Aspire encrypted database aims to block leakage-abuse with metadata-only leakage
Original title: Aspire: Practical Batch Queries on Dynamic Encrypted Database with Full Leakage Suppression
Authors report under 1.38 ms amortized latency per keyword on a 2^22-pair database, about 2.95 KB each.
An arXiv paper presents Aspire, an encrypted database meant to stop leakage-abuse attacks that depend on semantic leakage. It defines restricted zero-leakage as allowing only non-semantic metadata such as database size and query timing, and claims this is enough to block those attacks. Aspire uses probabilistic batch codes and minimal perfect hashing for batch keyword queries and dynamic updates. Reported tests put amortized latency under 1.38 ms, or 7.53 s for 5461 queries, and about 2.95 KB, or 16.1 MB total.
Unconfirmed: Practicality and attack resistance are the authors' claims from their experiments and definitions.
- Ideal zero-leakage would hide everything beyond public parameters.
- Restricted zero-leakage still allows size and query-timing metadata.
- Test database held 2^22 key-value pairs.
- A 5461-query batch took 7.53 seconds and 16.1 MB in the reported run.
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgLeakage-abuse attacks against encrypted database systems exploit semantic leakage and pose a severe threat to the confidentiality of plaintext data and queries. To address this problem, we propose a zero-leakage encrypted database that rules out leakage-abuse attacks, which fundamentally rely on semantic leakage. We first distinguish between two kinds of zero-leakage security.
By Hao Nie · arxiv.org
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