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AI-scripted campaign hit government Linux servers, Unit 42 says

Original title: Hackers Used AI-Generated Scripts to Break Into Government Linux Servers and Hunt for Secrets

GBHackersby Mayura Kathir ()3 min read1 · 1 read
AI summary · x-ai/grok-4.7Summaries by Vani AI

Cluster CL-UNK-1211 used web shells, a sudo-password hook, and SysGoRAT while hunting databases and mailboxes.

Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 says operators used apparently AI-generated PHP and shell scripts against government Linux infrastructure between October 2025 and April 2026. The cluster, tracked as CL-UNK-1211, planted web shells, stole credentials, deployed the SysGoRAT remote access Trojan, and tried to collect databases and mail. Attribution is unresolved, and a broken mailbox-archive script does not prove those messages were stolen.

Unconfirmed: Unit 42 has not determined whether CL-UNK-1211 is state-sponsored or financially motivated, and mailbox theft is not confirmed.

Key facts
  • Activity ran from October 2025 through April 2026.
  • SysGoRAT is a custom Go RAT for Linux and Windows.
  • A modified .bashrc alias captured sudo passwords into Solarwinds.StatusLog.txt.
  • Default WebSocket C2 was 104.194.158[.]65:443.
  • zip_mails.sh had syntax errors, so mailbox theft is not shown.
Security assessment · AI, from the article

Impact: Credential theft and attempts to take databases and mail

What to do
  1. 1.Restrict outbound connections and watch utilities that spawn interactive shells.
  2. 2.Investigate unauthorized PHP auto_prepend_file changes under /etc/php/ and /opt/plesk/php/.
  3. 3.Look for history-clearing and the published defanged IP and domain indicators.
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Indicators of compromise

auto-extracted · verify before use · export allAll
TypeIndicatorContext
domainberaskencur.siteain solidmonpe[.]com Domain wibu-bau-bawang[.]online Domain beraskencur[.]site Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged
domainmagento.inkP address 138.68.244[.]146 IP address 185.21.136[.]6 Domain magento[.]ink Domain solidmonpe[.]com Domain wibu-bau-bawang[.]online D
domainsolidmonpe.com.]146 IP address 185.21.136[.]6 Domain magento[.]ink Domain solidmonpe[.]com Domain wibu-bau-bawang[.]online Domain beraskencur[.]site
domainwibu-bau-bawang.online136[.]6 Domain magento[.]ink Domain solidmonpe[.]com Domain wibu-bau-bawang[.]online Domain beraskencur[.]site Note: IP addresses and domains
ipv4104.194.158.65. Its WebSocket command-and-control connection defaulted to 104.194.158[.]65:443 , although operators could override the address. Capa
ipv4138.68.244.146ress 45.88.188[.]140 IP address 198.23.185[.]234 IP address 138.68.244[.]146 IP address 185.21.136[.]6 Domain magento[.]ink Domain sol
ipv4185.21.136.6ess 198.23.185[.]234 IP address 138.68.244[.]146 IP address 185.21.136[.]6 Domain magento[.]ink Domain solidmonpe[.]com Domain wibu-
ipv4198.23.185.234romise Type Indicator IP address 45.88.188[.]140 IP address 198.23.185[.]234 IP address 138.68.244[.]146 IP address 185.21.136[.]6 Dom
ipv445.88.188.140tabases. Indicators of Compromise Type Indicator IP address 45.88.188[.]140 IP address 198.23.185[.]234 IP address 138.68.244[.]146 I

From the original article

3 min read at gbhackers.com

Hackers used apparently AI-generated scripts to compromise government Linux infrastructure, harvest credentials and pursue sensitive databases and official mailboxes in a campaign tracked as CL-UNK-1211. The investigation, published October 15, linked the operation to government entities and state-affiliated infrastructure.

GBHackers

By Mayura Kathir · gbhackers.com

Read the full article at GBHackers

A short excerpt; the article and its images belong to the publisher. Summary, key facts and assessment above are AI-written from the article and can be wrong.