Liveness attacks on GossipSub and DOG gossip protocols
Original title: Attacking P2P Networks: Liveness Attacks on the GossipSub and DOG Gossip Protocols
Research shows adversaries can separate nodes from honest mesh using few nodes in P2P networks.
The paper studies robustness of gossip protocols against adversaries aiming to violate liveness in P2P networks like those used in Ethereum. For GossipSub, constant number of nodes with latency advantage can separate a constant fraction of nodes. For DOG protocol, a single node can disable all forwarding routes.
- Adversary uses geographically distributed nodes
- Separation maintained under churn
- DOG attack uses one physical node
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgPeer-to-peer (P2P) networks form the communication layer of large decentralized systems such as Ethereum, and the correctness of higher-level protocols depends on the gossip layer delivering messages to honest nodes.
By Jiaheng Li · arxiv.org
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