FVQKD machine-checks finite-key BB84 security in Rocq
Original title: FVQKD: A Formal Verification of Quantum Key Distribution Security in Rocq
The admit-free proof surfaces unstated side conditions, including a missing branch in the published argument.
Researchers introduce FVQKD, a Rocq library for machine-checking quantum key distribution proofs. Its first result is an end-to-end, admit-free proof of composable finite-key security for BB84, rebuilt from smooth entropy, the entropic uncertainty relation, and the Quantum Leftover Hash Lemma. The mechanization finds side conditions the published argument leaves unstated and grounds the bound in a formal semantics of protocol execution. It relies only on the Rocq kernel and standard foundational axioms, using MathComp, MathComp-Analysis, and CoqQ.
Unconfirmed: The claim of being first is stated as the authors' knowledge, not an independent survey.
- Authors say this is the first end-to-end formal verification of a QKD security proof.
- One uncovered side condition reveals a missing proof branch.
- The library is intended for reuse on other QKD variants and quantum cryptography.
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgQuantum key distribution (QKD), whose security is derived from quantum mechanics rather than computational assumptions, is moving into standardization and commercial deployment. Yet its security guarantees rest on technically delicate proofs checked by hand.
By Ruixuan Deng · arxiv.org
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