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RPMC flaws enable Windows Hello PIN brute force on locked hardware

Original title: Hello Again: Exploiting Replay Protected Monotonic Counters to Brute-Force Windows Hello PINs

arXiv cs.CRby Christian Werling ()1 min read1
AI summary · x-ai/grok-4.7Summaries by Vani AI

A 4-digit PIN fell in 40 hours versus 69 days; a default 6-digit BitLocker PIN worst case fell to 20 days.

Researchers report the first practical analysis of Replay Protected Monotonic Counters on shipping x86 systems that store firmware TPM lockout state. Winbond SPI flash leaked its HMAC key under voltage glitching, and AMD's NV controller did not verify RPMC increments, allowing lockout-counter rollback. On two AMD desktops without RPMC flash, reflashing an old image reset those counters. A recovered PIN also reached device-bound keys and Hello-based enterprise SSO.

Unconfirmed: The paper says AMD platforms without RPMC flash appear to lack NV rollback protection, based on two desktops.

Key facts
  • Windows Hello is described as primary authentication on over one billion Windows 11 devices.
  • Winbond is cited as the leading NOR flash vendor with over 25% market share.
  • The demonstrated setup found a 4-digit PIN in 40 hours instead of 69 days.
  • BitLocker TPM+PIN worst case for a default 6-digit PIN dropped from 19 years to 20 days.
  • Low-cost interposer hardware was used on a physically accessible SPI bus.
Security assessment · AI, from the articlePublic proof of concept

Impact: PIN recovery, device-bound keys, and BitLocker bypass

ProductAffected
Microsoft Windows Hello—
Microsoft BitLocker—
Winbond SPI flash—
AMD NV controller—
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From the original article

1 min read at arxiv.org

Windows Hello is the primary authentication mechanism on over one billion Windows 11 devices, supporting PINs as short as four digits. Such low-entropy PINs are viable only because the TPM's anti-hammering protection mitigates brute-force attacks. Most modern x86 platforms rely on firmware TPMs (fTPMs) that persist their non-volatile (NV) state, including the lockout state, to SPI flash.

arXiv cs.CR

By Christian Werling · arxiv.org

Read the full article at arXiv cs.CR

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.