Coordinated inverter attacks can overload selected grid corridors
Original title: From Caveman to COBA: Coordinated Optimization-Based Attacks on Grid-Edge Smart Inverters in DER-Rich Power Systems
On a 37-bus Hawaii synthetic grid, COBA overloaded two 69-kV lines near 30% and 55% penetration.
A paper introduces Coordinated Optimization-Based Attack (COBA), which uses network information and location-specific DER setpoints to maximize thermal loading on a chosen transmission corridor. A compromised coordination layer can change active- and reactive-power commands across a distributed fleet. On the Hawaii Synthetic Grid-37 Buses case, COBA overloaded named lines at lower penetration than uniform fleet commands, which mainly stressed other weak lines.
Unconfirmed: Results are from a synthetic grid case, not a confirmed field incident.
- Baselines are all-off, all-on, and maximum reactive absorption or injection.
- Rooftop-PV-like capability is aggregated at 20 selected 69-kV buses.
- Power flow was verified with MATPOWER under single-reference-bus balancing.
- B86 overloaded near 30% penetration and B51 near 55%.
Impact: Thermal overload on a selected transmission corridor
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgAggregation platforms and smart-inverter control channels can allow a compromised coordination layer to alter active- and reactive-power commands across a geographically distributed DER fleet. This paper introduces the Coordinated Optimization-Based Attack (COBA), which uses network information and location-specific DER P/Q setpoints to maximize thermal loading on a selected transmission corridor.
By Emad Abukhousa · arxiv.org
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