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Cybercriminals Abandon Domains but Keep the Hosting Networks Behind Malware Campaigns

GBHackersby Mayura Kathir ()5 min read2
AI summary · glm-5.3Summaries by Vani AI

Black Hills monitoring ties four ClickFix malware delivery chains to bulletproof host AS202412 (OMEGATECH LTD), making ASN-level blocking the durable defense.

Five months of monitoring linked four distinct malware delivery chains to bulletproof hosting ASN AS202412, operated by OMEGATECH LTD, which has expanded to announcing 24 /24 prefixes. All chains began with ClickFix fake verification pages that place a malicious command on the clipboard and instruct victims to run it via Windows+R. Downstream stages varied: direct hosting, Amazon S3 bucket staging, domain-based C2, and EtherHiding-style retrieval of C2 addresses from blockchain smart contracts via public RPC. Researchers recommend blocking the ASN and automating prefix tracking with RIPEstat data, since domains rotate constantly or are unnecessary when compromised legitimate sites inject the lure.

Key facts
  • AS202412 (OMEGATECH LTD) served fake verification pages across six /24 networks, now 24 prefixes.
  • ClickFix places malicious commands on the clipboard for victims to execute via Windows+R.
  • Chains used S3 staging, bare-IP PowerShell, msiexec with Unicode switches, and blockchain-based C2 (EtherHiding).
  • Compromised legitimate sites inject the ClickFix lure, defeating URL blocklists.
  • Recommend ASN-level blocking plus automated RIPEstat/BGP prefix reviews.
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From the original article

5 min read at gbhackers.com

Cybercriminals are rapidly rotating lure domains, cloud storage buckets and command-and-control channels, but one infrastructure component is proving far harder to replace: the bulletproof hosting network that delivers the initial fake verification page. Five months of monitoring linked four distinct malware delivery chains to AS202412, operated by OMEGATECH LTD, making the ASN not individual domains […]

GBHackers

By Mayura Kathir · gbhackers.com

Read the full article at GBHackers

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.