migrate to unexposed servers.

Cymulate Research Lab has developed a custom-made assessment for ProxyNotShell that enable organizations to estimate exactly their degree of exposure to ProxyNotShell.

A ProxyNotShell attack vector has been added to the advanced scenarios templates, and running it on your environment yields the necessary information to validate exposure – or lack thereof - to ProxyNotShell.

Until verified patches are available from Microsoft, assessing exposure to ProxyNotShell to evaluate exactly which servers are potential targets is the most cost-efficient way to evaluate exactly which assets are exposed and devise targeted preemptive measures with maximum impact.

Note: This article is contributed by Cymulate Research Labs.

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Text extracted automatically; images, tables and formatting may be missing. Original: https://thehackernews.com/2022/10/proxynotshell-new-proxy-hell.html