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Falcon C2 used to hijack browsers at government agencies

Original title: Hackers Use Falcon C2 Framework to Hijack Browsers and Steal Credentials From Government Agencies

GBHackersby Eswar ()3 min read
Part of a story covered by 2 sourcesFalcon browser C2 hit government agencies in five countriesMerged summary & timeline
AI summary · x-ai/grok-4.7Summaries by Vani AI

Unit 42 says the Node.js framework, also tracked as XG, hit agencies in five countries from March to May 2026.

Unit 42 reports that Falcon, a Node.js command-and-control framework also tracked as XG, was used against government entities in one Middle Eastern country and four Southeast Asian countries between March and May 2026. Operators injected JavaScript into compromised webmail and government applications, then used browser extensions to steal credentials, cookies, and communications and to proxy requests through victims' sessions. A fake Adobe Flash Player update delivered Antino, a Rust implant that uses Microsoft Graph and OneDrive. One justice-sector extension remained active for more than three weeks.

Unconfirmed: Unit 42 does not name the five countries or attribute Falcon operators to a known group.

Key facts
  • Targets included foreign affairs, defense, interior, and law enforcement organizations.
  • The admin panel listens on TCP port 8080; the victim listener uses port 443.
  • The Chrome extension, posing as PDF Viewer, requests 40 permissions.
  • Antino persists through a Registry Run key as sdiagnhost.exe and tasks via OneDrive.
  • Shared loaders and Hm_lvt_ identifiers connect Falcon to PeckBirdy.
Security assessment · AI, from the article

Impact: Stolen credentials, cookies, and access to government applications

What to do
  1. 1.Investigate unauthorized developer-mode extensions, injected webmail scripts, and Hm_lvt_ artifacts.
  2. 2.Correlate browser WebSocket activity with foreign OneDrive logins and antino directory writes.
Analyze this story with Vani AIImpact, who is affected and what defenders should do, in a new chat

Indicators of compromise

auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll
TypeIndicatorContext
domainavbliud.comlcon C2 domain fonts.chrorne[.]com — Falcon C2 domain robot.avbliud[.]com — Chrome extension ID mbidcmlcbgbphpoacojjbmfpohcimjji —
domainchrorne.comC2 domain fonts.tarotfree101[.]top — Falcon C2 domain fonts.chrorne[.]com — Falcon C2 domain robot.avbliud[.]com — Chrome extension
domainmicrosoft-flash.com6ade59cab76b50b4128f7 twitter-dm.js Payload delivery domain microsoft-flash[.]com — Payload delivery domain wps-cn[.]com — Antino sample 0c
domaintarotfree101.topry Indicator / SHA-256 Hash Filename Falcon C2 domain fonts.tarotfree101[.]top — Falcon C2 domain fonts.chrorne[.]com — Falcon C2 domain
domainwps-cn.comvery domain microsoft-flash[.]com — Payload delivery domain wps-cn[.]com — Antino sample 0c39264337a1186b2e765e24073399cbdcba11830
sha256065d18fcfeddbd718c054f4b21c3cde5b9291db921d01f343d7ac0d4b41f29ce6351fb8f7806dae0862 content-script.js Chrome extension file 065d18fcfeddbd718c054f4b21c3cde5b9291db921d01f343d7ac0d4b41f29ce icon128.png Chrome extension file 3eab406d841fa22a4b0200c95
sha2560c39264337a1186b2e765e24073399cbdcba118306614eb411e315887af578bd]com — Payload delivery domain wps-cn[.]com — Antino sample 0c39264337a1186b2e765e24073399cbdcba118306614eb411e315887af578bd flashcenter_pp_ax_install_en.exe Note: IP addresses and dom
sha25624d69139cb2d32598f0f4983876f6320485fac134a66ade59cab76b50b4128f77b6e5f8c939f5636a1b2315ce sandbox.js Firefox extension file 24d69139cb2d32598f0f4983876f6320485fac134a66ade59cab76b50b4128f7 twitter-dm.js Payload delivery domain microsoft-flash[.]com
sha256265c2b36060e4b21c25aa86a8bb22d1db5f806117b484774c75c65b5b38222e0480ca132248ed5c7c309c45ac3dbb page.js Chrome extension file 265c2b36060e4b21c25aa86a8bb22d1db5f806117b484774c75c65b5b38222e0 sandbox.html Chrome extension file 66e9098551a1c0c74077d6cf
sha2562ebe36f1322b77264a33fded81cd4b8817f93362945070bf0bb5845dd27c057543abdff385ee8cb6e9 analytics-core.js Firefox extension file 2ebe36f1322b77264a33fded81cd4b8817f93362945070bf0bb5845dd27c0575 background.js Firefox extension file 857429faffe0e0747ce299
sha2562ed834d92bfefc9d07a9f1a48f986974ae2a29669029f8163a1f6e8706388fcdc4c1857b35f2446b2d49fda manifest.json Chrome extension file 2ed834d92bfefc9d07a9f1a48f986974ae2a29669029f8163a1f6e8706388fcd offscreen.html Chrome extension file 356b96c2267c5f2d8c0769
sha25632af8413cbd38ce8beb257288cb8e6aa2f9b781d56d0f5272bffbcdc22d999f48b4ffa74699fa1732da5a00c offscreen.js Chrome extension file 32af8413cbd38ce8beb257288cb8e6aa2f9b781d56d0f5272bffbcdc22d999f4 page.html Chrome extension file e2b6b1becdbcc340121e163b5af
sha256356b96c2267c5f2d8c07693643626e090b6389318b4ffa74699fa1732da5a00c29f8163a1f6e8706388fcd offscreen.html Chrome extension file 356b96c2267c5f2d8c07693643626e090b6389318b4ffa74699fa1732da5a00c offscreen.js Chrome extension file 32af8413cbd38ce8beb25728
sha2563e535d63af8a95221fb517fa1b3e4a0029d3463d8b767443abdff385ee8cb6e9ID mbidcmlcbgbphpoacojjbmfpohcimjji — Chrome extension file 3e535d63af8a95221fb517fa1b3e4a0029d3463d8b767443abdff385ee8cb6e9 analytics-core.js Chrome extension file f8b86238e179d88a997
sha2563e923f11db08413fca8a3a69d33d8896cfd56309e5179e8604d7fb7110428da25ef0b0f2053e139394e61c442d sandbox.js Chrome extension file 3e923f11db08413fca8a3a69d33d8896cfd56309e5179e8604d7fb7110428da2 twitter-dm.js Firefox extension file 3e535d63af8a95221fb517
sha2563eab406d841fa22a4b0200c95c1afab068347f835400d5771e8de60aef732016921d01f343d7ac0d4b41f29ce icon128.png Chrome extension file 3eab406d841fa22a4b0200c95c1afab068347f835400d5771e8de60aef732016 icon16.png Chrome extension file 5711586125909863b91c1b5ff7
sha2565711586125909863b91c1b5ff7cf70ef5d35249d67b11d7a23dc864405cddfe2835400d5771e8de60aef732016 icon16.png Chrome extension file 5711586125909863b91c1b5ff7cf70ef5d35249d67b11d7a23dc864405cddfe2 icon48.png Chrome extension file b6a7be724871ed3e81c986b74d
sha25666e9098551a1c0c74077d6cf55570e5d307a4a5ef0b0f2053e139394e61c442d7b484774c75c65b5b38222e0 sandbox.html Chrome extension file 66e9098551a1c0c74077d6cf55570e5d307a4a5ef0b0f2053e139394e61c442d sandbox.js Chrome extension file 3e923f11db08413fca8a3a69d3
sha256857429faffe0e0747ce299e86eed063ed781b4e403b917ca7e853e89bedf072c5070bf0bb5845dd27c0575 background.js Firefox extension file 857429faffe0e0747ce299e86eed063ed781b4e403b917ca7e853e89bedf072c content-script.js Firefox extension file 065d18fcfeddbd718c
sha25688e8b07bdf294ace0357d35acb7e108c66ba65a2c4ad66351fb8f7806dae0862d634bc1348fdfb0944a3b92 background.js Chrome extension file 88e8b07bdf294ace0357d35acb7e108c66ba65a2c4ad66351fb8f7806dae0862 content-script.js Chrome extension file 065d18fcfeddbd718c0
sha256898656c33effb51e109c548fc213f157f151a870ea64a4601eda74ae75bd3af69f8163a1f6e8706388fcd offscreen.html Firefox extension file 898656c33effb51e109c548fc213f157f151a870ea64a4601eda74ae75bd3af6 offscreen.js Firefox extension file 32af8413cbd38ce8beb2572
sha256b33f2e95943e3ff0a72dea1be9fdea03d986bada4def34f6991b3113ec161ad7d67b11d7a23dc864405cddfe2 icon48.png Firefox extension file b33f2e95943e3ff0a72dea1be9fdea03d986bada4def34f6991b3113ec161ad7 manifest.json Firefox extension file 2ed834d92bfefc9d07a9f1
sha256b3d8ea89b19a87bf2fdd63127086681059f41d67b6e5f8c939f5636a1b2315ceb484774c75c65b5b38222e0 sandbox.html Firefox extension file b3d8ea89b19a87bf2fdd63127086681059f41d67b6e5f8c939f5636a1b2315ce sandbox.js Firefox extension file 24d69139cb2d32598f0f49838
sha256b6a7be724871ed3e81c986b74d62da8911c82a336c4c1857b35f2446b2d49fda9d67b11d7a23dc864405cddfe2 icon48.png Chrome extension file b6a7be724871ed3e81c986b74d62da8911c82a336c4c1857b35f2446b2d49fda manifest.json Chrome extension file 2ed834d92bfefc9d07a9f1a
sha256e2b6b1becdbcc340121e163b5afdfc5437a480ca132248ed5c7c309c45ac3dbb81d56d0f5272bffbcdc22d999f4 page.html Chrome extension file e2b6b1becdbcc340121e163b5afdfc5437a480ca132248ed5c7c309c45ac3dbb page.js Chrome extension file 265c2b36060e4b21c25aa86a8bb22
sha256f8b86238e179d88a9979b6f97750a39dda1d07b54d634bc1348fdfb0944a3b92443abdff385ee8cb6e9 analytics-core.js Chrome extension file f8b86238e179d88a9979b6f97750a39dda1d07b54d634bc1348fdfb0944a3b92 background.js Chrome extension file 88e8b07bdf294ace0357d35

From the original article

3 min read at gbhackers.com

Hackers deployed Falcon, a Node. js command-and-control framework tracked as XG or Xiàng Gē, against government entities in one Middle Eastern country and four Southeast Asian countries between March and May 2026. Unit 42 identified targets spanning foreign affairs, defense, interior, and law enforcement organizations, indicating strategic intelligence collection.

GBHackers

By Eswar · gbhackers.com

Read the full article at GBHackers

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.