A Zero-Knowledge Signature Framework for Efficient Post-Quantum Message Authentication in Cooperative Automated Driving
ZKS-PQC swaps bulky post-quantum V2X signatures for compact zero-knowledge proofs, cutting message size over 95%.
Connected vehicles authenticate high-frequency V2X safety messages, but NIST post-quantum signatures and public keys add too much overhead for cooperative awareness messages. ZKS-PQC replaces that material with a compact zero-knowledge proof while remaining compatible with certificate-based trust and legacy ECDSA. Implemented with liboqs and Bulletproofs, tests on Linux and a commercial on-board unit show message-size reductions above 95% for all evaluated algorithms, with added sender and receiver processing on the order of milliseconds for many of them.
- Replaces large PQC keys and signatures with compact zero-knowledge proofs
- Message size falls by more than 95% for every algorithm tested
- Added processing stays on the order of milliseconds for many algorithms
- Tested on Linux and a commercial on-board unit using liboqs and Bulletproofs
- Keeps certificate-based trust and backward compatibility with ECDSA
- Products
- liboqsBulletproofs
- Organizations
- NISTOpen Quantum Safe
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgConnected and Automated Vehicles (CAV) rely on authenticated Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications to exchange safety-critical information among vehicles and roadside infrastructure.
By Takahito Yoshizawa · arxiv.org
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