Protocol Integration of Physical Layer Deception into EAP-TEAP Wi-Fi Authentication
Researchers integrate physical-layer deception into EAP-TEAP Wi-Fi authentication in hostap 2.12.
The paper adds a batched Physical Layer Deception re-verification step to Enterprise Wi-Fi's TEAP/RADIUS/IEEE 802.11 chain, implemented end to end in open-source hostap 2.12. Each attempt uses three rounds with at least one active and no dedicated activation flag. Across 1,593 attempts in four campaigns, the prototype rejected a naive credential-bearing attacker in all 30 tries and measured latency and reliability trade-offs for one to three active rounds.
- PLD re-verification added to EAP-TEAP Wi-Fi authentication
- Implemented across server, access point, and device in hostap 2.12
- Naive credential attacker rejected in all 30 attempts
- 1,593 attempts measured latency and active-round trade-offs
From the original article
1 min read at arxiv.orgCredential-based Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) authentication cannot distinguish a legitimate credential holder from an adversary using compromised credentials. Physical Layer Deception (PLD) complements credential-based authentication by exposing a deceptive primary object over a primary transport while a separate recovery object travels with differentiated reliability over a secondary channel.
By Moustafa Ibrahim · arxiv.org
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